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 ABSTRACT 
  
 Buildings are designed to withstand loading events that are deemed credible hazards and 
to protect the public safety in the event such credible hazards are experienced. Buildings are not 
designed to withstand any event that could ever conceivably occur, and any building can collapse if 
subjected to a sufficiently extreme loading event. Communities adopt building codes to help 
building designers and regulators determine those loading events that should be considered as 
credible hazards in the design process. These building codes are developed by the designers and 
regulatory communities themselves, through a voluntary committee consensus process. Prior to 
September 11, 2001, it was the consensus of these communities that aircraft impact was not a 
sufficiently credible hazard to warrant routine consideration in the design of buildings and, 
therefore, the building codes did not require that such events be considered in building design. 
Nevertheless, the design of world trade center towers (WTC) did include at least some 
consideration of the probable response of the buildings to an aircraft impact, albeit a somewhat 
smaller and slower moving aircraft than those actually involved in the September 11 events. 
Building codes do consider fire as a credible hazard and include extensive requirements to control 
the spread of fire throughout buildings, to delay the onset of fire-induced structural collapse, and to 
facilitate the safe egress of building occupants in a fire event. 
 The world trade center towers, which attacked by Boeing 767-E 200 on September 11, 
2001. were the first structure out side of the military and the nuclear industries whose design 
considering the impact of a jet air liner, the Boeing707, and have been designed to ACI and ASIC 
codes, which include the general safety requirement therefore stand for a long time before collapsed 
to give a chance for occupant to evacuate from towers with out injuring, and there was only 2,830 
from 58,000 occupants died including 403 fire fighter & the two aircraft passengers with their crew, 
when we are calculating the percentage of death to the life, we say this number is so small in 
comparison with this large event and huge buildings occupants.     
 The study of this collapse required; information reported from field observations at the 
WTC site and the results from tested samples of the collapsed structures. Hundreds of hours of 
video and thousands of still photographs were viewed. Conducted interviews with witnesses and 
persons involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of each of the affected buildings 
reviewed & construction documents, and conducted preliminary analyses of the damage to the 
WTC towers. And I found that the structural damage sustained by each of the two buildings as a 
result of the attacks was massive. The fact that the structures were able to sustain this level of 
damage and remain standing for an extended period of time is remarkable and is the reason that 
most building occupants were able to evacuate safely. Events of this type, resulting in such 
substantial damage, are generally not considered in building design, and the ability of these 
structures to successfully withstand such damage is noteworthy. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ﻪـﺨﻼﺼ
ﻴﺘﻡ ﺘﺼﻤﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺎﻨﻲ ﻟﺘﺤﻤل ﺍﻷﺤﻤﺎل ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻔﺘﺭﺽ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﺴﻴﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﻟﻬﺎﺯ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﻤـﻥ ﺨـﻼل 
ﻭﻤﻥ ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻴﺼﻤﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨـﻲ ﻟﺘﺤﻤـل . ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺒﻨﺎﺀ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻴﺔ ﺃﻤﻥ ﻭﺴﻼﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ 
ﻭﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻴﻜﻭﻥ ﺃﻱ ﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﻋﺎﺩﻱ ﻋﺭﻀﻪ ﻟﻼﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺘﻌﺭﻀﻪ . ل ﻏﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻭﻗﻌﺔ ﺇﻻ ﻓﻲ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻷﺤﻤﺎ
 ﻭ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﻬﺩﻑ ﺘﺴﻬﻴل ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺘﺼﻤﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺎﻨﻲ ﺕﻗﺎﻤﺕ ﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻬﻨﺩﺴﻴﺔ ﺒﻭﻀﻊ ﻤﺩﻭﻨﺎ . ﻟﺤﻤل ﻏﻴﺭ ﻋﺎﺩﻱ 
ﻭﻴﺘﻡ . ﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺭﺍﺩ ﺘﺸﻴﻴﺩﻩ ﻟﻨﻭﻋﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻤﺒ " ﻤﻥ ﺨﻼل ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺩ ﻨﻭﻉ ﻭﻗﻴﻡ ﺍﻷﺤﻤﺎل ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺎﺀﺍﺕ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﺘﺒﻌﺎ 
ﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻭﻨﺎﺕ ﻋﻥ ﻁﺭﻴﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﻤﻤﻴﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻤﻴﺔ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﻤﻥ ﺨﻼل ﻋﻤل ﺍﻟﻠﺠﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻁﻭﻋﻴﺔ ﻓـﻲ 
  . ﻤﺠﺎل ﺍﻟﺒﺤﻭﺙ
. ﻗﺒل ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﻱ ﻋﺸﺭ ﻤﻥ ﺴﺒﺘﻤﺒﺭ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻴﻭﺠﺩ ﺇﺠﻤﺎﻉ ﺃﻥ ﺤﻤل ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺌﺭﺍﺕ ﻏﻴﺭ ﻤﻌﺘﻤﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺘـﺼﻤﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺒـﺎﻨﻲ 
 ﻤﺒﻨﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﻤـﻊ ﻤﻼﺤﻅـﺔ ﺃﻥ ﺴـﺭﻋﺔ ﻭﻜﺘﻠـﻪ ﻭﻤﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻓﺈﻨﻪ ﺘﻡ ﺍﻋﺘﻤﺎﺩ ﺤﻤل ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺌﺭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺼﻤﻴﻡ 
  . ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺌﺭﺓ ﺃﻗل ﻤﻥ ﺘﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﻱ ﻋﺸﺭ ﻤﻥ ﺴﺒﺘﻤﺒﺭ
ﻤﺎ ﻴﺘﻡ ﺍﻋﺘﻤﺎﺩ ﺘﺼﻤﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻴﻕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﺎﻨﻲ ﺒﺼﻭﺭﻩ ﺍﻋﺘﻴﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻜﻡ ﻓـﻲ ﺍﻨﺘـﺸﺎﺭ " ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ
  .ﻲ ﺤﺘﻰ ﻴﺘﻤﻜﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺇﺠﻼﺀ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻤﻴﻥ ﺒﺴﻼﻡﻭﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺒﻐﺭﺽ ﺘﺄﺨﻴﺭ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨ، ﺍﻟﻨﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﺩﺍﺨل ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺄﺓ
 ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺩﻱ ﻋـﺸﺭ  RE-002-767ﺇﻥ ﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﺒﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺘﻤﺕ ﻤﻬﺎﺠﻤﺘﻪ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﻁﺎﺌﺭﺓ ﺒﻭﻴﻨﻕ 
ﻤﻥ ﺴﺒﺘﻤﺒﺭ ﺃﻟﻔﻴﻥ ﻭﻭﺍﺤﺩ ﻴﻌﺘﺒﺭ ﺃﻭل ﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﺨﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺎل ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺭﻱ ﻭ ﺍﻟﻨﻭﻭﻱ ﻴﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﻓـﻲ ﺘـﺼﻤﻴﻤﻪ ﺃﺤﻤـﺎل 
" ﻟﻠﻤﺩﻭﻨﺔ ﺍﻷﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﻴﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻌﺘﺒﺭ ﺃﺴﺎﺴﺎ " ﻨﻪ ﻤﺼﻤﻡ ﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻜﻤﺎ ﺇ  . 707ﻁﺎﺌﺭﺍﺕ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻭﺠﻪ ﺍﻟﺨﺼﻭﺹ ﺒﻭﻴﻨﻕ 
 ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﻀﻤﻥ ﺇﺠﺭﺍﺀﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﻼﻤﺔ ﺒﻬﺩﻑ ﺇﺨﻼﺀ ﺍﻟﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻭﻗﻭﻉ ﺇﻀـﺭﺍﺭ AISA ﻭ  ICAﻟﻠﻤﺩﻭﻨﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺤﺩﻴﺜﺔ 
ﺭﻜـﺎﺏ "  ﻤﺘـﻀﻤﻨﺎ 038,2 ﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ ﺘﻭﻓﻲ 000,85ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻤﻥ ﻤﺠﻤﻭﻉ ، ﻤﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺭﻭﺤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺤﺩﻭﺙ ﺍﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ 
ﻤـﻊ ﺤﺠـﻡ " ﻭﻋﻨﺩ ﺤﺴﺎﺏ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻨﺠﺩﻫﺎ ﻀﺌﻴﻠﺔ ﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨـﺔ .  ﻋﺎﻤل ﺇﻨﻘﺎﺫ 304 ﺇﻟﻲ ﻭﻁﺎﻗﻡ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺌﺭﺓ ﺒﺎﻹﻀﺎﻓﺔ 
  .ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺩﻤﻴﻥ ﻭﻀﺨﺎﻤﺔ ﺍﻻﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ
ﺠﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻭﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻭﻨﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺯﻴﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻴﺩﺍﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺠـﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺒﻌـﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﻜﻭﻤـﺔ ، ﻭﻗﺩ ﺘﻁﻠﺒﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ 
ﻤﻊ ﻤﻌﺎﻴﻨﺔ . ﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻭﻗﻊ ﺒﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﻭﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﻠﺼﺔ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﺒ 
ﻜﻤﺎ ﺃﻨﺔ ﺘﻡ . ﺴﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﻤﻥ ﺸﺭﺍﺌﻁ ﺍﻟﻔﻴﺩﻴﻭ ﻟﻠﺘﺄﻜﺩ ﻤﻥ ﺘﺴﻠﺴل ﺍﻷﺤﺩﺙ ﻭﻨﻭﻋﻴﺔ ﺍﻻﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ ﻭﺒﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺼﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺘﻭﻏﺭﺍﻓﻴﺔ 
ﻤﻊ ﺍﻻﺴـﺘﻔﺎﺩﺓ ﻤـﻥ . ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻌﺎﻨﺔ ﺒﺄﻗﻭﺍل ﺸﻬﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﻴﺎﻥ ﻭﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺃﻗﻭﺍل ﺍﻟﻤﺼﻤﻤﻴﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻨﻔﺫﻴﻥ ﻟﻤﺒﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ 
 ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺠﺯ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﻓﺭﻴﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﻤل ﺍﻟﻤﻜﻠـﻑ ﻤـﻥ ﻗﺒـل ﻭﻜﺎﻟـﺔ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ 0002 PASﻨﺘﺎﺌﺞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴل ﺍﻹﻨﺸﺎﺌﻲ ﺒﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ 
ﻭﻟﻘﺩ ﻭﺠﺩﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻀﺭﺭ ﺍﻹﻨﺸﺎﺌﻲ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﺼﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺒﺭﺠﻴﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺠﺭﺍﺀ ﺍﻟﻬﺠـﻭﻡ  .  )AMEF(ﺍﻟﻁﻭﺍﺭﻱ ﺍﻻﺘﺤﺎﺩﻴﺔ 
ﻟѧﻀﺨﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﻬﺠѧﻮم وهѧﻮ ﻳﻌﺘﺒѧﺮ ﺻѧﻔﺔ ﻣﻤﻴѧﺰة ﻟﻬѧﺬا "  ﻳﺒﻘѧﻲ ﺻѧﻤﻮد اﻟﺒѧﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻟﻮﻗѧﺖ ﻃﻮﻳѧﻞ هѧﻮ اﻟѧﺴﺆال اﻟﻤﺤﻴѧﺮ ﻧѧﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻜﻥ". ﻜﺒﻴﺭ ﻨﺴﺒﻴﺎ 
  . اﻟﻤﺒﻨﻲ
  
  
 
 snoitaiverbbA
 metsyS gnitropeR dna gnisserddA snoitacinummoC tfarcriA SRACA
 etutitsnI etercnoC naciremA ICA
 noitcurtsnoC leetS fo etutitsnI naciremA CSIA
 retaw dezirusserp-ria WPA
 
 sreenignE liviC fo yteicoS naciremA ECSA
 
 srehpargotohP aideM fo yteicoS naciremA PMSA
 
 slairetaM dna gnitseT rof yteicoS naciremA MTSA
 
 licnuoC ygolonhceT deilppA   CTA
 
 noitaroproC gnitsacdaorB hsitirB CBB
 
 rebmem etalp pu-tliub MPB
 
 ydutS ecnamrofreP gnidliuB SPB
 
 tnemhsilbatsE hcraeseR gnidliuB ERB
 
 etutitsnI sdradnatS hsitirB    ISB
 
 scimanyD diulF lanoitatupmoC   DFC
 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
 
CM Claremont (salvage yard) 
 
Con Ed    Consolidated Edison 
 
CTBUH Council on Tall Buildings in the Urban Habitat 
 
DDC Department of Design and Construction (NYC) 
 
DEC Department of Environmental Conservation 
 
DoB Department of Buildings (NYC) 
 
DOD Department of Defense 
 
DOE Department of Energy 
 
EDT Eastern Daylight Time 
 
EDX energy dispersive x-ray analysis 
 
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
 
FCC Fire Command Center 
 
FDNY Fire Department of New York 
 
FDS1 Fire Dynamics Simulator Version 1 
 
FEM finite element modeling 
 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
FK Fresh Kills (salvage yard) 
 
HSLA high-strength low-alloy 
 
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning 
 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
 
KB Keasbey (salvage yard) 
 
LDEO      Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (Columbia University) 
 
LZA LZA Technology/Thornton-Tomasetti 
 
MTA       Metropolitan Transit Authority 
 
NAIC National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
 
NBC National Broadcasting Company 
 
NBS      National Bureau of Standards 
 
NCSEA National Council of Structural Engineers Associations 
 
NFPA National Fire Protection Association 
 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 
NJ New Jersey 
 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
 
NW Newark (salvage yard) 
 
NY New York 
 
NYBFU NY Board of Fire Underwriters 
 
NYC New York City 
 
NYPD New York Police Department 
 
OCC    Operations Control Center 
 
OEM Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (NYC) 
 
PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
 
PATH    Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
 
SCBA   self-contained breathing apparatus 
 
SEAoNY Structural Engineers Association of New York 
SEERP Structural Engineering Emergency Response Plan 
 
SEI Structural Engineering Institute 
 
SEI/ASCE    Structural Engineering Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers 
 
SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers 
 
SOM Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 
 
SSB Salomon Smith Barney 
STD    Standard 
 
TMS   The Masonry Society 
 
UL Underwriters Laboratories 
 
UPS uninterruptible power supply 
 
USC United States Code 
 
UTC         Coordinated Universal Time 
 
WFC    World Financial Center 
 
WTC World Trade Center 
 
Y/T          yield-to-tensile-strength ratio 
 
Symbols 
°C degrees Celsius  
 
°F degrees Fahrenheit  
 
cfm cubic feet per minute  
 
ft2 square feet  
 
gpm gallons per minute  
 
GW gigawatt  
 
Hz hertz  
 
in-k or kip-in  
 
kip-inch  
 
kips/bolt  
 
kips per bolt  
 
kg/m2   kilograms per square meter  
 
kJ/g    kilojoules per gram  
 
km kilometer  
 
km/h   kilometers per hour  
 
ksi kips per square inch  
 
kV kilovolt  
 
kava   kilovoltampere 
kW kilowatt  
 
kW/m2    kilowatt per square meter  
 
m3/s   cubic meters per second  
 
m micrometer  
 
min minute  
 
mm2 square millimeter  
 
MPa megapascals 
mph miles per hour  
 
mW megawatt  
 
n/a    not applicable  
 
nm nanometer  
 
nm/s    nanometers per second  
 
psf pounds per square foot  
 
psi pounds per square inch  
 
s second  
 
sf   square foot  
 
V   volt  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The events following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City were among the 
worst building disasters in history and resulted in the largest loss of life from any single building 
collapse in the United States. Of the 58,000 people estimated to be at the WTC Complex, 2,830 lost 
their lives that day, including 403 emergency responders. Two commercial airliners were hijacked, 
and each was flown into one of the two 110-storey towers. The structural damage sustained by each 
tower from the impact, combined with the ensuing fires, resulted in the total collapse of each 
building. As the towers collapsed, massive debris clouds consisting of crushed and broken building 
components fell onto and blew into surrounding structures, causing extensive collateral damage 
and, in some cases, igniting fires and causing additional collapses. In total, 10 major buildings 
experienced partial or total collapse and approximately 30 million square feet of commercial office 
space was removed from service, of which 12 million square feet belonged to the WTC Complex.  
 During the time of this study, the question of whether building codes should be changed in 
some way to make future buildings more resistant to such attacks was frequently explored. 
Depending on the size of the aircraft, it may not be technically feasible to develop design provisions 
that would enable all structures to be designed and constructed to resist the effects of impacts by 
rapidly moving aircraft, and the ensuing fires, without collapse. In addition, the cost of constructing 
such structures might be so large as to make this type of design intent practically infeasible.  
1.2 The World Trade Center Towers (WTC1 & WTC2)  
 The World Trade Center Towers were located on New York City's lower west side, 
adjacent to the Hudson River at the southern tip of Manhattan.  The WTC site itself comprises 16 
acres with buildings grouped around a 5-acre plaza. It is bounded by Vesey Street to the north, 
Church Street to the east, Liberty Street to the south, and West Street to the west. The WTC 
Complex consisted of seven buildings (referred to in this thesis as WTC 1 through WTC 7), the Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) and Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) WTC stations, and 
associated Concourse areas. The WTC Plaza and its six buildings were originally developed by the 
Port Authority. Groundbreaking for construction was on August 5, 1966. Steel erection began in 
August 1968. First tenant occupancy of the 110-storey north tower (WTC 1) was in December 
1970, and occupancy of the 110-storey south tower (WTC 2) began in January 1972. The other 
WTC buildings were constructed during the 1970s and into the 1980s, with WTC 7 constructed just 
north of the WTC site in 1985. WTC 3, located immediately west of the south tower, was a 22-
storey hotel operated by the Marriott Corporation. WTC 4 and 5 were nine-storey office buildings, 
and WTC 6 was an eight-storey office building. WTC 7 was a 47-storey office building. The seven-
building complex provided approximately 12 million square feet of rentable floor space occupied 
by a variety of government and commercial tenants. Many of the commercial tenants were in the 
insurance and financial industries. At the time of the September 11 attacks, the entire project had 
been transferred to a private party under a 99-year capital lease.  
 As each tower was struck, extensive structural damage, including localized collapse, 
occurred at the several floor levels directly impacted by the aircraft. Despite this massive localized 
damage, each structure remained standing. However, as each aircraft impacted a building, jet fuel 
on board ignited. Part of this fuel immediately burned off in the large fireballs that erupted at the 
impact floors. Remaining fuel flowed across the floors and down elevator and utility shafts, igniting 
intense fires throughout upper portions of the buildings. As these fires spread, they further 
weakened the steel-framed structures, eventually leading to total collapse.  
 The collapse of the towers astonished most observers, including knowledgeable structural 
engineers, and, in the immediate aftermath, a wide range of explanations were offered in an attempt 
to help the public understand these tragic events. However, the collapse of these symbolic buildings 
entailed a complex series of events that were not identical for each tower. To determine the 
sequence of events, likely root causes, and methods or technologies that may improve or mitigate 
the building performance observed.  
 This thesis is generated by using the information reported from field observations at the 
WTC site and steel salvage yards, removed and the results from tested samples of the collapsed 
structures, viewed hundreds of hours of video and thousands of still photographs, conducted 
interviews with witnesses and persons involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of 
each of the affected buildings, reviewed construction documents, and conducted preliminary 
analyses of the damage to the WTC towers.  
 With the information and time available, the sequence of events leading to the collapse of 
each tower could not be definitively determined. However, the following observations and findings 
were made: 
 The structural damage sustained by each of the two buildings as a result of the attacks was 
massive. The fact that the structures were able to sustain this level of damage and remain standing 
for an extended period of time is remarkable and is the reason that most building occupants were 
able to evacuate safely. Events of this type, resulting in such substantial damage, are generally not 
considered in building design, and the ability of these structures to successfully withstand such 
damage is noteworthy.  
 Preliminary analyses of the damaged structures, together with the fact the structures 
remained standing for an extended period of time, suggest that, absent other severe loading events 
such as a windstorm or earthquake, the buildings could have remained standing in their damaged 
states until subjected to some significant additional load. However, the structures were subjected to 
a second, simultaneous severe loading event in the form of the fires caused by the aircraft impacts.  
 The large quantity of jet fuel carried by each aircraft ignited upon impact into each 
building. A significant portion of this fuel was consumed immediately in the ensuing fireballs. The 
remaining fuel is believed either to have flowed down through the buildings or to have burned off 
within a few minutes of the aircraft impact. The heat produced by this burning jet fuel does not by 
itself appear to have been sufficient to initiate the structural collapses. However, as the burning jet 
fuel spread across several floors of the buildings, it ignited much of the buildings' contents, causing 
simultaneous fires across several floors of both buildings. The heat output from these fires is 
estimated to have been comparable to the power produced by a large commercial power generating 
station. Over a period of many minutes, this heat induced additional stresses into the damaged 
structural frames while simultaneously softening and weakening these frames. This additional 
loading and the resulting damage were sufficient to induce the collapse of both structures.  
 The ability of the two towers to withstand aircraft impacts without immediate collapse 
was a direct function of their design and construction characteristics, as was the vulnerability of the 
two towers to collapse a result of the combined effects of the impacts and ensuing fires. It was not 
the purpose of this study to assess the code-conformance of the building design and construction, or 
to judge the adequacy of these features. However, during the time of this research, the structural and 
fire protection features of the buildings were examined. The research did not reveal any specific 
structural features that would be regarded as substandard, and, in fact, many structural and fire 
protection features of the design and construction was found to be superior to the minimum code 
requirements.  
 Several building design features have been identified as key to the buildings' ability to 
remain standing as long as they did and to allow the evacuation of most building occupants. These  
Included the following:  
• Robustness and redundancy of the steel framing system. 
• Adequate escape stairways which were well marked and lighted  
•  Conscientious implementation of emergency exiting training programs for building 
tenants  
 Similarly, several design features have been identified that may have played a role in 
allowing the buildings to collapse in the manner that they did and in the inability of victims at and 
above the impact floors to safely exit. These features should not be regarded either as design 
deficiencies or as features that should be prohibited in future building codes. Rather, these are  
features that should be subjected to more detailed evaluation, in order to understand their 
contribution to the performance of these buildings and how they may perform in other buildings.  
These include the following:  
• The type of steel floor truss system present in these buildings and their structural 
robustness and redundancy when compared to other structural systems 
• Use of impact-resistant enclosures around egress paths  
• Resistance of passive fire protection to blasts and impacts in buildings designed to 
provide resistance to such hazards  
• Grouping emergency egress stairways in the central building core, as opposed to 
dispersing them throughout the structure  
  Although the attacks on the World Trade Center are a reason to question design 
philosophies, it is believed there are insufficient data to determine whether there is a reasonable 
threat of attacks on specific buildings to recommend inclusion of such requirements in building 
codes. Some designers believe the likelihood of such attacks on any specific building is deemed 
sufficiently low to not be considered at all. However, individual building developers may wish to 
consider design provisions for improving redundancy and robustness for such unforeseen events, 
particularly for structures that, by nature of their design or occupancy, may be especially susceptible 
to such incidents. Although some conceptual changes to the building codes that could make 
buildings more resistant to fire or impact damage or more conducive to occupant egress were 
identified in the time of this research. It is felt that extensive technical, policy, and economic study 
of these concepts should be performed before any specific code change recommendations are 
developed. This research specifically recommends such additional studies. Future building code 
revisions may be considered after the technical details of the collapses and other building responses 
to damage are better understood.    
 Developed recommendations were set for specific issues, based on the Structural 
Assessment of the WTC towers in response to the impact and fire damage that occurred. These 
recommendations have a broader scope than the important issue of building concepts and design for 
mitigating damage from terrorist attacks, and also address the level at which resources should be 
expended for aircraft security, how the fire protection and structural engineering communities 
should increase their interaction in building design and construction, possible considerations for 
improved egress in damages structure, the public understanding of typical building design 
capacities, issues related to the assessment process and future activities, and issues for communities 
to consider when they are developing emergency response plans that include engineering response. 
1.3 Interaction of Structural Elements and Fire 
  The existing prescriptive rating method (ASTM E119) does not provide sufficient 
information to determine how long a building component in a structural system can be expected to 
perform in an actual fire. A method of assessing performance of structural members and 
connections as part of a structural system in building fire is needed for designers and emergency 
personnel. The behavior of the structural system under fire condition should be considered as an 
integral part of the structural design.  
1.4 Interaction of Professions in Design 
  The structural, fire protection, mechanical, architectural, blast, explosion, earthquake, and 
wind engineering communities need to work together to develop guidance for probability of 
progressive collapse under single- and multiple-hazard scenarios. 
1.5 Education of Stakeholders 
  Stakeholders (e.g., owners, operators, tenants, authorities, designers) should be further 
educated about building codes, the minimum design loads typically addressed for building design, 
and the extreme events that are not addressed by building codes. Should stakeholders desire to 
address events not included in the building codes, they should understand the process of developing 
and implementing strategies to mitigate damage from extreme events.  
 Stakeholders should also be educated about the expected performance of their building 
when renovations, or changes in use or occupancy, occur and the building is subjected to different 
floor or fire loads. For instance, if the occupancy in a building changes to one with a higher fire 
hazard, stakeholders should have the fire protection systems reviewed to ensure there is adequate 
fire protection. Or, if the structural load is increased with a new occupancy, the structural support 
system should be reviewed to ensure it can carry the new load.  
1.6 Thesis Process 
  This thesis benefited from a tremendous amount of professional volunteerism in response 
to this unprecedented international disaster. Improvements can be made that would aid the process 
for any future efforts. Recommendations are to:  
• Provide resources that are proportional to the required level of effort.  
• Provide better access to data, including building information, interviews, samples, site 
photos, and documentation.  
1.7 Archival Information 
  Archival information has been collected and provided the groundwork for continued 
study. It is recommended that a coordinated effort for the preservation of this and other relevant 
information be undertaken by a responsible organization or agency, capable of maintaining and 
managing such information. This effort would include:  
•  cataloging all photographic data collected to date  
•  enhancing video data collected for both quality and timeline  
•   conducting interviews with building occupants, witnesses, rescue workers, and any 
others who may provide valuable information  
•   initiating public requests for information  
1.8 Objectives 
 It was not the purpose of this study to assess the code-conformance of the building design 
and construction, or to judge the adequacy of these features. But the objectives are: 
• To collect data & information to have a background & idea about what happened at 
World Trade Center site.  
• To examine the damage caused by these events 
• To develop an understanding of the response of each affected Tower 
• To identify the causes of observed behavior, and identify studies that should be 
performed. 
• To determine the immediate effects of the aircraft impacts on each tower. 
• To study the spread of fires following the crashes. 
• To investigate the fire-induced reduction of structural strength, 
• To establish the mechanism that led to the collapse of each tower.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The structural form of a high-rise building is influenced strongly by its function, while 
having to satisfy the requirements of strength and serviceability under all probable conditions of 
gravity and lateral loading. Other influential factors include the building's material of construction, 
its accommodation of services and, of course, and its overall economy. The taller a building, the 
more important it is economically to select an appropriate structural form (Bryan Stafford, 1991). 
 The basic structural forms of first half of the twentieth century were the braced frame, 
which is unrestricted in height but limited to steel structures, and the rigid frame or the flat plate, 
which are economical to only about 25 stories in height and appropriate particularly to concrete 
structures. These forms have now been augmented by a variety of other forms that allow structures 
of greater efficiency and height to be achieved in both steel and concrete. Advances have occurred 
mainly in the use of shear walls, framed tubes, large-scale braced systems, and space frames, and in 
better recognizing and accounting for the various types of vertical and horizontal interaction 
between the major vertical components (Bryan Stafford, 1991). 
 The single structural forms used in the vertical prismatic "modern" high-rise buildings of 
the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s have given way to some extent to hybrid, or mixed, forms in the 
less regularly shaped "postmodern" buildings of the later 1970s and 1980s. In these mixed forms, 
combinations of two or more of the single forms are used to fit the "postmodern" buildings' 
irregular shapes or cut-outs  (Bryan Stafford,1991). 
 Floors slabs are invariably of reinforced concrete. The most appropriate type of floor 
framing system may depend on the material of construction of the building, whether the building is 
for office use-requiring larger spans, or residential use allowing shorter spans, and whether the floor 
system is expected to participate in the lateral load resistance of the building (Bryan Stafford,1991). 
2.2 Building Functions  
 A major consideration affecting the structural form is the function of the building. There 
fore they are divided into two groups:  
• Modern office buildings. 
• Residential buildings or hotel. 
 
2.2.1 Modern office buildings 
 Modern office buildings call for large open floor spaces that can be subdivided with 
lightweight partitioning to suit the individual tenant's needs. Consequently the structure's main 
vertical components are generally arranged, as far as possible, around the perimeter of the plan and, 
internally, in groups around the elevator, stair, and service shafts. The floors span the areas between 
the exterior and interior components, leaving column-free areas available for office planning. The 
services are distributed horizontally in each story above the partitioning and are usually concealed 
in a ceiling space. The extra depth required by this space causes the typical story height in an office 
building to be 11 ft-6 in. (3.5 m) or more. 
2.2.2 Residential buildings or hotels 
 For a residential building or hotel, accommodation is subdivided permanently and usually 
repetitively from floor to floor. Therefore, continuously vertical columns and walls can be 
distributed over the plan to form, or fit within, the partitioning. The services can then be run 
vertically, adjacent to the walls and columns or in separate shaft, to emerge in each story either very 
close to the corridor ceiling spaces. With the exception of the corridors, therefore, a ceiling space is 
not required, and the soffit of the slab can serve as the ceiling. This allows the storey height in a 
typical residential building or hotel to be kept down to approximately 8 ft- in. (2.7 m). A 40-storey 
residential building is, therefore, generally of significantly less height than a 40-storey office 
building.  
2.3 Structural Form System of Tall Buildings  
2.3.1 Tubular structural forms 
 The development of tubular structures for very tall buildings, involving a range of related 
structural forms: framed-tube, tube-in-tube, bundled-tube, braced-tube, and composite-tube 
systems. All have evolved from the traditional rigidly jointed structural frame. The basic design 
philosophy in all of these forms has been to place as much as possible of the load-carrying material 
around the external periphery of the building to maximize the flexural rigidity of the cross section. 
Because this research deals with world trade center therefore only the framed-tube and tube-in-
tube as shown in Figure (2-1, 2-2) forms are discussed here.  
2.3.1.1 Framed-tube structures 
 The most basic framed-tube structure consists essentially of four orthogonal rigidly 
jointed frame panels forming a tube in plan, as shown in Figure 2-3a. The frame panels are formed 
by closely spaced perimeter columns that are connected by deep spandrel beams at each floor level. 
In such structures, the "strong" bending direction of the columns is aligned along the face of the 
building as shown in Figure 2-3b, in contrast to the typical rigid frame bent structure where it is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aligned perpendicular to the face. The basic requirement has been to place as much of the load-
carrying material at the extreme edges of the building to maximize the inertia of the building's cross 
section. Consequently, in many structures of this form, the exterior tube is designed to resist the 
entire wind loading. The frames parallel to the wind act as the "webs" of the perforated tube 
cantilever, while the frames normal to the wind act as the "flanges." Vertical gravitational forces are 
resisted partly by the exterior frames and partly by some inner structure such as interior columns or 
an interior core, using the floor system that spans between the different vertical elements. Although 
tubular structures are most commonly of square or rectangular plan form, they have also been 
employed in circular, triangular, and trapezoidal shaped cross sections. 
 The essential uniformity of the system enables industrialized techniques to be used in the 
construction sequence. For steel structures, large elements of the façade frame may be prefabricated 
in a factory and transported to the site where they are hoisted into place and fixed. For concrete 
structures, the use of gang forms raised story by story enables very speedy construction rates to be 
achieved. 
    The closely spaced column configuration makes access difficult to the public lobby area 
at the base. In many buildings, larger openings at ground floor level have been achieved by using a 
large transfer girder to collect the vertical loads from the closely spaced columns and distribute 
them to a smaller number of larger more widely spaced columns at the base as shown in Fig 2-3c. 
Alternatively, several columns may be merged through an inclined column arrangement to allow 
fewer larger columns in the lowest stories, as shown in Figure 2-3d. 
 In resisting the entire wind load by the peripheral frame, the tubular structure has the 
architectural advantage of allowing freedom in planning the interior. For example, a central core 
with long-span floors from the tube to the core provides the open spaces desired for office 
buildings, while distributed interior columns and walls, with shallow short-span floors, is very well 
suited for residential buildings. 
2.3.1.2 Framed tube structural behavior 
 The behavior of this form is much more complex than that of a plain imperforated tube, 
and the stiffness may be considerably less. When subjected to bending under the action of lateral 
forces, the primary mode of action is that of a conventional vertical cantilevered tube, in which the 
columns on opposite sides of the neutral axis are subjected to tensile and compressive forces, as 
indicated by the broken lines in Figure 2-4. In addition, the frames parallel to the direction of the 
lateral load (AD and BC of Figure 2-4) are subjected to the usual in-plane bending, and the shearing 
or racking action associated with an independent rigid frame. This primary action is complicated by 
the fact that the flexibility of the spandrel beams produces a shear lag which increases the stresses 
in the corner columns and reduces those in the inner columns of both the flange panels (AB and 
DC), and the web panel (AD and BC), as shown by the solid lines in Figure 2-4. 
 This behavior may readily be appreciated by considering the basic mode of action 
involved in resisting lateral forces. The primary resisting comes from the side web panels, which 
deform so that the corner columns A and B are in tension and D and C are in compression Figure 2-
4c. The principal interaction between the web and flange frames occurs through the vertical 
displacements of the corner columns. These displacements corresponding to vertical shear in the 
girders of the flange frames, mobilize the axial forces in the flange columns. When column C, for 
example, suffers a compressive deformation, it will tend to compress the adjacent column C1 as 
shown in Figure 2-5, since the two are connected by the spandrel beams. The compressive 
deformation will not be identical since the flexible connecting spandrel beam will bend, and the 
axial deformation of the adjacent column will be less, by an amount depending on the stiffness of 
the connecting beam. (Pure tubular behavior would theoretically require connecting beams of 
infinite stiffness.)  The deformation of column C1 will in turn induce compressive deformations of 
the next inner column C2, but the deformation will again be less. Thus each successive interior 
column will suffer a smaller deformation and hence a lower stress than the outer ones. Since the 
external applied moment must be resisted by the internal coupled by the compressive and tensile 
forces on opposite sides of the neutral axis of the building, it follows that the stresses in the corner 
columns will be greater than those from pure tubular action, and those in the inner columns will be 
less. 
 The differences between the pure tubular stress distribution, as predicated by ordinary 
engineer's beam theory and the true situation is illustrated in Figure2-4. Because the column stresses 
are distributed less effectively than in a proper tube, the moment of resistance and the flexural 
rigidity are reduced. Thus, although an unbraced framed tube is a highly effective form of tall 
building construction, it does not fully exploit the potential stiffness and strength of the structure 
because of the effects of shear lag in the perimeter frames. 
 The shear lag effect remains plane; consequently, deformations of interior partitions and 
secondary structural components occur, which increase cumulatively throughout the height of the 
building. It is therefore of considerable importance to predict accurately the structural behavior of 
the system in order to produce an efficient and acceptable design.    
2.3.1.3 Tube-in-tube (hull-core) structures 
 This variation of the framed tube consists of an outer framed, the "hull" together with an 
internal elevator and service core Figure 2-2. The hull and core act jointly in resisting both gravity 
and lateral loading. In steel structure, the core may consist of braced frames, whereas in a concrete 
structure it would consist of an assembly of shear walls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To some extent, the outer framed tube and the inner core interact horizontally as the shear 
and flexural components of a wall-frame structure, with the benefit of increased lateral stiffness. 
However, the structural tube usually adopts a highly dominant role because of its much greater 
structural depth.  
2.3.2 Outrigger trusses 
 This efficient structural form consists of a central core, comprising either braced frames or 
shear walls, with horizontal cantilever "outrigger" trusses or girders connecting the core to the outer 
columns. When the structure is loaded horizontally, vertical plane rotations of the core are 
restrained by the outriggers through tension in the windward columns and compression in the 
leeward columns.  The effective structural depth of the building reduces the lateral deflections and 
moments in the core. In effect, the outriggers join the columns to the core to make the structure 
behave as a partly composite cantilever. 
 Perimeter columns, other than those connected directly to the ends of the outriggers, can 
also be made to participate in the outrigger action by joining all the perimeter columns with a 
horizontal truss or girder around the face of the building at the outrigger level. The large, often two-
story, depth of the outrigger and perimeter trusses make it desirable to locate them within the plant 
levels in the building. 
 The degree to which the perimeter columns of an outrigger structure behave compositely 
with the core depends on the number of levels of outriggers and their stiffness. For multilevel 
outrigger structures, this increase diminishes, however, with each additional level of outriggers, so 
that four or five levels appear to be the economic limit. Outrigger-braced structures have been used 
for buildings from 40 to 70 stories high, but the system should be effective and efficient for much 
greater heights. 
2.4 Structural Form System of WTC Towers  
 WTC Towers are modern buildings office, used for rental occupancy, therefore the system 
of these towers following the system of modern office buildings. The main structural form used in 
WTC towers is a framed-tube structure, helped by bracing system and outrigger trusses to raise the 
efficiency of lateral resistance in buildings to horizontal loads, this combination of systems makes it 
very rigid to act as a one unit cantilever.  
2.5 Effect of Temperature & Fire on Tall Buildings: 
2.5.1 Fire effect 
 The design considerations fore fire prevention and protection, smoke control, fire-fighting, 
and escape are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, since fire appears to be by far the most 
common extreme situation that will cause damage in structures, it must be a primary consideration 
in the design process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6 Modulus of elasticity at elevated temperatures for structural steel and steel reinforcement bars 
(SFPE 2000). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7 Reduction of the yield strength of cold-formed light-gauge steel at elevated temperatures. 
 
 The characteristic feature of fire, such as the temperature and duration, can be estimated 
from knowledge of the important parameters involved, particularly the quantity and the nature of 
combustible materials present, the possibility and extent of ventilation, and the geometric and 
thermal properties of the fire compartment involved. Once the temperatures at the various surfaces 
have been determined, from the gas temperature curve, it is possible to estimate the heat flow 
through the insulation and structural member. Knowledge of the temperature gradient across the 
member and the degree of restraint afforded by the supports and surrounding structure, enables the 
stress in the member to be evaluated. The mechanical properties of the structural materials, 
particularly the elastic modulus or stiffness and strength, may deteriorate rapidly as the temperature 
rises, and the resistance to the load is greatly reduced. For example the yield stress of mild steel at a 
temperature of 700 ْ C is only some 10-20% of its value at room temperature. Over the same 
temperature range, the elastic modulus drops by around 40-50% .Figures 2-6 and 2-7 show the 
relationship between elastic modulus & strength vs temperature respectively. The critical 
temperature witch large deflections or collapse occurs will thus depend on the materials used, the 
nature of the structure, and the load conditions. 
 The parameters that govern the approach are stochastic in nature, and the results of any 
calculation can be given in which the risks due to the different extreme situations are comparable. 
2.5.2 Temperature effect 
 In buildings with partially or fully exposed exterior columns, significant temperature 
differences may occur between exterior and interior columns, and any restraint to their relative 
deformations will induced stresses in the members concerned. The analysis of such actions required 
knowledge of the differential temperature gradient through the members. This will allow an 
evaluation of the free thermal length changes that would occur if no restraint existed, and, hence, 
using a standard elastic analysis, the resulting thermal stresses and deformations may be 
determined. 
2.6 Tall buildings Subjected to Blast & Impact: 
Progressive collapse is characterized by the loss of load-carrying capacity of a relatively 
small portion of the structure due to an abnormal load which can trigger a cascade of failures 
affecting a major portion of the structure. Several buildings have collapsed in this fashion such as 
the Murrah building in Oklahoma (1995) and the recent collapse of the World Trade Centre (2001).  
 
 
 
 
 
Lessons learnt from these events were that special attention must be given to the behavior of the 
structural elements to improve their redundancy, toughness, and ductility under extreme events. The 
ultimate goal of the protection is to minimize injuries and loss of life and facilitate the evacuation 
and rescue of survivors. The casualties that will occur to occupants in the immediate vicinity of the 
explosion or impact may be unavoidable, but by preventing progressive collapse, the remaining 
occupants may be spared from injury or death.  
An ongoing study on the performance of typical Australian tall buildings under the extreme 
events has been carried out at the University of Melbourne. Several extreme event scenarios 
involving a bomb blast or an aircraft impact were identified, and their effects were investigated. A 
typical floor of each building was examined to determine the vertical load capacity of the beam-slab 
system. The objective of this appendix is to develop a preliminary method of assessing the 
structural consequences of extreme event impacts with focus on progressive collapse prevention and 
suggest design directions for enhancing the performance of existing and future buildings. A 
vulnerability assessment procedure has been proposed, which consists of three main steps: (i) 
Determination of hazard levels and load conditions, (ii) Global and local damage assessment, and 
(iii) Progressive collapse assessment. 
2.6.1 Hazard levels – extreme load cases 
2.6.1.1 Hazard levels – performance based approach 
The technical hazards to tall buildings may range from an accidental gas explosion to a car 
bomb, an impact of a missile to a jet airplane collision. For these assaults, the source can originate 
either external or internal to the structure. (Ngo, Mendis) The difference between technical hazards 
(accidental or terrorist) and other natural hazards is that the risks of technical hazards are very hard 
to quantify. For these types of hazards the performance-based approach can be used as a rational 
method for assessment or design of buildings against extreme events. Example of the performance 
level – hazard matrix of a bomb blast event is shown in Figure 2-8. 
2.6.1.2 Blast loading 
The threat for a conventional bomb is defined by two equally important elements, the bomb 
size (or charge weight (W), which is normally measured using the equivalent amount of TNT), and 
the standoff distance (R) between the blast source and the target. For example, the blast occurred at 
the basement of World Trade Centre in 1993 has the charge weight of 816.5 kg TNT. The 
Oklahoma bomb in 1995 has a charge weight of 1814 kg at a stand off of 4.75m (Longinow, 1996). 
 
Figure 2-8 Performance-based approach 
With the detonation of a mass of TNT at or near the ground surface, the peak blast pressures 
resulting from this hemispherical explosion decay as a function of the distance from the source as 
the expanding shock front dissipates with range (Fig 2-9). The incident peak pressures are amplified 
by a reflection factor as the shock wave encounters an object or structure in its path. The reflected 
pressure is at least twice that of the incident shock wave and is proportional to the strength of the 
incident shock, which is proportional to the charge weight. The blast pressure decays exponentially 
and eventually becomes negative as shown in Fig 2-10. This then subjects the building to pressures 
acting in the direction opposite (suction pressure) to that of the original shock front, peak blast loads 
may be several orders of magnitude larger than the largest loads for which conventional buildings 
are designed (Table 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-9 Variation of pressure with distance                    Figure 2-10 Blast wave pressure – Time history 
 
Table 2-1 Peak reflected overpressures (MPa) with different W-R combinations (TM5-1300, 1990) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1.3 Aircraft impact loading 
Design loads resulting from aircraft impacts are governed by the absorption of kinetic 
energy from the aircraft by the building at its maximum deflection. These loads are limited by the 
yield, buckling and crushing of the aircraft. Total impact load F(t) at the interface of the collapsing 
aircraft and the building is given by (Kar, 1979): 
 
F(t) = Fc + µ [m(t)] V(t) (1) 
 
in which m(t) is the mass of the aircraft reaching the building per unit time; 
 
- µ is a coefficient for change in momentum (which can be taken conservatively as 1); 
- Fc is a constant which can be determined from the design acceleration for failure  
  of the aircraft; 
- V(t) is the velocity of the aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-11 Impact load-time history for aircraft impacts 
 
The frame is classed as a soft missile which will suffer considerable deformation and a finite 
difference method of calculation is employed to describe its perfectly plastic impact. The engines 
which are considered separately are assumed to constitute a much harder missile which will 
undergo little deformation. Fig 2-11 compares the impact loads produced by different aircrafts. The 
peak loads and impact durations are given in Table 2-2. More details are given elsewhere (Mendis 
& Ngo., 2002). 
 
Table 2-2 Examples of aircrafts and peak impact loads 
 
 
 
 
2.6.2 Case study – global and local damage assessment 
2.6.2.1 Structural configuration 
A 52 storey building (modified from a typical tall building designed in Australia) was 
analyzed in this study. The plan view and structural configuration of the building are shown in 
Figure 2-12. The typical storey height is 3.85m. Perimeter columns are spaced at typical 8.4m 
centers and are connected by spandrel beams to support the facade. The lateral loads are resisted by 
6 core boxes located at the centre of the structural plan. The building is designed to resist lateral 
loads due to wind and seismic ground motion specified by Australian Loading Standards AS1170.2 
and AS1170.4. The slab, columns and core walls are all cast-in-place concrete. High-strength 
concrete is used for columns and core walls at the lower stories (see Table 2-3). The lateral load 
resistance system (LLRS) of the building relies mainly on the lateral load capacity of the core walls 
which account for about 80% of the overall capacity. 
2.6.2.2 Non-linear time-history analysis (global assessment) 
The global stability of the example building (Fig 2-12) was analyzed using program 
RUAUMOKO-3D (Carr, 2001) which takes into account both material nonlinearity and geometric 
nonlinearity (P-delta effect). The effects of blast and aircraft impact were considered in the 
nonlinear time history analysis to obtain the dynamic load-deflection responses of the building. 
Two lateral extreme load cases as shown in Fig 2-13 were modeled as time-history force functions. 
The blast load was calculated based on data from the Oklahoma bomb (Mlakar et.al., 1998) with a 
stand off distance of 20m. The peak overpressure is 4.1MPa at the ground level and reduces rapidly 
up the height of the building (Fig 2-13). The average duration of loading was adopted as 15 
milliseconds. The triangle shape of the blast load profile was used as the first push-over case (see 
Fig 2-14). The impact of a Boeing 767 at level 40th was modeled as a concentrated load with the 
peak impact load of 320,000 kN (see Table 2-2). The duration of the impact was estimated as 0.36 
seconds. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-3 Concrete strength used in  
the 52-storey building
Figure 2-12 Structural configuration   
  
 
 
Figure 2-13 Distribution of Peak Pressure                  Figure 2-14 bending moment diagrams of core walls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For reinforced concrete structures subjected to blast or impact effects, response at very high strain 
rates (up to 1000 s-1) is often sought. At these high strain rates, the strength of concrete and steel 
reinforcing bars can increase significantly. For concrete, the ratio of the dynamic to static strength 
can be up to 3 in compression, and 6 in tension. In this case study, the CEB-FIP-1990 model for 
strain rate enhancement of concrete was adopted. Fig 2-15 shows the relationship between the 
fundamental behavior of the kinetic energy, strain energy, energy dissipated through normal 
damping and plastic energy (energy dissipated through permanent deformations) due to aircraft 
impact. The push-over curve of impact load case is plotted in Fig 2-16. As seen the global lateral 
load capacity of the example building is adequate to withstand these loadings. Similar analyses 
confirmed that the example building can withstand the blast loads globally. 
 
 Figure 2-15 Energy time history (Aircraft impact)      Figure 2-16 Push-over curve of the aircraft impact. 
 
2.6.2.3 Local damage assessment 
The local damages caused by a bomb blast or an aircraft impact were assessed in order to 
determine the likelihood of progressive collapse to the tall building. Example that included the 
assessment of key structural elements (columns, core walls and spandrel beams) being struck by 
blast pressure or aircraft parts such as engines and wings, using the finite element explicit code in 
LS-DYNA (2001) (see Figs 2-17,18). As aircraft engines and undercarriages are the heaviest 
components, they pose the greatest threat to structural elements. For column sizes commonly used 
in tall buildings more attention should be focused on the local resistance to impact and the design of 
column splices. Detailed analysis of the performance of a concrete column subjected to a bomb 
blast (Fig 2-18) is given elsewhere (Ngo et.al, 2003). 
 
        
Figure 2-17 Local damage of a light aircraft      Figure 2-18 Ground floor column subjected to a bomb blast 
 impact 
2.6.3 Progressive collapse analysis 
Design recommendations on progressive collapse analysis have been introduced in British 
Standards since 1968, after the collapse of 22-storey Ronan Point apartment building. In recognition 
of this issue, a number of European countries, USA and Canada have incorporated progressive 
collapse provisions in their building codes. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
Standard A58.1-1982, “Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and other Structures” recommends 
the alternative path method, in which the local failure is allowed to occur but an alternative path 
must be provided around the failed structural elements. It should also be noted that there are no 
provisions or recommendations in the current Australian standards with regard to progressive 
collapse. 
In this appendix, based on the local damage assessment due to the two load cases 
progressive collapse analyses were performed on the example building. The structural stability and 
integrity of the building were assessed by considering the effects of the failure of some perimeter 
columns, spandrel beams and floor slabs due to blast overpressure or aircraft impact. The main 
purpose of the analysis is to check if failure of any primary structural member will cause 
progressive collapse propagating beyond one story level above or below the affected member 
vertically, or to the next vertical structural member. 
 
Extreme bending 
Figure 2-19 Direct column loading (Blast pressure)     Figure 2-20 Uplifting of floor slabs (Blast pressure) 
 
Figs 2-19 & 20 show the effect of direct blast pressure on perimeter columns, beams and floor 
slabs. The concrete slabs in this example building are 125mm thick supported by prestressed wide 
band beams. The portion of floor slabs in close proximity to the blast was directly hit by the blast 
overpressure. The normal glazing façade offers insignificant resistance to the blast wave so after the 
failure of glazing; the blast fills the structural bay above and below each floor slab. The pressure 
below the slab is greater than the pressure above and causes the net upward load on each slab     
(Fig 2-20). 
To detect the local damage, the blast analysis was carried out for perimeter columns, beams 
and floor slabs based on the actual blast pressures on each element. Results plotted in Fig 2-21 
show column lines 4, 5 of the ground and 1st levels failed due to the direct impact of the blast wave. 
Slabs and beams from column line 3 to 6 also collapsed. Member assessment was carried out using 
program RESPONSE (2001) based on the Modified Compression Field theory. More details are 
given elsewhere (Mendis & Ngo, 2002). The calculation also showed that if the columns were 
detailed using requirements for special moment resisting frames (SMRS) as given in ACI-318 
Section 21, the shear capacity and the ductility would be improved significantly, thus improving the 
blast and impact resistance of the member. The damaged model of perimeter frame, in which failed 
elements were removed (Fig 2-21), was analyzed to check if progressive collapse would propagate 
beyond one story level above or below. 
 
 
Figure 2-21 Progressive collapse analysis of perimeter frame (damaged by blast load) 
 
The progressive analysis was also carried out for the impact of aircraft. In this case, it was 
assumed that columns in three consecutive levels (level 39-41) were damaged by direct impact. As 
seen from Figs 2-21 & 22, the alternative load paths go through columns surrounding the damaged 
area where the vertical loads are transferred. Beams and floor slabs above that area become critical 
due to the loss of supporting columns. The overall stability of the structure will rely on continuity 
and ductility of these elements to redistribute forces within the structure. The falling debris of the 
collapsed members also imposes severe loads on the floors below (Fig 2-22). It is essential to check 
whether that overload can be carried without causing further collapse. 
 
 
Figure 2-22 Progressive collapse analysis of perimeter frame (damaged by aircraft impact) 
 
• The high temperature of burning jet fuel also results in the spalling and softening 
of concrete members which may lead to further instability of the structure. In 
addition, high-strength concrete has been found to be more prone to spalling 
failure than normal-strength concrete when exposed to relatively rapid heating 
(Phan et.al, 2001). The effect of fire will be investigated in a future study. 
Parametric studies were also undertaken to investigate the impact resistance of the 
floor slab, assuming a floor above had collapsed onto it. The collapsing floor was 
treated as falling debris, i.e. the energy applied to the floor below was the weight 
of the collapsing floor multiplied by the height through which it fell. To obtain an 
estimate of the impact load-bearing capacity of the floor slab, the structure was 
analyzed using a dynamic nonlinear finite element analysis (DNLFEA) procedure. 
In addition to material and geometric nonlinearities, the analyses considered 
membrane action, inertia effects, and other influencing factors. The results show 
that the ultimate capacity of the floor slab is approximately 16.5kPa which is 2.75 
times the total floor load (dead load plus 0.4 live load). Therefore in this case study 
if more than two floors collapsed (Fig 2-22), the falling debris of the collapsed 
members may impose an overload for the floor below and trigger a progressive 
collapse of the example building. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.4 Summary of impact & blast effect 
  We can summarize the effect of impact and blast as follows: 
• Fire confined to the impact site raised the temperature of steel to at or near melting 
point. 
• Local melting caused the local structure to fail. The remaining upper structure then 
free-fell onto the intact tower structure. 
• When the upper structure hits the intact lower structure the impact force is on the 
order of 294 & 718 time the mass above of each tower respectively (WTC1, 
WTC2). This force fails all the attachments and causes a cascade of floor pan 
caking downward. 
2.7 WTC Site  
 The World Trade Center and adjacent affected buildings were located on New York City's 
lower west side, adjacent to the Hudson River at the southern tip of Manhattan. As shown in   
Figure 2-23, the WTC site itself comprises 16 acres with buildings grouped around a 5-acre plaza. It 
is bounded by Vesey Street to the north, Church Street to the east, Liberty Street to the south, and 
West Street to the west. The WTC Complex consists of seven buildings (referred to in this report as 
WTC 1 through WTC 7), the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) and Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (MTA) WTC stations, and associated Concourse areas. The WTC Plaza and its six 
buildings were originally developed by the Port Authority. Groundbreaking for construction was on 
August 5, 1966. Steel erection began in August 1968. First tenant occupancy of the 110-story north 
tower (WTC 1) was in December 1970, and occupancy of the 110-story south tower (WTC 2) 
began in January 1972. The other WTC buildings were constructed during the 1970s and into the 
1980s, with WTC 7 constructed just north of the WTC site in 1985. WTC 3, located immediately 
west of the south tower, was a 22-story hotel operated by the Marriott Corporation. WTC 4 and 5 
were nine-story office buildings, and WTC 6  was an eight-story office building. WTC 7 was a 47-
story office building. The seven-buildings complex provided approximately 12 million square feet 
of rentable floor space occupied by a variety of government and commercial tenants. Many of the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-23 WTC site map. 
 
commercial tenants were in the insurance and financial industries. At the time of the September 11 
attacks, the entire project had been transferred to a private party under a 99-year capital lease. 
 The New York Stock Exchange and the Wall Street financial district are located about 
three blocks southeast of the site. The World Financial Center (WFC) complex was constructed in 
the early 1980s and is located directly to the west, across West Street. Other prominent buildings 
immediately surrounding the WTC site include a historic Cass Gilbert designed building at 90 West 
Street and the Bankers Trust building at 130 Liberty Street, both located immediately to the south;  
the 1 Liberty Plaza building, located to the east; and the Verizon building, located directly to the 
north.  
 A six-story subterranean structure was underneath a large portion of the main WTC Plaza 
and WTC 1, 2, 3, and 6. Material excavated to construct this site was used to fill a portion of the 
Hudson River shoreline just across West Street and to create the adjacent World Financial Center 
(WFC) site. Construction of this deep substructure was a significant challenge, given the proximity 
of the Hudson River and the presence of a number of tall buildings along the south, east, and north 
sides of the site. In order to aid the excavation, slurry wall technology was utilized. In this 
technology, a trench is dug in the eventual location of the perimeter retaining walls. A bentonite 
slurry is pumped into the trench as it is excavated, and used to keep the trench open against the 
surrounding earth. Reinforcing steel is lowered into the trench, and concrete is placed through a 
tremie to create a reinforced concrete wall around the site perimeter. After the concrete wall is 
cured, excavation of the substructure begins. As the excavation progresses below surrounding 
grade, tiebacks are drilled through the exposed concrete wall and through the surrounding soil into 
the rock below to provide stability for the excavation. At the WTC site, these tiebacks were 
temporary and were replaced in the final construction by the subterranean floor slabs that provided 
lateral support to the walls.  
 A further challenge to the construction of the substructure was the presence of two 
existing subway lines across the site. The Interboro Rapid Transit System 1 and 9 subway lines, 
operated by the MTA, ran north to south across the middle of the site adjacent to the east wall of the  
substructure. A second subway system, PATH, operated by the Port Authority, made a 180-degree 
terminal bend beneath the western half of the site. This subway tunnel was temporarily supported 
across the excavation and incorporated into the final construction with a station provided for this 
line inside the slurry wall, just west of the 1 and 9 subway lines, and below the Plaza area just east 
of WTC 1 and partially below WTC 6. Although significant damage was sustained by the buildings, 
subterranean structure, and subway system, only the performances of the above-grade buildings 
were assessed in this research.  
 
2.8 Timeline and Event Summary  
 On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial jetliners were 
deliberately flown into the WTC towers. The first plane, American Airlines Flight 11, originated at 
Boston's Logan International Airport at 7:59 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time. The plane was flown 
south, over midtown Manhattan, and crashed into the north face of the north tower (WTC 1) at 8:46 
a.m. The second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, departed Boston at 8:14 a.m., and was flown 
over Staten Island and crashed into the south face of the south tower (WTC 2) at 9:03 a.m.  
 Both flights, scheduled to arrive in Los Angeles, were Boeing 767-200ER series aircraft 
loaded with sufficient fuel for the transcontinental flights. These aircraft are described in Appendix 
E. There were 92 people on board Flight 11 and 65 people on board Flight 175. Figure 2-24 shows 
the approximate flight paths for the two aircraft. The north tower was struck between floors 94 and 
98, with the impact roughly centered on the north face. The south tower was hit between floors 78 
and 84 toward the east side of the south face (Figures 2-25 and 2-26). Each plane banked steeply as 
it was flown into the building, causing damage across multiple floors. According to Government 
sources, the speed of impact into the north tower was estimated to be 410 knots, or 470 miles per 
hour (mph), and the speed of impact into the south tower was estimated to be 510 knots, or 590 
mph. As the two aircraft impacted the buildings, fireballs erupted (Figure 2-27) and jet fuel spread 
across the impact floors and down interior shaftways, igniting fires (Figure 2-28). The term fireball 
is used to describe deflagration, or ignition, of a fuel vapor cloud. As the resulting fires raged 
throughout the upper floors of the two WTC towers, thousands attempted to evacuate the buildings. 
It was estimated by the Port Authority that the population of the WTC complex on September 11, 
2001, was 58,000 people. This estimate includes the PATH and MTA stations and the Concourse 
areas. Almost everyone in WTC 1 and WTC 2 who was below the impact areas was able to safely  
evacuate the buildings, due to the length of time between the impact and collapse of the individual 
towers.  
At 9:59 a.m., 56 minutes after it was struck, the south tower collapsed. The north tower continued 
to stand until 10:29 a.m., when it, too, collapsed. The north tower had survived 1 hour and 43 
minutes from the time the jetliner crashed into it. A total of 2,830 people lost their lives in the 
collapse of the WTC towers, including 2,270 building occupants, 157 airplane crew and passengers, 
and 403 firefighters, police personnel, and other emergency responders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-24 
Approximate flight paths of aircraft 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-25 WTC impact location and resulting fireballs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-26 Areas of aircraft debris impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2-27 Fireball erupts on the north face of WTC 2 as United Airlines Flight 175 strikes the building. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-28 Ignition of fire. 
 
 
  
 Debris from the collapsing towers, some of it still on fire, rained down on surrounding 
buildings, causing structural damage and starting new fires (Figure 2-29). The sudden collapse of 
each tower sent out air pressure waves that spread dust clouds of building materials in all directions 
for many blocks. The density and pressure of the dust clouds were strong enough to carry light 
debris and lift or move small vehicles and break windows in adjacent buildings for several blocks 
around the WTC site. Most of the fires went unattended as efforts were devoted to rescuing those 
trapped in the collapsed towers. The 22-story Marriott World Trade Center Hotel (WTC 3) was hit 
by a substantial amount of debris during both tower collapses. Portions of WTC 3 were severely 
damaged by debris from each tower collapse, but progressive collapse of the building did not occur. 
However, little of WTC 3 remained standing after the collapse of WTC 1. WTC 4, 5, and 6 had 
floor contents and furnishings burnt completely and suffered significant partial collapses from 
debris impacts and from fire damage to their structural frames. WTC 7, a 47-story building that was 
part of the WTC complex, burned unattended for 7 hours before collapsing at 5:20 p.m. The falling 
debris also damaged water mains around the WTC site at the following locations:  
• 20-inch main on West Street, close to the slurry wall, about midway between Vesey 
Street and Liberty Street  
•  20-inch main along the Financial Center north of the South Link Bridge  
• 20-inch main at the corner of Liberty Street and West Street  
• main in front of the West Street entrance to 90 West  
• 24-inch main on Vesey Street, near West Street  
•  main at the corner of Vesey Street and West Broadway, near the subway station  
•  main at the southwest edge of 30 West Broadway 16-inch main inside the slurry wall 
Damaged mains were located after the collapses, but access was impeded by the 
collapse debris.  
 The timeline of the major events is summarized in Table 3.4. The times and seismic data 
were recorded at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO) of Columbia University. The 
signal duration and Richter Scale magnitudes were included to indicate the relative magnitudes of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-29 Schematic depiction of areas of collapse debris, based on aerial photograph and documented 
damage. striped areas indicate predominant locations of exterior steel columns, inner circle approximate 
radius of exterior steel columns and other heavy debris. Outer circles indicate approximate radius of 
aluminum cladding and other lighter debris. Heavy Xs show where exterior steel columns were found 
outside the predominate debris areas.  
 
energy transmitted through the ground between the events. Figure 2-30 shows the accelograms 
recorded by the observatory during the events. 
  Other buildings surrounding the WTC plaza were also damaged by falling debris. A few 
buildings, such as the Bankers Trust building, suffered significant damage but remained standing.  
  
     Table 2.4 Timeline of Major Events1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Many buildings had their façades and glazing damaged and their interiors blanketed with debris 
from the collapse of the WTC towers and WTC 7. Figures 2-31 and 2-32 are satellite images of the 
WTC site taken before and after the September 11 attacks, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-30 Seismic recordings on east-west component at Palisades, NY, for events at WTC on September 
11, 2001, distance 34 km. Three hours of continuous data are shown starting at 08:40 EDT (12:40 UTC). The 
two largest signals were generated by the collapses of towers 1 and 2. Expanded views of first impact and 
first collapse are shown in red. The amplitude of the seismic signal is in nanometers per second (nm/s), and 
the peak amplitude of the ground motion at this station reached to 4,545 nm/s for the first collapse. Note the 
relatively periodic motions for impacts 1 and 2. 
2.9 Overview of Building Codes and Fire Standards  
2.9.1 Building codes  
 Building design and occupancy in the United States is governed by building codes that 
specify the minimum environmental, or external, loads that a building must have the strength to 
resist. They also prescribe requirements for internal challenges such as fire protection and timely 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-31 Satellite photograph of the WTC site taken before the attacks. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-32 Satellite photograph of the WTC site taken after the attacks. 
 
egress for life safety. However, designers must consider project circumstances and owner 
requirements when determining building design loads. The primary external loads specified are:  
• Gravity. 
•  wind  
•  earthquake  
 Other risks considered include the potential for fire, hazardous material leaks or explosion, 
and the need to promptly evacuate occupants to safety. These demands establish building code 
requirements for fire resistive construction, emergency egress, and fire protection systems.  
 National model building codes do not include requirements to design for loads that might 
be imposed due to acts of war or terrorism. It is usually considered unnecessary to provide the 
capacity to resist such loads in most buildings; however, these loads may be included at the 
discretion of building owners if they desire a higher level of protection (e.g., an embassy, bank, or 
military facility). 
  Gravity loads include both the weight of the building and its contents. The weight of the 
building is calculated based on building construction plans and material densities. The weight of the 
contents is not specifically known at the time of design because it will depend on the building user 
and will vary with time. Therefore, the codes specify minimum floor loads on a pounds per square 
foot basis. For instance, for standard office occupancy, the codes typically specify a minimum live 
load of 50 pounds per square foot (psf) of floor area. It is the responsibility of the building owners 
to see that floors are not overloaded.  
 Wind loads specified by codes are based on maps of design wind speed for different 
regions of the country. As wind speed increases, the wind pressure on the building increases 
proportionally to the square of the wind velocity. The pressure on the building also varies with the 
height and degree of shielding provided by other buildings and geographic features. Although not 
usually required by building codes, engineers frequently use wind tunnel studies to more accurately 
determine wind loads on tall buildings, where standard calculations may not be adequate. WTC 1, 
2, 4, 5, and 6 all had extensive wind tunnel studies performed as part of the design process. WTC 1 
and WTC 2 were among the first structures that were designed using wind tunnel studies.  
 The hazard presented by earthquakes is also highly dependent on the geographic region. In 
all regions of the country, including the most severe seismic areas of California, the effects of 
earthquakes are relatively small for very tall buildings. The flexibility of a very tall building, say 
100 stories, generally allows the building to respond as the ground moves back and forth without  
 
 
developing forces nearly as large as those produced by design wind loads. Therefore, even in a 
severe seismic area, tall building design is generally controlled by wind loads.  
 Engineers design buildings for gravity, wind, and earthquake loads. Architects, in concert 
with fire protection professionals, including fire protection engineers, oversee the selection and 
application of fire resistive construction elements and fire protection systems such as sprinklers, fire 
alarms, and special hazard protection.  
 The building codes also prescribe the minimum requirements for life safety if a fire 
occurs. The prescribed fire safety features are intended to limit the fire threat and safeguard those in 
the building. Prime among these features are the egress and emergency notification (alarm) 
requirements. Particularly in high-rise buildings, fire safety requirements are prescribed to maintain 
the integrity of the structure by controlling the intensity of fire and providing adequate structural 
strength during fires. In modern building codes, this is accomplished through a three-step approach:  
• The first line of defense is the automatic sprinkler protection designed to control fires 
in their early stage of development and either extinguish them or hold the fire in check 
for the arrival of the fire department. Sprinklers are not normally capable of 
controlling fires that are of large size before the sprinklers can operate. Such was the 
case in the WTC towers. 
•   The second line of defense is manual firefighting by the fire department or fire 
brigades. The building is provided with standpipes, emergency control of elevators, 
special emergency communication systems, control centers, and other features to 
enable effective firefighting above the levels that can be attacked from the exterior. It 
was this line of defense that successfully controlled the 1975 fire. In the September 11 
incident, the damage done to the elevators and the height of the fires precluded the fire 
department from being able to directly attack the fire. Even if they had reached the fire 
floors, they would have been faced with a fire situation possibly beyond even the 
excellent capabilities of the FDNY.  
•  The final line is the fire resistance of the building and its elements, including the 
building frame, the floors, partitions, shaft enclosures, and other elements that 
compartmentalize the building and structurally support it. Most important of these are 
the requirements for the structural frame (including columns, girders, and trusses). See 
Section 1.5.3 for a discussion of fire resistance ratings.  
 All three of these lines of defense were present, but were overwhelmed by the magnitude 
of the events of September 11, 2001. 
  
  For life safety and egress, stairways must have minimum widths based on the maximum 
number of occupants who may be in the building. Stairs must be separated from the remainder of 
the building by a minimum 1- or 2-hour fire resistant barrier to provide a level of safety while 
occupants traverse the stairs. At least two stairways must be provided with widely separated entry 
points. In most jurisdictions, elevators are designed to automatically return to the lobby level during 
a fire alarm to be controlled by firefighters. In many high-rise buildings, the elevator shafts and exit 
stairs are pressurized to keep out smoke and heat. The use of elevators is discouraged for 
emergency egress because of the potential for elevator failure and the likelihood of the elevator 
shaft acting like a chimney, carrying heat, smoke, and toxic gases throughout the building.  
 Fire protection systems (sprinklers, fire alarms, and special-hazard protection) are required 
to provide early notification and fire control until the fire department can arrive and begin manual 
suppression efforts. Smoke management systems are intended to aid emergency evacuation of 
building occupants and operations of emergency personnel. Manual suppression efforts by 
emergency personnel are aided by the presence of standpipe systems.  
2.9.2 Unusual building loads  
 In planning a new building, an owner may request enhanced requirements in its design for 
events that are not anticipated by the building codes. In some cases, where unusual hazards such as 
explosive or toxic materials exist, the building codes prescribe special life safety and fire protection 
features. In most non-hazardous occupancies, these are not required. Only a very small percentage 
of buildings have extraordinary provisions for unusual circumstances and there is a limit to the 
events that can be handled and the strength capacities that can be provided. Defense facilities, 
nuclear power plants, and overseas embassies are just a few examples where special strengthening 
features are requested by building owners in the design and engineering of their facilities.  
 The WTC towers were the first structures outside of the military and the nuclear industries 
whose design considered the impact of a jet airliner, the Boeing 707. It was assumed in the 1960s 
design analysis for the WTC towers that an aircraft, lost in fog and seeking to land at a nearby 
airport, like the B-25 Mitchell bomber that struck the Empire State Building on July 28, 1945, 
might strike a WTC tower while low on fuel and at landing speeds. However, in the September 11 
events, the Boeing 767-200ER aircraft that hit both towers were considerably larger with 
significantly higher weight, or mass, and travelling at substantially higher speeds. The Boeing 707 
that was considered in the design of the towers was estimated to have a gross weight of 263,000 
pounds and a flight speed of 180 mph as it approached an airport; the Boeing 767-200ER aircraft  
 
 
that were used to attack the towers had an estimated gross weight of 274,000 pounds and flight 
speeds of 470 to 590 mph upon impact.  
 Including aircraft impact as a design load requires selecting a design aircraft, as well as its 
speed, weight, fuel, and angle and elevation of impact. Figure 2-33 compares the design 
characteristics of several large aircraft that were in use or being planned for use during the life of 
the WTC towers. The maximum takeoff weight, fuel capacity, and cruise speed shown for each 
class of aircraft are presented for comparison of relative sizes and speeds. The larger square 
represents the floor plan area of the WTC towers (approximately 207 feet by 207 feet), and the 
smaller square represents a more typical size for a high-rise building. The likelihood of a building 
surviving an aircraft impact decreases as aircraft size and speed increase. The Airbus A380 is 
expected to be flying in 2006. Its weight and fuel capacity are approximately three times those of a  
767-200ER. The security of  aircraft is critical to the safety of high-rise and all other buildings; 
aircraft security measures should be commensurate with the size and potential risk posed by the 
aircraft.  
 The decision to include aircraft impact as a design parameter for a building would clearly 
result in a major change in the design, livability, usability, and cost of buildings. In addition, 
reliably designing a building to survive the impact of the largest aircraft available now or in the 
future may not be possible. These types of loads and analyses are not suitable for inclusion in 
minimum loads required for design of all buildings. Just as the possibility of a Boeing 707 impact 
was a consideration in the original design of WTC 1 and WTC 2, there may be situations where it is 
desirable to evaluate building survival for impact of an airplane of a specific size travelling at a 
specific speed. Although there is limited public information available on this topic (Bangash 1993, 
DOE 1996), interested building owners and design professionals would require further guidance for 
application to buildings.  
2.9.3 Overview of fire-structure interaction  
 Control of structural behavior under fire conditions has historically been based on highly 
prescriptive building code requirements. These requirements specify hourly fire resistance ratings. 
A popular misconception concerning fire resistance ratings for walls, columns, floors, and other 
building components is that the ratings imply the length of time that a building component will 
remain in place when exposed to an actual fire. For example, a 2-hour fire-resistant wall is often 
expected to remain standing for 2 hours if exposed to an actual fire. However, the time to collapse 
of such a wall in an actual fire may be greater or less than 2 hours. The standard method of test to  
evaluate fire resistance (ASTM E119) is a comparative test of relative specimen behavior under 
controlled conditions and is not intended to be predictive of actual behavior. Further, the results of 
the ASTM E119 test do not consider actual conditions such as member interactions, restraint, 
connections, or situations where damage to the structural assembly is present prior to initiation of 
the fire.  
2.9.3.1 ASTM E119 Standard Fire Test  
 Building code requirements for structural fire protection are based on laboratory tests 
conducted in accordance with the Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction 
and Materials, ASTM E119 (also designated NFPA 251 and UL 263). Since its inception in 1918, 
the ASTM E119 Standard Fire Test has required that test specimens be representative of actual 
building construction. Achieving this requirement in actual practice has been difficult because 
available laboratory facilities can only accommodate floor specimens on the order of a 14-foot x 17-
foot (4.3-meter x 5.2-meter) plan area in a fire test furnace. The specimens do not account for 
impact damage to fire protection coatings. For typical steel and concrete structural systems, the 
behavior of specimens in an ASTM E119 fire test does not reflect the behavior of floor and roof 
constructions that are exposed to uncontrolled fire in real buildings. The ASTM E119 fire 
endurance test exposes the test specimen to the time-temperature relationship shown in appendix A, 
Figure A-9. 
  In contrast with the structural characteristics of ASTM E119 test specimens, floor slabs in 
real buildings are continuous over interior beams and girders, connections range from simple shear 
to full moment connections, and framing member size and geometry vary significantly, depending 
on structural system and building size and layout. Even for relatively simple structural systems, 
realistically simulating the restraint, continuity, and redundancy present in actual buildings is 
extremely difficult to achieve in a laboratory fire test assembly. In addition, the size and intensity of 
a real uncontrolled fire and the loads superimposed on a floor system during that exposure are 
variables not investigated during an ASTM E119 fire test. Many factors influence the intensity and 
duration of an uncontrolled fire and the likelihood of full design loads occurring simultaneously 
with peak fire temperatures is minimal.  
 The ASTM E119 Standard Fire Test was developed as a comparative test, not a predictive 
one. In effect, the Standard Fire Test is used to evaluate the relative performance (fire endurance) of 
different construction assemblies under controlled laboratory conditions, not to predict performance 
in real, uncontrolled fires.  
2.9.3.2 Performance in actual Building fires  
 Extensive fire research in the United States and the international community established 
that the temperatures generated during an actual fire, represented by a time-temperature curve, is 
not only a function of the fire load, but also the following:  
 
 
• ventilation (air access through the windows, doors, and heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning [HVAC] system)  
•  compartment geometry (floor area, ceiling height, length to width to height ratios)  
•   thermal properties of the walls, floor, and ceiling construction  
•  combustion characteristics of the fuel (rate and duration of heat release)  
 International research in the past 30 years has substantiated the importance of ventilation 
rates. It is now recognized that two entirely different types of fires can occur within buildings or 
compartments. The first is a "fuel surface controlled fire" that will develop when compartment 
openings are sufficiently large to provide adequate combustion air for unrestricted burning. Such 
fires will generally be of short duration and the intensity will be controlled by the fire load and its 
arrangement.  
 The second type of fire is "ventilation controlled" and will develop when the compartment 
openings are not large enough to allow unrestricted burning. Such fires will burn longer than fires 
controlled by the amount of surface fuel. Fires in large spaces often burn in ventilation controlled 
and fuel surface controlled regimes, at different times during the fire and at different locations 
within the enclosure. 
  These real fires contrast with building code requirements for fire resistant design, which 
are based on a presumed duration of a standard fire as a function of fire load and building 
occupancy, height, and area. The severity of actual fires is determined by additional factors, which 
are not typically considered in building codes except as an alternate material method or equivalency 
when accepted by the enforcing official (the authority having jurisdiction). Although there have 
been a number of severe fires in protected steel buildings, including the three described in Appendix 
A, Section A.3.1.3, the team is unaware of any protected steel structures that have collapsed in a fire 
prior to September 11. However, none of the other fire events had impact damage to structural and 
fire protection systems. Recent fire research provides a basis for designing more reliable fire 
protection for structural members by analytical methods that are becoming more acceptable to the 
building code community. Such methods were not available when the WTC buildings were 
designed in the 1960s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-33 Comparison of high-rise building and aircraft sizes.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTION OF  
WORLD TRADE CENTER TOWERS (WTC1, WTC2) 
 
3.1 General  
 The WTC towers, also known as WTC 1 and WTC 2, were the primary components of the 
seven-building World Trade Center complex. Each of the towers encompassed 110 stories above 
the Plaza level and seven levels below. WTC 1 (the north tower) had a roof height of 1,368 feet, 
briefly earning it the title of the world's tallest building. WTC 2 (the south tower) was nearly as tall, 
with a roof height of 1,362 feet. WTC1 also supported a 360-foot-tall television and radio 
transmission tower. Each building had a square floor plate, 207 feet 2 inches long on each side. 
Corners were chamfered 6 feet 11 inches. Nearly an acre of floor space was provided at each level. 
A rectangular service core, with overall dimensions of approximately 87 feet by 137 feet, was 
present at the center of each building, housing 3 exit stairways, 99 elevators, and 16 escalators. 
Figure 3-1 presents a schematic plan of a representative aboveground floor.  
 The project was developed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (hereafter 
referred to as the Port Authority), a bi-state public agency. Original occupancy of the towers was 
dominated by government agencies, including substantial occupancy by the Port Authority itself. 
However, this occupancy evolved over the years and, by 2001, the predominant occupancy of the 
towers was by commercial tenants, including a number of prominent financial and insurance 
services firms. 
  Design architecture was provided by Minoru Yamasaki & Associates, and Emery Roth & 
Sons served as the architect of record. Skilling, Helle, Christiansen, Robertson were the project 
structural engineers; Jaros, Baum & Bolles were the mechanical engineers; and Joseph R. Loring & 
Associates were the electrical engineers. The Port Authority provided design services for site 
utilities, foundations, basement retaining walls, and paving. Groundbreaking for construction was 
on August 5, 1966. Steel construction began in August 1968. First tenant occupancy of WTC 1 was 
in December 1970, and occupancy of WTC 2 began in January 1972. Ribbon cutting was on April4,  
1973. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Representative floor plan (based on floor plan for 94th and 95th floors of WTC 1). 
 
 
3.2 Structural Description  
 WTC 1 and WTC 2 were similar, but not identical. WTC 1 was 6 feet taller than WTC 2 
and also supported a 360-foot tall transmission tower. The service core in WTC 1 was oriented east 
to west, and the service core in WTC 2 was oriented north to south. In addition to these basic 
configuration differences, the presence of each building affected the wind loads on the other, 
resulting in a somewhat different distribution of design wind pressures, and, therefore, a somewhat 
different structural design of the lateral-force-resisting system. In addition, tenant improvements 
= Core Area 
over the years resulted in removal of portions of floors and placement of new private stairways 
between floors, in a somewhat random pattern. Figure 3-2a-b presents a structural framing plan 
representative of an upper floor in the towers.  
 The buildings' signature architectural design feature was the vertical fenestration, the 
predominant element of which was a series of closely spaced built-up box columns. At typical 
floors, a total of 59 of these perimeter columns were present along each of the flat faces of the 
building. These columns were built up by welding four plates together to form an approximately 
14-inch square section, spaced at 3 feet 4 inches on center. Adjacent perimeter columns were 
interconnected at each floor level by deep spandrel plates, typically 52 inches in depth. In alternate 
stories, an additional column was present at the center of each of the chamfered building corners. 
The resulting configuration of closely spaced columns and deep spandrels created a perforated steel 
bearing-wall frame system that extended continuously around the building perimeter. 
 Figure 3-3 presents a partial elevation of this exterior wall at typical building floors. 
Construction of the perimeter-wall frame made extensive use of modular shop prefabrication. In 
general, each exterior wall module consisted of three columns, three stories tall, interconnected by 
the spandrel plates, using all-welded construction. Cap plates were provided at the tops and bottoms 
of each column, to permit bolted connection to the modules above and below. Access holes were 
provided at the inside face of the columns for attaching high-strength bolted connections. 
Connection strength varied throughout the building, ranging from four bolts at upper stories to six 
bolts at lower stories. Near the building base, supplemental welds were also utilized.  
 Side joints of adjacent modules consisted of high-strength bolted shear connections 
between the spandrels at mid-span. Except at the base of the structures and at mechanical floors, 
horizontal splices between modules were staggered in elevation so that not more than one third of 
the units were spliced in any one story. Where the units were all spliced at common level, 
supplemental welds was used to improve the strength of these connections. Figure 3-3 illustrates the 
construction of typical modules and their interconnection. At the building base, adjacent sets of 
three columns tapered to form a single massive column, in a fork-like formation, shown in      
Figure 3-4.  
 Twelve grades of steel, having yield strengths varying between 42 kips per square inch 
(ksi) and 100 ksi, were used to fabricate the perimeter column and spandrel plates as dictated by the 
computed gravity and wind demands. Plate thickness also varied, both vertically and around the 
building perimeter, to accommodate the predicted loads and minimize differential shortening of 
columns across the floor plate. In upper stories of the building, plate thickness in the exterior wall 
was generally 1/4 inch. At the base of the building, column plates as thick as 4 inches were used. 
Arrangement of member types (grade and thickness) was neither exactly symmetrical within a 
given building nor the same in the two towers.  
 The stiffness of the spandrel plates, created by the combined effects of the short spans and 
significant depth, created a structural system that was stiff both laterally and vertically. Under the 
effects of lateral wind loading, the buildings essentially behaved as cantilevered hollow structural 
tubes with perforated walls. In each building, the windward wall acted as a tension flange for the 
tube while the leeward wall acted as a compression flange. The side walls acted as the webs of the 
tube, and transferred shear between the windward and leeward walls through Vierendeel action 
(Figure 3-5). Vierendeel action occurs in rigid trusses that do not have diagonals. In such structures, 
stiffness is achieved through the flexural (bending) strength of the connected members. In the lower 
seven stories of the towers, where there were fewer columns (Figure 3-4), vertical diagonal braces 
were in place at the building cores to provide this stiffness. This structural frame was considered to 
constitute a tubular system.  
 Floor construction typically consisted of 4 inches of lightweight concrete on 1-1/2-inch, 
22-gauge non-composite steel deck. In the core area, slab thickness was 5 inches. Outside the 
central core, the floor deck was supported by a series of composite floor trusses that spanned 
between the central core and exterior wall. Composite behavior with the floor slab was achieved by 
extending the truss diagonals above the top chord so that they would act much like shear studs, as 
shown in Figure 3-6. Detailing of these trusses was similar to that employed in open-web joist 
fabrication and, in fact, the trusses were manufactured by a joist fabricator, the LaClede Steel 
Corporation. However, the floor system design was not typical of open-web-joist floor systems. It 
was considerably more redundant and was well braced with transverse members. Trusses were 
placed in pairs, with a spacing of 6 feet 8 inches and spans of approximately 60 feet to the sides and 
35 feet at the ends of the central core. Metal deck spanned parallel to the main trusses and was 
directly supported by continuous transverse bridging trusses spaced at 13 feet 4 inches and 
intermediate deck support angles spaced at 6 feet 8 inches from the transverse trusses. The 
combination of main trusses, transverse trusses, and deck support enabled the floor system to act as 
a grillage to distribute load to the various columns.  
 At the exterior wall, truss top chords were supported in bearing off seats extending from 
the spandrels at alternate columns. Welded plate connections with an estimated ultimate capacity of 
90 kips (refer to Appendix B) tied the pairs of trusses to the exterior wall for out-of-plane forces. At  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2a Representative structural framing plan, upper floors. 
 
the central core, trusses were supported on seats off a girder that ran continuously past and was 
supported by the core columns. Nominal out-of-plane connection was provided between the trusses 
and these girders. Figures 3-7 and 3-8 illustrate this construction, and Figure 3-9 shows a cross-
section through typical floor framing. Floors were designed for a uniform live load of 100 pounds 
per square foot (psf) over any 200-square-foor area with allowable live load reductions taken over 
larger areas. At building corners, this amounted to a uniform live load (unreduced) of 55 psf. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2b Representative structural framing plan, upper floors. 
At approximately 10,000 locations in each building, viscoelastic dampers extended between the 
lower chords of the trusses and gusset plates mounted on the exterior columns beneath the stiffened 
seats (Detail A in Figure 3-6). These dampers were the first application of this technology in a high-
rise building, and were provided to reduce occupant perception of wind-induced building motion. 
 Pairs of flat bars extended diagonally from the exterior wall to the top chord of adjacent 
trusses. These diagonal flat bars, which were typically provided with shear studs, provided 
horizontal shear transfer between the floor slab and exterior wall, as well as out-of-plane bracing for 
perimeter columns not directly supporting floor trusses (Fig 3-2). 
 The core consisted of 5-inch concrete fill on metal deck supported by floor framing of 
rolled structural shapes, in turn supported by a combination of wide flange shape and box-section 
columns. Some of these columns were very large, with cross sections measuring 14 inches wide by 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Partial elevation of exterior bearing-wall frame showing exterior wall module construction. 
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Figure 3-4 Base of exterior wall frame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Structural tube frame behavior. 
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Figure 3-6  Floor truss member with details of end connections. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Erection of prefabricated components,                Figure 3-8 Erection of floor framing                 
forming exterior wall and floor deck units.                            during original construction 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Cross-sections through main double trusses, showing transverse truss. 
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Figure 3-10 Outrigger truss system at tower roof.  
 
36 inches deep. In upper stories, these rectangular box columns transitioned into heavy rolled wide 
flange shape. 
 Between the 106th and 110th floors, a series of diagonal braces were placed into the 
building frame. These diagonal braces together with building columns and floor framing formed a 
deep outrigger truss system that extended between the exterior walls and a cross the building core 
framing. A total of 10 outrigger truss lines were present in each building (Fig 3-10), 6 extended a 
cross the long direction of the core and 4 extended a cross the short direction of the core. This 
outrigger truss system provided stiffening of the frame for wind resistance, mobilized some of the 
dead weight supported by the core to provide stability against wind-induced overturning, and also 
provided direct support for the transmission tower on WTC 1. Although WTC 2 did not have a  
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Figure 3-11 Location of subterranean structure.  
 
 transmission tower, the outrigger trusses in that building were also designed to support 
such a tower.  
 A deep subterranean structure was present beneath the WTC Plaza (Figure 3-11) and the 
two towers. The western half of this substructure, bounded by West Street to the west and by the 
1/9 subway line that extends approximately between West Broadway and Greenwich Street on the 
east, was 70 feet deep and contained six subterranean levels. The structure housed a shopping mall 
and building mechanical and electrical services, and it also provided a station for the PATH subway 
line and parking for the complex. 
 Prior to construction, the site was underlain by deep deposits of fill material, informally 
placed over a period of several hundred years to displace the adjacent Hudson River shoreline and 
create additional usable land area. In order to construct this structure, the eventual perimeter walls 
for the subterranean structure were constructed using the slurry wall technique. After the concrete 
wall was cured and attained sufficient strength, excavation of the basement was initiated. As 
excavation proceeded downward, tieback anchors were drilled diagonally down through the wall 
and grouted into position in the rock deep behind the walls. These anchors stabilized the wall 
against the soil and water pressures from the unexcavated side as the excavation continued on the 
inside. After the excavation was extended to the desired grade, foundations were formed and poured 
against the exposed bedrock, and the various subgrade levels of the structure were constructed.  
 Floors within the substructure were of reinforced concrete flat-slab construction, 
supported by structural steel columns. Many of these steel columns also provided support for the 
structures located above the plaza level. After the floor slabs were constructed, they were used to  
 
provide lateral support for the perimeter walls, holding back the earth pressure from the 
unexcavated side. The tiebacks, which had been installed as a temporary stabilizing measure, were 
decommissioned by cutting off their end anchorage hardware and repairing the pockets in the slurry 
wall where these anchors had existed.  
 Tower foundations beneath the substructure consisted of massive spread footings, 
socketed into and bearing directly on the massive bedrock. Steel grillages, consisting of layers of 
orthogonally placed steel beams, were used to transfer the immense column loads, in bearing, to the 
reinforced concrete footings.  
3.3 Fire Protection  
 The fire safety of a building is provided by a system of interdependent fire protection 
features, including suppression systems, detection systems, notification devices, smoke 
management systems, and passive systems such as compartmentation and structural protection. The 
failure of any of these fire protection systems will impact the effectiveness of the other systems in 
the building.  
3.3.1 Passive protection  
 In WTC 1, structural elements up to the 39th floor were originally protected from fire with 
a spray-applied product containing asbestos (Nicholson, et al. 1980). These asbestos-containing 
materials were later abated inside the building, either through encapsulation or replacement. On all 
other floors and throughout WTC 2, a spray-applied, asbestos-free mineral fiber material was used. 
Each element of the steel floor trusses was protected with spray-applied material. The specific 
material used was a low-density, factory-mixed product consisting of manufactured inorganic 
fibers, proprietary cement-type binders, and other additives in low concentrations to promote 
wetting, set, and dust control. Air setting, hydraulic setting, and ceramic setting binders were added 
in varying quantities and combinations or singly at the site, depending on the particular application 
and weather conditions. Finally, water was added at the nozzle of the spray gun as the material was 
sprayed onto the member to be protected. The average thickness of spray-applied fireproofing on 
the trusses was 3/4 inch. In the mid-1990s, a decision was made to upgrade the fire protection by 
applying additional material onto the trusses so as to increase fireproofing thickness to 1-1/2 inches. 
The fireproofing upgrade was applied to individual floors as they became vacant. By September 11, 
2001, a total of 31 stories had been upgraded, including the entire impact zone in WTC 1 (floors 94-
98), but only the 78th floor in the impact zone in WTC 2 (floors 78-84). spandrels and girders were 
specified to have sufficient protection to achieve a 3-hour rating. Except for the interior face of 
perimeter columns between spandrels, which were protected with a plaster material, spray-applied 
materials similar to those used on the floor systems were used. The thickness of protection on 
spandrels and girders varied, with the more massive steel column sections receiving reduced 
fireproofing thickness relative to the thinner elements.  
 The primary vertical compartmentation was provided by the floor slabs that were cast 
flush against the spandrel beams at the exterior wall, providing separation between floors at the 
building perimeter. After a fire in 1975, vertical penetrations for cabling and plumbing were sealed 
with fire-resistant material. At stair and elevator shafts, separation was provided by a wall system 
constructed of metal studs and two layers of 5/8-inch thick gypsum board on the exterior and one 
layer of 5/8-inch thick gypsum board on the interior. These assemblies provided a 2-hour rating. 
Horizontal compartmentation varied throughout the complex. Some separating walls ran from slab 
to slab, while others extended only up to the suspended ceiling. A report by the New York Board of 
Fire Underwriters (NYBFU) titled One World Trade Center Fire, February 13, 1975 (NYBFU 
1975) presented a detailed discussion of the compartmentation features of the building at that time.  
3.3.2 Suppression  
 When originally constructed, the two towers were not provided with automatic fire 
sprinkler protection. However, such protection was installed as a retrofit circa 1990, and automatic 
sprinklers covered nearly 100 percent of WTC 1 and WTC 2 at the time of the September 11 
attacks. In addition, each building had standpipes running through each of its three stairways. A 1.5-
inch hose line and a cabinet containing two air-pressurized water (APW) extinguishers were also 
present at each floor in each stairway.  
 The primary water supply was provided by a dedicated fire yard main that looped around 
most of the complex. This yard main was supplied directly from the municipal water supply. Two 
remotely located high-pressure, multi-stage, 750-gallons per minute (gpm) electrical fire pumps 
took suction from the New York City municipal water supply and produced the required operating 
pressures for the yard main. 
  Each tower had three electrical fire pumps that provided additional pressure for the 
standpipes. One pump, located on the 7th floor, received the discharge from the yard main fire 
pumps and moved it up to the 41st floor, where a second 750-gpm fire pump pushed it up to a third 
pump on the 75th floor. Each fire pump produced sufficient pressure to supply water to the pump 
two stages up from it in the event that any one pump should fail. Several 5,000-gallon storage tanks, 
filled from the domestic water system, provided a secondary water supply. Tanks on the 41st, 75th, 
and 110th floors provided water directly to a standpipe system. A tank on the 20th floor supplied 
water directly to the yard main. Numerous Fire Department of New York (FDNY) connections 
were located around the complex to allow the fire department to boost water pressure in the 
buildings. 
3.3.3 Smoke management 
  A zoned smoke control system was built into each building' s ventilation systems and was 
activated upon direction of the responding FDNY Incident Commander. The system was designed 
to limit smoke spread from the tenant area to the core area, thereby assisting both individuals 
evacuating from an area and those responding to the scene by limiting smoke spread into the core. 
3.3.4 Fire department features 
 At the time of the 1993 world trade center bombing, a centralized Fire Command Center 
(FCC) for the two towers was present at the Concourse level. This FCC was located in the B-1 level 
Operations Control Center (OCC). Following the 1993 bombing, additional FCCs were installed in 
the lobbies of each tower. 
 A Radiax cable and antenna were installed in the WTC complex to facilitate the use of 
FDNY radios in the towers, fire department telephones were provided in both towers on odd floors 
in stairway 3, as well as on levels B-1, B-4, and B-6. 
 The WTC had its own fire brigade, consisting of Port Authority police officers trained in 
fire safety, who worked with the FDNY to investigate fire conditions and take appropriate actions. 
The internal fire brigade had access to fire carts located on the Concourse level and on the 44th and 
78th floor sky lobbies of each tower. These fire carts were equipped with hoses, nozzles, self-
contained breathing apparatus, turnout coats, forcible entry tools, resuscitators, first-aid kits, and 
other emergency equipment. Typically, the WTC fire brigade would collect the nearest fire cart and 
set up operations on the floor below the fire floor. 
 The WTC complex had 24 Siamese connection located at street level for use by the FDNY 
apparatus. Each of these Siamese connections served various portions of the complex and was 
identified as such. 
3.4 Emergency Egress 
 Each tower was provided with three independent emergency fire exit stairways, located in 
the core of the building, as indicated in figure 3-12. Two of these stairways, designated stairway 1 
and stairway 2, were 44 inches wide and ran to the 110th floor. The third stairway, designated 
stairway 3, had a width of 56 inches and ran to the 108th floor. The stairways did not run in  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12Floor plan of 94th and 95th floors of WTC 1showing egress stairways. 
 
continuous vertical shaft from the top of the bottom of the structure. Instead, the plan location of the 
stairways shifted at some levels, and occupants traversing the stairways were required to move from 
one vertical shaft to another through a transfer corridor. Both stairways 1 and 2 had transfers at the 
42nd, 48th, 76th, and 82nd levels. Stairway 1 had an additional transfer at the 26th level and stairway 3 
had a single transfer at the 76th level. After the 1993 bombing, battery-operated emergency lighting 
was provided in the stairways and photo luminescent paint was placed on the edge of the stair 
treated to facilitate emergency egress. 
 There were 99 elevators in each of the towers, including 23 express elevators; however; 
the express elevators were not intended to be used for emergency access or egress. There were also 
several freight elevators servicing groups of floors in the buildings. The several elevators that 
served each floor were broken into two groups that operated on different power supplies. 
 Upon alarm activation, an automatic elevator override system commanded all elevators 
serving or affected by a fire area to immediately return to the ground floor, or to their sky lobby 
(44th and 78th). From there, the elevators could be operated manually by the FDNY. Although many 
Stair 1 Stair 2 
Stair 3 
fire departments routinely use elevators to provide better access in high-rise buildings, FDNY does 
not do this, because there have been fatalities associated with such use. 
3.5 Emergency Power 
 Primary power was provided at 13.8 kilovolts (kV) through a ground level substation in 
WTC 7 near the Barclay Street entrance to the underground parking garage. The primary power was 
wired to the buildings through two separate systems. The first provided power throughout each 
building; the second provided power to emergency systems in the event that the primary wiring 
system failed. 
 Six 1,200-kilowatt (kW) emergency power generators located in the sixth basement (B-6) 
level provided a secondary power supply. These generators were checked on a routine basis to 
ensure that they would function properly during an emergency. This equipment provided backup 
power for communications equipment, elevators, emergency lighting in corridors and stairwells, 
and fire pumps. Telephone systems were provided with an independent battery backup system. 
Emergency lighting units in exit stairways, elevator lobbies, and elevator cabs were equipped with 
individual backup batteries. 
3.6 Management Procedures 
 The Port Authority has a risk management group that coordinates fire and safety activities 
for their various properties. This group provided training for the WTC fire brigade, fire safety 
directors, and tenant fire wardens. The WTC had 25 fire safety directors who assisted in the 
coordination of fire safety activities in the buildings throughout the year. Six satellite 
communication stations, staffed by deputy fire safety directors, were spaced throughout the towers. 
In addition, each tenant was required to provide at least one fire warden. Tenants that occupied 
large areas of the building were required to provide one fire warden for every 7,500 square feet of 
occupied space. The fire safety directors trained the fire wardens and fire drills were held twice a 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 Building Response  
 WTC 1 and WTC 2 each experienced a similar, though not identical, series of loading 
events. In essence, each tower was subjected to three separate, but related events. The sequence of 
these events was the same for the two buildings, although the timing was not. In each case, the first 
loading event was a Boeing 767-200ER series commercial aircraft hitting the building, together 
with a fireball resulting from immediate rapid ignition of a portion of the fuel on board the aircraft. 
Boeing 767-200ER aircraft has a maximum rated takeoff weight of 395,000 pounds, a wingspan of 
156 feet 1 inch, and a rated cruise speed of 530 miles per hour. The aircraft is capable of carrying 
up to 23,980 gallons of fuel, and it is estimated that, at the time of impact, each aircraft had 
approximately 10,000 gallons of unused fuel on board (compiled from Government sources).  
 In each case, the aircraft impacts resulted in severe structural damage, including some 
localized partial collapse, but did not result in the initiation of global collapse. In fact, WTC 1 
remained standing for a period of approximately 1 hour and 43 minutes, following the initial 
impact; WTC 2 remained standing for approximately 56 minutes following impact. The second 
event was the simultaneous ignition and growth of fires over large floor areas on several levels of 
the buildings. The fires heated the structural systems and, over a period of time, resulted in 
additional stressing of the damaged structure, as well as sufficient additional damage and strength 
loss to initiate the third event, a progressive sequence of failures that culminated in total collapse of 
both structures.  
4.1.1 WTC 1  
4.1.1.1 Initial damage from aircraft impact  
 American Airlines Flight 11 struck the north face of WTC 1 approximately between the 
94th and 98th floors (Figures 4-1 and 4-2), causing massive damage to the north face of the 
building within the immediate area (Figure 4-3). At the central zone of impact corresponding to the 
airplane fuselage and engines, at least five of the prefabricated, three-column sections that formed 
the exterior walls were broken loose of the structure, and some were pushed inside the building 
envelope. Locally, floors supported by these exterior wall sections appeared to have partially 
collapsed, losing their support along the exterior wall. Away from this central zone, in areas 
impacted by the outer wing structures, the exterior columns were fractured by the force of the 
collision. Interpretation of photographic evidence suggests that from 31 to 36 columns on the north 
building face were destroyed over portions of a four-story range. Partial collapse of floors in this 
zone appear to have occurred over a horizontal length of wall of approximately 65 feet, while floors 
in other portions of the building appear to have remained intact. Figure 4-4 shows the damage to the 
exterior columns on the impacted face of WTC 1.  
 In addition to this damage at the building perimeter, a significant but undefined amount of 
damage also occurred to framing at the central core. Interviews were conducted with persons who 
were present in offices on the 91st floor of the building at the north face of the structure, three floors 
below the approximate zone of impact. Their descriptions of the damage evident at this floor level 
immediately following the aircraft impact suggest relatively slight damage at the exterior wall of the 
building, but progressively greater damage to the south and east. They described extensive building 
debris in the eastern portion of the central core, preventing their access to the easternmost exit 
stairway. This suggests the possibility of immediate partial collapse of framing in the central core. 
These persons also described the presence of debris from collapsed partition walls from upper 
floors in stairways located further to the west, suggesting the possibility of some structural damage 
in the northwestern portion of the core framing as well. Figure 4-5 is a sketch made during an 
interview with building occupants indicating portions of the 91st floor that could not be accessed 
due to accumulated debris.  
 It is known that some debris from the aircraft travelled completely through the structure. 
For example, life jackets and portions of seats from the aircraft were found on the roof of the 
Bankers Trust building, located to the south of WTC 2. Part of the landing gear from this aircraft 
was found at the corner of West and Rector Streets, some five blocks south of the WTC complex 
(Figure 4-6). As this debris passed through the building, it doubtless caused some level of damage 
to the structure across the floor plate, including, potentially, interior framing, core columns, framing 
at the east, south, and west walls, and the floors themselves. The exact extent of this damage will 
likely never be known with certainty. It is evident that, despite this damage, the structure retained 
sufficient integrity and strength to remain globally stable for a period of approximately 1 hour and 
43 minutes.  
 The building's structural system, composed of the exterior load bearing frame, the gravity 
load bearing frame at the central core, and the system of deep outrigger trusses in upper stories, was 
highly redundant. This permitted the building to limit the immediate zone of collapse to the area 
where several stories of exterior columns were destroyed by the initial impact and, perhaps, to 
portions of the central core as previously described. Following the impact, floor loads originally  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Zone of aircraft impact on the north face of WTC 1.  
 
supported by the exterior columns in compression were successfully transferred to other load paths. 
Most of the load supported by the failed columns is believed to have transferred to adjacent 
perimeter columns through Vierendeel behavior of the exterior wall frame. Preliminary structural 
analyses of similar damage to WTC 2 suggests that axial load demands on columns immediately 
adjacent to the destroyed columns may have increased by as much as a factor of 6 relative to the 
load state prior to aircraft impact. However, these exterior columns appear to have had substantial 
over strength for gravity loads. 
Neglecting the potential loss of lateral support resulting from collapsed floor slabs and any 
loss of strength due to elevated temperatures from fires, the most heavily loaded columns were 
probably near, but not over, their ultimate capacities. Columns located further from the impact zone  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 approximate zone of impact of aircraft on the north face of WTC 1.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Impact damage to the north face of WTC 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL NOTE: (1) Column damage captured from photographs and enhanced   (2) Damage to column lines 111-115 at level 98 is estimates.              
                                       videos.   
Figure 4-4 Impact damage to exterior columns on the north face of WTC 1.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4-5 
Approximate debris location on the 91st 
 floor of WTC 1.  
 
Figure  4-6 
Landing gear found at the corner of West and Rector Streets.  
are thought to have remained substantially below their ultimate capacities. The preliminary analyses 
also indicate that loss of the columns resulted in some immediate tilting of the structure toward the 
impact area, subjecting the remaining columns and structure to additional stresses from P-delta 
effects. Also, in part, exterior columns above the zone of impact were converted from compression 
members to hanger-type tension members, so that, in effect, a portion of the floors' weight became 
suspended from the outrigger trusses (Figure 3-10) and were transferred back to the interior core 
columns. The outrigger trusses also would have been capable of transferring some of the load 
carried by damaged core columns to adjacent core columns. Figure 4-7 illustrates these various 
secondary load paths. Section 4.1.2.2 provides a more detailed description of these analyses and 
findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7 Redistribution of load after aircraft impact.  
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 Following the aircraft impact into the building, the structure was able to successfully 
redistribute the building weight to the remaining elements and to maintain a stable condition. This 
return to a stable condition is suggested by the preliminary analyses and also evidenced by the fact 
that the structure remained standing for 1 hour and 43 minutes following the impact. However, the 
structure's global strength was severely degraded. Although the structure may have been able to 
remain standing in this weakened condition for an indefinite period, it had limited ability to resist 
additional loading and could potentially have collapsed as a result of any severe loading event, such 
as that produced by high winds or earthquakes. WTC 1 probably experienced some additional 
loading and damage due to the collapse of the adjacent WTC 2. The extent of such damage is not 
known but likely included broken window and façade elements along the south face. This additional 
damage was not sufficient to cause collapse. The first event of sufficient severity to cause collapse 
was the fires that followed the aircraft impact.  
4.1.1.2 Fire development  
 It is estimated, based on information compiled from Government sources, that each 
aircraft contained about 10,000 gallons of jet fuel upon impact into the buildings. A review of 
photographic and video records shows that the aircraft fully entered the buildings prior to any visual 
evidence of flames at the exteriors of the buildings. This suggests that, as the aircrafts crashed into 
and plowed across the buildings, they distributed jet fuel throughout the impact area to form a 
flammable "cloud." Ignition of this cloud resulted in a rapid pressure rise, expelling a fuel rich 
mixture from the impact area into shafts and through other openings caused by the crashes, 
resulting in dramatic fireballs.  
 Although only limited video footage is available that shows the crash of American 
Airlines Flight 11 into WTC 1 and the ensuing fireballs, extensive video records of the impact of 
United Airlines Flight 175 into WTC 2 are available. These videos show that three fireballs 
emanated from WTC 2 on the south, east, and west faces. The fireballs grew slowly, reaching their 
full size after about 2 seconds. The diameters of the fireballs were greater than 200 feet, exceeding 
the width of the building. Such fireballs were formed when the expelled jet fuel dispersed and 
flames travelled through the resulting fuel/air mixture. Experimentally based correlations for similar 
fireballs (Zalosh 1995) were used to estimate the amount of fuel consumed. The precise size of the 
fireballs and their exact shapes are not well defined; therefore, there is some uncertainty associated 
with estimates of the amount of fuel consumed by these effects. Calculations indicate that between 
1,000 and 3,000 gallons of jet fuel were likely consumed in this manner. Barring additional 
information, it is reasonable to assume that an approximately similar amount of jet fuel was 
consumed by fireballs as the aircraft struck WTC 1.  
 Although dramatic, these fireballs did not explode or generate a shock wave. If an 
explosion or detonation had occurred, the expansion of the burning gasses would have taken place 
in microseconds, not the 2 seconds observed. Therefore, although there were some overpressures, it 
is unlikely that the fireballs, being external to the buildings, would have resulted in significant 
structural damage. It is not known whether the windows that were broken shortly after impact were 
broken by these external overpressures, overpressures internal to the building, the heat of the fire, or 
flying debris.  
 The first arriving firefighters observed that the windows of WTC 1 were broken out at the 
Concourse level. This breakage was most likely caused by overpressure in the elevator shafts. 
Damage to the walls of the elevator shafts was also observed as low as the 23rd floor, presumably 
as a result of the overpressures developed by the burning of the vapor cloud on the impact floors.  
 If one assumes that approximately 3,000 gallons of fuel were consumed in the initial 
fireballs, then the remainder either escaped the impact floors in the manners described above or was 
consumed by the fire on the impact floors. If half flowed away, then approximately 4,000 gallons 
remained on the impact floors to be consumed in the fires that followed. The jet fuel in the aerosol 
would have burned out as fast as the flame could spread through it, igniting almost every 
combustible on the floors involved. Fuel that fell to the floor and did not flow out of the building 
would have burned as a pool or spill fire at the point where it came to rest.  
 The time to consume the jet fuel can be reasonably computed. At the upper bound, if one 
assumes that all 10,000 gallons of fuel were evenly spread across a single building floor, it would 
form a pool that would be consumed by fire in less than 5 minutes (SFPE 1995) provided sufficient 
air for combustion was available. In reality, the jet fuel would have been distributed over multiple 
floors, and some would have been transported to other locations. Some would have been absorbed 
by carpeting or other furnishings, consumed in the flash fire in the aerosol, expelled and consumed 
externally in the fireballs, or flowed away from the fire floors. Accounting for these factors, it is 
believed that almost all of the jet fuel that remained on the impact floors was consumed in the first 
few minutes of the fire.  
 As the jet fuel burned, the resulting heat ignited office contents throughout a major portion 
of several of the impact floors, as well as combustible material within the aircraft itself.  
 A limited amount of physical evidence about the fires is available in the form of videos 
and still photographs of the buildings and the smoke plume generated soon after the initial attack. 
Estimates of the buoyant energy in the plume were obtained by plotting the rise of the smoke 
plume, which is governed by buoyancy in the vertical direction and by the wind in the horizontal 
direction. Using the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) fire model, Fire Dynamics Simulator 
Ver. 1 (FDS1), fire scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Rehm, 
et al. 2002) were able to mathematically approximate the size of fires required to produce such a 
smoke plume. As input to this model, an estimate of the openings available to provide ventilation 
for the fires was obtained from an examination of photographs taken of the damaged tower. 
Meteorological data on wind velocity and atmospheric temperatures were provided by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) based on reports from the Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS). The information used weather 
monitoring instruments onboard three aircraft that departed from LaGuardia and Newark airports 
between 7:15 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on September 11, 2001. The wind speed at heights equal to the 
upper stories of the towers was in the range of 10-20 mph. The outside temperatures over the height 
of the building were 20-21 °C (68-70 °F).  
 The modeling suggests a peak total rate of fire energy output on the order of 35 trillion 
Btu/hr, around 11.5 gigwatts (GW), for each of the two towers. From one third to one half of this 
energy flowed out of the structures. This vented energy was the force that drove the external smoke 
plume. The vented energy and accompanying smoke from both towers combined into a single 
plume. The energy output from each of the two buildings is similar to the power output of a 
commercial power generating station. The modeling also suggests ceiling gas temperatures of 1,000 
°C (1,800 °F), with an estimated confidence of plus or minus 100 °C (200 °F) or about 900-1,100 
°C (1,600-2,000 °F). A major portion of the uncertainty in these estimates is due to the scarcity of 
data regarding the initial conditions within the building and how the aircraft impact changed the 
geometry and fuel loading. Temperatures may have been as high as 900-1,100 °C (1,700-2,000 °F) 
in some areas and 400-800 °C (800-1,500 °F) in others.  
 The viability of a 35 trillion Btu/hr (11.15 GW) fire depends on the fuel and air supply. 
The surface area of office contents needed to support such a fire range from about 30,000-50,000 
square feet, depending on the composition and final arrangement of the contents and the fuel 
loading present. Given the typical occupied area of a floor as approximately 30,000 square feet, it 
can be seen that simultaneous fire involvement of an area equal to 12 entire floors can produce such 
a fire. Fuel loads are typically described in terms of the equivalent weight of wood. Fuel loads in 
office-type occupancies typically range from about 412 psf, with the mean slightly less than 8 psf 
(Culver 1977). File rooms, libraries, and similar concentrations of paper materials have significantly 
higher concentrations of fuel. At the burning rate necessary to yield these fires, a fuel load of about 
5 psf would be required to provide sufficient fuel to maintain the fire at full force for an hour, and 
twice that quantity to maintain it for 2 hours. The air needed to support combustion would be on the 
order of 600,000-1,000,000 cubic feet per minute.  
 Air supply to support the fires was primarily provided by openings in the exterior walls 
that were created by the aircraft impacts and fireballs, as well as by additional window breakage 
from the ensuing heat of the fires. Table 4.1 lists the estimated exterior wall openings used in these 
calculations. Although the table shows the openings on a floor-by-floor basis, several of the 
openings, particularly in the area of impact, actually spanned several floors (see Figure 4-6).  
 Sometimes, interior shafts in burning high-rise buildings also deliver significant quantities 
of air to a fire, through a phenomenon known as "stack effect," which is created when differences 
between the ambient exterior air temperatures and the air temperatures inside the building result in 
differential air pressures, drawing air up through the shafts to the fire area. Because outside and 
inside temperatures appear to have been virtually the same on September 11, this stack effect was 
not expected to be strong in this case.  
 Based on photographic evidence, the fire burned as a distributed collection of large but 
separate fires with significant temperature variations from space to space, depending on the type 
and arrangement of combustible material present and the available air for combustion in each 
particular space. Consequently, the temperature and related incident heat flux to the structural 
elements varied with both time and location. This information is not currently available, but could 
be modeled with advanced CFD fire models.  
 Damage caused by the aircraft impacts is believed to have disrupted the sprinkler and fire 
standpipe systems, preventing effective operation of either the manual or automatic suppression 
systems.  Even if these systems had not been compromised by the impacts, they would likely have 
been ineffective.  It is believed that the initial flash fires of jet fuel would have opened so many 
sprinkler heads that the systems would have quickly depressurized and been unable to effectively 
deliver water to the large area of fire involvement. Further, the initial spread of fires was so 
extensive as to make occupant use of small hose streams ineffective.  
Table 4.1 Estimated Openings in Exterior Walls of WTC 1  
North  Wall South Wall East Wall West wall Total Area 
Floor 
(ft2) (m2) (ft2) (m2) (ft2) (m2) (ft2) (m2) (ft2) (m2) 
92 743 69 0 0 1,572 146 0 0 2,314 215 
93 958 89 0 0 1,356 126 0 0 2,314 215 
94 592 55 54 5 1,163 108 0 0 1,808 168 
95 1,055 98 54 5 0 0 420 39 1,528 142 
96 797 74 151 14 0 0 1,518 141 2,465 229 
97 926 86 151 14 0 0 1,798 167 2,874 267 
98 1,335 124 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,335 124 
Total 6,405 595 409 38 4,090 380 3,735 347 14,639 1,360 
 
NOTE: Differences in totals are due to rounding in the conversion of square meters to square feet. 
 
4.1.1.3 Evacuation  
 Some occupants of WTC 1 and WTC 2 began to voluntarily evacuate the buildings soon 
after the first aircraft struck WTC 1. Full evacuation of all occupants below the impact floors in 
WTC 1 was ordered soon after the second plane hit the south tower (Smith 2002). As indicated by 
Cauchon (2001a), the overall evacuation of the towers was as much of a success as thought 
possible, given the overall incident. Cauchon indicates that, between both towers, 99 percent of the 
people below the floors of impact survived (2001a) and by the time WTC 2 collapsed, the stairways 
in WTC 1 were observed to be virtually clear of building occupants (Smith 2002). In part this was 
possible because conditions in the stairways below the impact levels largely remained tenable. 
However, this may also be a result of physical changes and training programs put into place 
following the 1993 WTC bombing. Important modifications to building egress made following the 
1993 WTC bombing included the placement of photo-luminescent paint on the egress paths to assist 
in way finding (particularly at the stair transfer corridors) and provision of emergency lighting for 
the stairways. In addition, an evacuation training program was instituted (Masetti 2001).  
 Shortly before the times of collapse, the stairways were reported as being relatively clear, 
indicating that occupants who were physically capable and had access to egress routes were able to 
evacuate from the buildings (Mayblum 2001). People within and above the impact area could not 
evacuate, simply because the stairways in the impact area had been destroyed.  
 Some survivors reported that, at about the same time that WTC 2 collapsed, lighting in the 
stairways of WTC 1 was lost (Mayblum 2001). Also, there were several accounts of water flowing 
down the stairways and of stairwells becoming slippery beginning at the 10th floor (Labriola 2001).  
 Anecdotes indicate altruistic behavior was commonly displayed. Some mobility-impaired 
occupants were carried down many flights of stairs by other occupants. There were also reports of 
people frequently stepping aside and temporarily stopping their evacuation to let burned and badly 
injured occupants pass by (Dateline NBC 2001, Hearst 2001). Occupants evacuating from the 91st 
floor noted that, as they descended to lower levels of the building, traffic was considerably impaired 
and formed into a slowly moving single-file progression, as evacuees worked their way around 
firefighters and other emergency responders, who were working their way up the stairways or who 
were resting from the exertion of the climb (Shark and McIntyre 2001).  
4.1.1.4 Structural response to fire loading  
 As previously indicated, the impact of the aircraft into WTC 1 substantially degraded the 
strength of the structure to withstand additional loading and also made the building more 
susceptible to fire-induced failure. Among the most significant factors:  
• The force of the impact and the resulting debris field and fireballs probably 
compromised spray-applied fire protection of some steel members in the immediate 
area of impact. The exact extent of this damage will probably never be known, but this 
likely resulted in greater susceptibility of the structure to fire-related failure.  
•  Some of the columns were under elevated states of stress following the impact, due to 
the transfer of load from the destroyed and damaged elements.  
•  Some portions of floor framing directly beneath the partially collapsed areas were 
carrying substantial additional weight from the resulting debris and, in some cases, 
were likely carrying greater loads than they were designed to resist.  
As fire spread and raised the temperature of structural members, the structure was further 
stressed and weakened, until it eventually was unable to support its immense weight. Although the 
specific chain of events that led to the eventual collapse will probably never be identified, the 
following effects of fire on structures may each have contributed to the collapse in some way. 
Appendix A presents a more detailed discussion of the structural effects of fire.  
• As floor framing and supported slabs above and in a fire area are heated, they expand. 
As a structure expands, it can develop additional, potentially large, stresses in some 
elements. If the resulting stress state exceeds the capacity of some members or their 
connections, this can initiate a series of failures (Figure 4-8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4-8 Expansion of floor slabs and framing results in outward deflection of columns And potential 
overload. 
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 Figure 4-9 Buckling of columns initiated by failure of floor framing and connections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Centenary action of floor framing on several floors initiates column   buckling failures.  
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 • As the temperature of floor slabs and support framing increases, these elements can 
lose rigidity and sag into catenary action. As catenary action progresses, horizontal 
framing elements and floor slabs become tensile elements, which can cause failure of 
end connections (Figure 4-9) and allow supported floors to collapse onto the floors 
below. The presence of large amounts of debris on some floors of WTC 1 would have 
made them even more susceptible to this behavior. In addition to overloading the 
floors below, and potentially resulting in a pancake-type collapse of successive floors, 
local floor collapse would also immediately increase the laterally unsupported length 
of columns, permitting buckling to begin. As indicated in Appendix B, the propensity 
of exterior columns to buckle would have been governed by the relatively weak bolted 
column splices between the vertically stacked prefabricated exterior wall units. This 
effect would be even more likely to occur in a fire that involves several adjacent floor 
levels simultaneously, because the columns could effectively lose lateral support over 
several stories (Figure 4-10).  
•  As the temperature of column steel increases, the yield strength and modulus of 
elasticity degrade and the critical buckling strength of the columns will decrease, 
potentially initiating buckling, even if lateral support is maintained. This effect is most 
likely to have been significant in the failure of the interior core columns. 
 
4.1.1.5 Progression of collapse  
 Construction of WTC 1 resulted in the storage of more than 4x1011 joules of potential 
energy over the 1,368-foot height of the structure. Of this, approximately 8x109 joules of potential 
energy were stored in the upper part of the structure, above the impact floors, relative to the lowest 
point of impact. Once collapse initiated, much of this potential energy was rapidly converted into 
kinetic energy. As the large mass of the collapsing floors above accelerated and impacted on the 
floors below, it caused an immediate progressive series of floor failures, punching each in turn onto 
the floor below, accelerating as the sequence progressed. As the floors collapsed, this left tall 
freestanding portions of the exterior wall and possibly central core columns. As the unsupported 
height of these freestanding exterior wall elements increased, they buckled at the bolted column 
splice connections, and also collapsed. Perimeter walls of the building seem to have peeled off and 
fallen directly away from the building face, while portions of the core fell in a somewhat random 
manner. The perimeter walls broke apart at the bolted connections, allowing individual 
prefabricated units that formed the wall or, in some cases, large assemblies of these units to fall to 
the street and onto neighboring buildings below. 
 Review of videotape recordings of the collapse taken from various angles indicates that 
the transmission tower on top of the structure began to move downward and laterally slightly before 
movement was evident at the exterior wall. This suggests that collapse began with one or more 
failures in the central core area of the building. This is consistent with the observations of debris 
patterns from the 91st floor, previously discussed. This is also supported by preliminary evaluation 
of the load carrying capacity of these columns, discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.2.2. The core  
 columns were not designed to resist wind loads and, therefore, had less reserve capacity than 
perimeter columns. As some exterior and core columns were damaged by the aircraft impact, the 
outrigger trusses at the top of the building shifted additional loads to the remaining core columns, 
further eroding the available factor of safety. This would have been particularly significant in the 
upper portion of the damaged building. In this region, the original design load for the core columns 
was less than at lower floors, and the column sections were relatively light. The increased stresses 
caused by the aircraft impact could easily have brought several of these columns close to their 
ultimate capacity, so that relatively little additional effects due to fire would have been required to 
initiate the collapse. Once movement began, the entire portion of the building above the area of 
impact fell in a unit, pushing a cushion of air below it. As this cushion of air pushed through the 
impact area, the fires were fed by new oxygen and pushed outward, creating the illusion of a 
secondary explosion.  
 Although the building appeared to collapse within its own footprint, a review of aerial 
photographs of the site following the collapse, as well as damage to adjacent structures, suggests 
that debris impacted the Marriott Hotel (WTC 3), the Customs House (WTC 6), the Morgan Stanley 
building (WTC 5), WTC 7, and the American Express and Winter Garden buildings located across 
West Street (Figure 4-11). The debris field extended as far as 400500 feet from the tower base.  
4.1.2 WTC 2  
4.1.2.1 Initial damage from aircraft impact  
 United Airlines Flight 175 struck the south face of WTC 2 approximately between the 
78th and 84th floors. The zone of impact extended from near the southeast corner of the building 
across much of the building face (Figures 4-12 and 4-13). The aircraft caused massive damage to 
the south face of the building in the zone of impact (Figures 4-14 and 4-15). At the central zone of 
impact corresponding to the airplane fuselage and engines, six of the prefabricated, three-column 
sections that formed the exterior walls were broken loose from the structure, with some of the 
elements apparently pushed inside the building envelope. Locally, as was the case in WTC 1, floors 
supported by these exterior wall sections appeared to have partially collapsed. Away from this  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Aerial photograph of the WTC site after September 11 attack showing adjacent buildings        
damaged by debris from the collapse of WTC 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-12 Southeast corner of WTC 2 shortly after aircraft impact.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-13 Approximate zone of impact of aircraft on the south face of WTC 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Impact damage to the south and east faces of WTC 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-15 Impact damage to exterior columns on the south face of WTC 2. 
 
 
central zone, in the areas impacted by the outer wing structures, the exterior steel columns were 
fractured by the impact. Photographic evidence suggests that from 27 to 32 columns along the south 
building face were destroyed over a five-story range. Partial collapse of floors in this zone appeared 
to have occurred over a horizontal length of approximately 70 feet, while floors in other portions of 
the building appeared to remain intact. It is probable that the columns in the southeast corner of the 
core also experienced some damage because they would have been in the direct travel path of the 
fuselage and port engine (Figure 4-14). 
 It is known that debris from the aircraft traveled completely through the structure. For 
example, a landing gear from the aircraft that impacted WTC 2 was found to have crashed through 
the roof of a building located six blocks to the north, and one of the jet engines was found at the 
corner of Murray and Church Streets. The extent to which debris scattered throughout the impact 
floors is also evidenced by photographs of the fireballs that occurred as the aircraft struck the 
building (Figure 4-16). (Figure 4-17) shows a portion of the fuselage of the aircraft, lying on the 
roof of WTC 5. 
 As described for WTC 1, this debris doubtless caused some level of damage to the 
structure across the floor plates, including interior framing; core columns at the southeast corner of 
the core; framing at the north, east, and west walls; and the floor plates themselves. Figure 4-18,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-16 Conflagration and debris exiting the north wall of WTC 2, behind WTC 1.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-17 A portion of the fuselage of United Airlines Flight 175 on the roof of WTC 5.  
 
showing the eastern side of the north face of the WTC 2 partially hidden behind WTC 1, suggests 
that damage to the exterior walls was not severe except at the zone of impact. The exact extent of 
this damage will likely never be known with certainty. It is evident that the structure retained 
sufficient integrity and strength to remain globally stable for a period of approximately 56 minutes.  
 There are some important differences between the impact of the aircraft into WTC 2 and 
the impact into WTC 1. First, United Airlines Flight 175 was flying much faster, with an estimated 
speed of 590 mph, while American Airlines Flight 11 was flying at approximately 470 mph. The 
additional speed would have given the aircraft a greater ability to destroy portions of the structure. 
The zone of aircraft impact was skewed toward the southeast corner of WTC 2, while the zone of 
impact on WTC 1 was approximately centered on the building's north face. The orientation of the 
core in WTC 2 was such that the aircraft debris would only have to travel 35 feet across the floor 
before it began to impact and damage elements of the core structure. Finally, the zone of impact in 
WTC 2 was nearly 20 stories lower than that in WTC 1, so columns in this area were carrying 
substantially larger loads. It is possible; therefore, that structural damage to WTC 2 was more 
severe than that to WTC 1, partly explaining why WTC 2 collapsed more quickly than WTC 1.  
 
4.1.2.2 Preliminary structural analysis  
 An approximate linear structural analysis of WTC-2 was performed using SAP-2000 
software (CSI 2000) by FEMA to provide an understanding of the likely stress state in the building 
following the aircraft impact. The upper 55 stories of the building's exterior-wall frame were 
explicitly modeled using beam and column elements. This encompassed the entire structure above 
the zone of impact and about 20 stories below.  The lower 55 stories of the exterior were modeled 
as a "boundary condition" consisting of a perimeter super-beam that was 52 inches deep and about 
50 inches wide, supported on a series of springs.  A base spring was provided at each column 
location to represent the axial stiffness of the columns from the 55th floor down to grade. The 
outrigger trusses at the top of the building were explicitly modeled, using truss-type elements.  
The interior core columns were modeled as spring elements.    
 An initial analysis of the building was conducted to simulate the pre-impact condition. In 
addition to the weight of the floor itself (approximately 54 psf at the building edges and 58 psf at 
the building sides), a uniform floor loading of 12 psf was assumed for partitions and an additional 
20 psf was conservatively assumed to represent furnishings and contents. At the 80th floor level, 
exterior columns were found to be approximately uniformly loaded with an average utilization ratio 
(ratio of actual applied stress to ultimate stress) of under 20 percent. This low utilization ratio is due 
in part to the unusually close spacing of the columns in this building, which resulted in a very small 
tributary area for each column. It reflects the fact that wind and deflection considerations were 
dominant factors in the design. Core columns were more heavily loaded with average calculated 
utilization ratios of 60 percent, which would be anticipated for these columns, which were designed 
to resist only gravity loads. 
 A second analysis was conducted to estimate the demands on columns immediately 
following aircraft impact and before fire effects occurred. Exterior columns were removed from the 
model to match the damage pattern illustrated in Figure 4-15. Although some core columns were 
probably damaged by the aircraft impact, the exact extent of this damage is not known and therefore 
was not considered in the model. As a result, this analysis is thought to underestimate the true stress 
state in the columns immediately after impact. The analysis indicates that most of the loads initially 
carried by the damaged exterior columns were transferred by Vierendeel truss action to the 
remaining exterior columns immediately adjacent to the impact area. If the floors at this level are 
assumed to remain intact and capable of providing lateral support to the columns, this raised the 
utilization ratio for the most heavily loaded column immediately adjacent to the damaged area to 
approximately a value of 1.0. At a value of 1.0, columns would lose stiffness and shift load to 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-18 North face of WTC 2 opposite the zone of impact on the south face, behind WTC 1. 
 
 
adjacent columns. Based on this analysis, it appears that the structure had a significant remaining 
margin against collapse. However, this analysis does not consider damage to the building 
core,which was likely significant. Columns located further from the damage area are less severely 
impacted, and columns located only 20 feet away from the damaged area experienced almost no 
increase in demand at all. These data are plotted in Figure 4-19.   
 The columns immediately above the damage area are predicted to act as tension members, 
transferring approximately 10 percent of the load initially carried by the damaged columns upward 
to the outrigger trusses, which, in turn, transfer this load back to the core columns. Not considering 
any damage to the core columns, utilization ratios on these elements are predicted to increase by  
 
 about 20 percent at the 80th floor level. In upper stories, where the core columns were more lightly 
loaded, the increase in utilization ratio is substantially larger and may have approached a value of 
1.0. These conditions would have been made more severe by damage to one or more core columns.  
4.1.2.3 Fire Development  
 Following the impact, fires spread throughout WTC 2, similar to the manner previously 
described for WTC 1. Extensive videotape of the fires' development through the building was 
recorded from various exterior vantage points. This videotape suggests that, in the minutes 
immediately preceding the collapse, the most intensive fires occurred along the north face of the 
building, near the 80th floor level. Just prior to the collapse, a stream of molten material-possibly 
aluminum from the airliner-was seen streaming out of a window opening at the northeast corner at 
approximately this level. This is of particular interest because, although the building collapse 
appears to have initiated at this floor level, the initiation seems to have occurred at the southeast 
rather than the northeast corner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-19 Plot of column utilization ratio at the 80th floor of WTC 2, viewed looking outward. 
(Conservatively assumes columns 407-411 and 440-441 to be missing.)  
 
 
4.1.2.4 Evacuation  
 Although less time was available for evacuation of WTC 2 than for WTC 1, and the 
aircraft hit the building some 16 floors lower than in WTC 1, fewer casualties occurred within this 
building. The reduced number of casualties to building occupants in WTC 2 may be attributed to 
the movement of some of the building occupants immediately after the aircraft impact into WTC 1 
and before the second aircraft struck WTC 2. Several survivors from WTC 2 stated that, following 
the impact of the aircraft into WTC 1, a message was broadcast over the loudspeaker system 
indicating that WTC 2 was secure and that occupants should return to their offices (Scripps 2001, 
BBC News 2001). Many of these survivors did not heed the announcement and continued to exit 
the building, using the elevators. Survivors also related reports of individuals who listened to the 
message, returned to their floors, and did not make it out after the second aircraft impacted WTC 2. 
Some survivors related that a small number of people traveled to the roof under the assumption that 
a helicopter rescue was possible (Cauchon 2001b).  
4.1.2.5 Initiation of collapse  
 The same types of structural behaviors and failure mechanisms previously discussed are 
equally likely to have occurred in WTC 2, resulting in the initiation of progressive collapse, 
approximately 56 minutes after the aircraft impact. Review of video footage of the WTC 2 collapse 
suggests that it probably initiated with a partial collapse of the floor in the southeast corner of the 
building at approximately the 80th level. This appears to have been followed rapidly by collapse of 
the entire floor level along the east side, as evidenced by a line of dust blowing out of the side of the 
building. As this floor collapse occurred, columns along the east face of the building appeared to 
buckle in the region of the collapsed floor, beginning at the south side and progressing to the north, 
causing the top of the building to rotate toward the east and south and to begin to collapse 
downward (Figure 4-20). It should be noted that failure of core columns in the southeast corner of 
the building could have preceded and triggered these events.  
4.1.2.6 Progression of collapse  
 As in WTC 1, a very large quantity of potential energy was stored in the building, during 
its construction. Once collapse initiated, much of this energy was rapidly released and converted 
into kinetic energy, in the form of the rapidly accelerating mass of the structure above the aircraft 
impact zone. The impact of this rapidly moving mass on the lower structure caused a wide range of 
structural failures in the floors directly at and below the aircraft impact zone, in turn causing failure 
of these floors. As additional floor plates failed, the mass associated with each of these floors joined 
that of the tower above the impact area, increasing the destructive energy on the floors immediately 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-20 The top portion of WTC 2 falls to the east, then south, as viewed from the northeast.  
 
below. This initiated a chain of progressive failures that resulted in the total collapse of the 
building.  
 A review of aerial photographs of the site, following the collapse, as well as identification 
of pieces of structural steel from WTC 2, strongly suggests that while the top portion of the tower 
fell to the south and east, striking Liberty Street and the Bankers Trust building, the lower portion 
of the tower fell to the north and west, striking the Marriott Hotel (WTC 3). Again, the debris 
pattern spread laterally as far as approximately 400-500 feet from the base of the structure.  
4.1.3 Substructure  
 As first WTC 2, then WTC 1 collapsed, nearly 600,000 tons of debris fell onto the Plaza 
level, punching large holes through the Plaza and the six levels of substructure below, and partially 
filling the substructure with debris. This damage severely compromised the ability of the slabs to 
provide lateral bracing of the substructure walls against the induced lateral earth pressures from the 
unexcavated side. This condition was most severe at the southern side of the substructure, adjacent 
to WTC 2 and WTC 3. In this region, debris from the collapsed WTC 2 punched through several  
levels of substructure slab, but did not completely fill the void left behind, leaving the south wall of 
the substructure in an unbraced condition over a portion of its length. 
 In early October, large cracks were observed along Liberty Street, indicating that the south 
wall had started to move into the failed area under the influence of the lateral earth pressures. 
Mueser-Rutledge Engineers were retained to review the situation and make suitable 
recommendations. As a temporary measure, sand fill was backfilled against the inside face of the 
south wall to counterbalance earth pressures on the unexcavated side. Following temporary 
stabilization of the wall, tiebacks were reinstalled through the wall in a manner similar to that used 
to stabilize the excavation during the original construction of the development. After these tiebacks 
were installed, it was possible to begin excavation of the temporary sand backfill and the 
accumulated debris. Tiebacks were similarly installed at the other exterior substructure walls to 
provide lateral support as the damaged slabs and debris were excavated and removed from the site.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCULOTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusions  
• The series of events due to aircraft impact to each of two towers is massive and it 
can be summarized as follow: 
? Removed some of exterior columns of perimeter wall which 
induced stress in the perimeter wall columns & core columns. 
? Dynamic loads from aircraft impact caused the removal of spray-
plaster, which protects the steel frame from direct fire exposure. 
This let steel exposed direct to fire without cover defense.  
? Caused damage to pipeline service in inner core, which feeds the 
sprinkler system that reduces fire induced in structure. 
? Fireball from aircraft fuel caused two severe loads such as external 
pressure due to fire oxygen demand, and internal suction due to 
explosion of fuel ignition. This resulted in a wide open area at 
exterior perimeter wall and additional lateral pressure. 
? Fire load due to remaining of aircraft fuel, which led to reduction of 
member properties and loss off lateral tightening. This caused 
buckling failure to outer and inner columns.   
• The two main functions which act as severe case to world trade center towers from 
aircraft load; The bending moment function which increase in cantilever due to 
point load with increase of lever arm, therefore to cause failure by moment the two 
tower should be impacted at roof to maximize the bending moment at base. The 
second function is stress/strength ratio which increases due to load from upper to 
lower floor & maximum value at tower base. Therefore this function is very 
severing to cause tower collapse rather than bending moment function, for this the 
southern tower collapsed quickly than the north tower.    
• The structural damage sustained by each of the two buildings as a result of the 
attacks was massive. The response of each tower to this attack was not worth, 
because the two towers stood for a long time() after the aircraft impact, which gave 
chance for occupants to evacuate safely until the towers sustained to another 
severe loading, then they began to collapse.  
• During the time of this study, the question of whether building codes should be 
changed in some way to make future buildings more resistant to such attacks was 
frequently explored. Depending on the size of the aircraft, it may not be 
technically feasible to develop design provisions that would enable all structures to 
be designed and constructed to resist the effects of impacts by rapidly moving 
aircraft, and the ensuing fires, without collapse. In addition, the cost of 
constructing such structures might be so large as to make this type of design intent 
practically infeasible.  
5-2 Recommendations  
 Additional studies of the performance of WTC 1 and WTC 2 during the events of 
September 11, 2001, and of related building performance or impact damage or more conducive to 
occupant egress were identified in the course of this study. Issues that should be studied may be 
summarized as follows:  
• The tower was already designed to stand with aircraft impact load but not designed 
to stand for both aircraft impact plus fire effects, therefore, may be redesigned to 
determine the new member size, properties, suitable structural form and stiff floor 
systems taking fire effects into consideration.  
• The fire test model may be combined with structural model to have a good 
understanding to the structural behavior under fire. 
• To avoid this type of collapse in future for specific buildings, it may raise the 
robustness and redundancy, beside good adheres of protection fire spray under 
impact load. 
• Detailed modeling of aircraft impacts into the building may be conducted in order 
to provide understanding of the probable damage state immediately following the 
impacts. 
• In the past, tall buildings have occasionally been damaged, typically by 
earthquakes, and experienced collapse within the damaged zones. Those structures 
were able to arrest collapse before they progressed to a state of total collapse. The 
two WTC towers were able to arrest collapse from the impact damage, but not 
from the resulting fires when combined with the impact effects of the aircraft 
attacks. Studies should be conducted to determine, given the great size and weight 
of the two towers, whether there are feasible design and construction features that 
would permit such buildings to arrest or limit a collapse, once it begins.  
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APPENDIX A 
OVERVIEW OF FIRE PROTECTION IN BUILDINGS 
A.1 Introduction  
 This chapter presents background information on the fire and life safety aspects of 
buildings for the interested reader. This review of fire behavior outlines burning characteristics of 
materials as well as the effect of building characteristics on the temperatures experienced. The 
description of the effect of fire exposure on steel and concrete structural members is intended to 
improve understanding of how these structural members respond when heated and also what 
measures are commonly used to limit temperature rise in structural members. Finally, a brief 
discussion on evacuation behavior in high-rise buildings is included to provide some context to the 
comments made in the research concerning the design of the means of egress and the evacuation 
process in WTC 1 and WTC 2.  
A.2 Fire Behavior  
 An important aspect of fire behavior in the affected buildings involves the following 
issues:  
• burning behavior of materials, including mass loss and energy release rates  
•  stages of fire development  
•  behavior of fully developed fires, including the role of ventilation, temperature 
development, and duration  
A.2.1 Burning Behavior of Materials  
 Once a material is ignited, a fire spreads across the fuel object until it becomes fully 
involved. The spread at which flame travels over the surface of the material is dependent on the fuel 
composition, orientation, surface to mass ratio, incident heat, and air supply. Given sufficient air,  
the energy released from a fire is dictated by the incident heat on the fuel and the fuel 
characteristics, most notably the heat of combustion and latent heat of vaporization. The 
relationship of these parameters to the energy release rate is given by:  
  Q” =   q”   ∆ HC 
             LV 
 
 
 
 
 Where:  
Q" = energy release rate per unit surface area of fuel  
q" = incident heat per unit surface area of fuel (i.e., heat flux)  
Lv = latent heat of vaporization  
Hc = heat of combustion  
 The effective heat of combustion for a mixture of wood and plastics is on the order of 16 
kJ/g. For fully developed fires, the radiant heat flux is approximately 150 to 200 kW/m2. The latent 
heat of vaporization for a range of wood and plastics is 5 to 8 kJ/g. Thus, the mass burning rate per 
unit surface area in typical office building fires ranges from 20 to 40 g/m2-s  and the associated 
energy release rate per unit surface area ranges from 320 to 640 kW/m2.  
 In typical fires, as the fire grows in size, the energy release rate increases to a peak value 
as depicted in Figure A-1. The increase in the heat release rate with time depends on the fuel 
characteristics, incident heat, and available air supply. Sample curves for alternate materials, 
described in the fire protection literature as "slow," "medium," and "fast" growth rate fires, are 
illustrated in Figure A-2.  
 At some point, the heat release rate of the fire will become limited by either the amount of 
fuel or the amount of oxygen that is available; this is referred to as the peak heat release rate. Peak  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-1 Heat release rate for office module (Madrzykowski 1996).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-2 Fire growth rates (from SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering). 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1 Peak Heat Release Rates of Various Materials (NFPA 92B and NFPA 72) 
Item Heat Release Rate 
Crumpled brown  lunch bag, 6 g 1.2 Kw 
Folded double-sheet newspaper, 22 g 4 Kw 
Crumpled double sheet newspaper, 22 g 17 Kw 
Medium wastebasket with milk cartons 100 Kw 
Plastic trash bag with cellulosic material(1.2 – 14 kg) 120 – 350 Kw 
Upholstered chair with polyurethane foam 350  Kw  
Christmas tree, dry 500 – 650 Kw 
Latex foam mattress (heat at room door) 1,200 Kw 
Furnished living room 4,000 – 8,000  Kw 
 
heat release rate data can be obtained through experimental testing and is available for many types 
of materials and fuels. Table A.1 includes a list of selected common items and their associated peak 
heat release rates.  
 After a fire has reached its peak heat release rate, it will decline after some period of time. 
At this point, most of the available fuel has typically been burned and the fire will slowly decrease 
in size. The length of the decay phase depends on what type of fuel is available, how complete was 
the combustion of the fuel, how much oxygen is present in the compartment, and whether any type  
of suppression is occurring. The burning rate of liquid fuels is on the order of 50 g/m2-s, with an 
associated energy release rate per unit surface area of approximately 2,000 kW/m2.  The burning 
rate per unit area of information is useful to estimate the duration of a fire involving a particular fuel 
spread over a specified area.  
A.2.2 Stages of fire development 
 Generally, fires are initiated within a single fuel object. The smoke produced from the 
burning object is transported by a smoke plume and collects in the upper portion of the space as a 
layer. The smoke plume also transports the heat produced by the fire into the smoke layer, causing 
the smoke layer to increase in depth and also temperature. This smoke layer radiates energy back to 
unburned fuels in the space, causing them to increase in temperature.  
 Fire spreads to other objects either by radiation from the flames attached to the originally 
burning item or from the smoke layer. As other objects ignite, the temperature of the smoke layer 
increases further, radiating more heat to other objects. In small compartments, the unburned objects 
may ignite nearly simultaneously. This situation is referred to as "flashover." In large 
compartments, it is more likely that objects will ignite sequentially. The sequence of the ignitions 
depends on the fuel arrangement, and composition and ventilation available to support combustion 
of available fuels.  
A.2.3 Behavior of fully developed fires  
 A fully-developed fire is one that reaches a steady state burning stage, where the mass loss 
rate is relatively constant during that period. The equilibrium situation may occur as a result of a 
limited ventilation supply (in ventilation controlled fires) or due to characteristics of the fuel (fuel-
controlled fires).  
 If the rate of mass burning based on the incident heat flux and fuel characteristics (see 
Section A.2.1) exceeds the amount that can be supported by the available air supply, the burning 
becomes ventilation controlled. Otherwise, the fire is referred to as being fuel controlled. The 
ventilation air for the fires may be supplied from openings to the room, such as open windows or 
doors, or other sources such as HVAC systems.  
 Given that the heat released per unit of oxygen is a relatively constant value of 13.1 kJ/g 
for common fuels, the air supply required to support fires of a particular heat release rate can be 
determined. For every 1 MW of heat release rate, 76 g/s of oxygen is consumed. Considering that 
air is 21 percent oxygen, this flow of oxygen requires a flow of 0.24 m3/s (500 cfm) of ambient air. 
In the case of WTC 1 and WTC 2, for a 3-GW fire, a flow of 1,500,000 cfm of air was required to  
support that fire. That airflow would have been supplied via openings in the exterior wall and the 
shaft walls.  
 Most of the research on fully-developed fires has been conducted in relatively small 
spaces with near-square floor plans. In such cases, the conditions (temperature of the smoke and 
incident heat on the enclosure) are relatively uniform throughout the upper portion of the space.  
However, Thomas and Bennetts (1999) have documented differences in that behavior for 
ventilation controlled fires in long, thin spaces or in large areas. In such cases, the burning occurs in 
the fuel nearest to the supply source of air. Temperatures are observed to be greatest nearest to the 
supply source of air.  
 In large or complex buildings, the incident flux on the structural elements is expected to 
vary over the entire space of fire involvement. A range of developing numerical models have the 
ability to compute the variation of the fire imposed heat flux on a 3-dimensional grid. The Fire 
Dynamics Simulator from the national institute of standards and technology (NIST) is an example 
of such a model that has the promise of developing into a tool that could be used to estimate the 
variation in incident heat flux on structural elements over a large space of fire involvement. 
A.3 Structural Response to Fire 
A.3.1 Effect of fire on steel 
A.3.1.1 Introduction 
 Fire resistance is defined as the property of a building assembly to withstand fire, or give 
protection from it (ASTM 2001a). Included in the definition of fire resistance are two issues. The 
first issue is ability of a building assembly to maintain its structural integrity and stability despite 
exposure to fire. Secondly, for some assemblies such as walls and floor-ceiling assemblies, fire 
resistance also involves serving as a barrier to fire spread. 
 Fire resistance is commonly assessed by subjecting a prototype assembly to a standard 
test. Results from the test are reported in terms of a fire resistance rating, in units of hour, based on 
the time duration of the test that the building assembly continues to satisfy the acceptance criteria in 
the test. 
 Fire resistance rating requirements for different building components are specified in 
building codes. These ratings depend on the type of occupancy, number of stories, and floor area. 
Because the standard test is intended to be a comparative test and is not intended to predict actual 
performance, the hourly fire resistance ratings acquired in the tests should not be misconstrued to 
indicate a specific duration that a building assembly will withstand collapse in an actual fire. 
 Generally, the fire resistance rating of structural member is a function of: 
• Applied structural load intensity. 
• Member type (e.g., column, beam, wall) . 
• Member dimension and boundary end conditions. 
• Incident heat flux from the fire on the member or assembly. 
• Type of construction materials (e.g., concrete , steel , wood), and 
• Effect of temperature rise within the structural member on the relevant properties of 
the member. 
 The fire performance of a structural member depends on the thermal and mechanical 
properties of the materials of which building components are composed. As a result of the increase 
in temperature caused by the fire exposure, the strength of steel decreases along with its ability to 
resist deformation, represented by the modulus of elasticity. In addition, deformations and other 
property changes occur in the materials under prolonged exposures. Likewise, concrete is affected 
by exposure to fire and losses strength and stiffness with increasing temperature. In addition, 
concrete may spall, resulting in a loss of concrete materials in the assembly. Spalling is most likely 
in rapid-growth fires, such as may have occurred in WTC1 and WTC2. 
 The performance of fire-exposed structural members can be predicted by structural 
mechanics analysis methods, comparable to those applied in ambient temperature design, except 
that the induced deformations and property changes need to be taken into consideration. 
 Beams and trusses may react differently to severe fire exposures, depending on the end 
conditions and fabrication. Unconnected members may collapse when the stresses from applied 
loads exceed the available strength for beams and trusses. In the case of connected members, 
significant deflections may occur as a result of reduced elastic modulus, but structural integrity is 
preserved as a result of catenary action. 
 In the case of slender columns, the susceptibility for buckling increases with a decrease in 
the modulus of elasticity. Where connections of floor framing to columns fail, either at the ends or 
intermediate locations, column slenderness is increased, thereby increasing the susceptibility of a 
column to buckling. 
   Steels most often used in building design and construction are either hot-rolled or cold-
drawn. Their strength depends mainly on their carbon content, though some structural steels derive  
a portion of their strength from a process of heat treatment known as quenching and tempering (e.g., 
ASTM A913 for rolled shapes and ASTM A325 and A490 for bolts).  
 
A.3.1.2 Evaluating fire resistance  
Performance criteria  
 Building code requirements for structural fire protection are based on laboratory tests 
conducted in accordance with ASTM E119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building 
Construction and Materials (2000). In these tests, building assemblies, such as floor-ceilings, 
columns, and walls are exposed to heating conditions created in a furnace, following a specified 
time-temperature curve. In Figure A-3, time-temperature curves are presented for the standard fire 
exposure specified in ASTM E119, the standard hydrocarbon exposure in ASTM E1529, and a real 
building fire. As can be seen, each is somewhat different.  
 There are three performance criteria in the standard ASTM E119 test method. These are 
related to load bearing capacity, insulation, and integrity : 
1. Load bearing capacity: for load bearing assemblies, the test specimen shall not 
collapse in such a way that it no longer performs the load bearing function for which it 
was constructed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-3 Comparison of exposure temperatures in standard tests.  
 
 
 
2. Insulation: for assemblies such as floors-ceilings and walls that have the function of 
separating two parts of building, 
a. The average temperature rise at the unexposed face of the specimen shall not 
exceed 139 Ċ (282 F), and 
b. The maximum temperature rise at the unexposed face of the specimen shall not 
exceed 181 Ċ (358 F). 
3. Integrity: for assemblies such as walls, floors, and roofs, the formation of openings 
through which flames or hot gases can pass shall not occur. Loss of integrity is 
deemed to have occurred when a specified cotton wool pad applied to the unexposed 
face is ignited.    
 Tests are conducted on prototype designs. The fire-resistance rating applies to replicates 
of the tested assembly, with limited changes permitted. Rules, guideline, and correlations are 
available to asses the impact of change or to develop acceptable variations to the design 
(ASCE/SFPE 1999). 
 ASTM E119 
 The ASTM E119 test is a comparative test and is not intended to be predictive. The test 
fire exposure, while recognize as severe, is not representative of all fires. Heat transfer conditions 
associated with the exposing fire are different than those in actual fires. Further, the test is not a 
full-scale test, with no attempt to scale the response of the test specimen to actual size building 
assemblies. Although the test requires that to scale the specimens be representative of actual 
building construction, achieving this in a 14-foot by 17- foot test specimen is difficult. 
Consequently, ASTM E119 is principally a thermal test, not a structural test, even though the test 
floor is loaded. Loading of floors and roofs is done to see if the fireproofing material will be 
dislodged by deflection and buckling of the steel during a fire. 
 Further, several factors are not applied in this test method, including structural framing 
continuity, member interaction restraint conditions, and applied load intensity. The test only 
evaluates the performance of a building assembly, such as a wall or floor-ceiling assembly. The test 
does not consider the interaction between adjacent assemblies or the behavior of the structural 
frame. In “real” buildings, beam/girder/column connections range from simple shear to full moment  
Connections and framing member size and geometry vary significantly, depending on the structural 
system and building size and layout. 
 In the underwriters laboratories, inc. (UL) version of the ASTM E119 test, UL,263, the 
beams are placed on shelf angles and steel wedges are driven by sledgehammers between the end of 
the beam and the heavy massive steel and concrete furnace frame. This is referred to as “restrained 
beam,” and the fire test results are published in volume 1 of the UL Fire Resistance Directory, 
which is the major reference used by architects and engineers to select designs that meet the 
building code requirements for fire resistance ratings. The UL fire resistance directory also 
publishes unrestrained fire resistance ratings based on critical temperature rise in the steel member 
as discussed in section 6.3.1.6. in spite of the ASTM E119 test  limitations relative to the structural 
conditions that exist in real buildings, the fire test is conservative to the point that more fire 
protection material is required than has been demonstrated necessary in large scale fire tests 
conducted and reported in the international fire research literature. 
  There has been much interest in revising the ASTM E119 Standard Fire Test. Arguments 
are posed that the fire exposure is too severe, while others suggest that the fire exposure is not 
severe enough. A good compromise is a performance oriented analysis using design fire curves for 
very specific occupancies and building geometry while still permitting the use of ASTM E119 for 
general applications.  
 For most of the 1900s, there was a single U.S. standard time-temperature curve described 
by ASTM E119. Most of the world adopted that curve or one similar in running the test furnaces.  
 In 1928, Ingberg of the National Bureau of Standards published a paper on the severity of 
fire (Ingberg 1928) in which he equated the gross combustible fuel load (combustible content in 
mass per unit area) to the potential fire exposure in terms of duration of exposure to a fire following 
the standard (ASTM E119) fire curve. Although subsequent research has shown the simple 
relationship proposed by Ingberg holds only in limited cases where the fire ventilation is the same 
as that present in his test series, his equation is still widely published in texts and used as the basis 
of regulation.  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, it was demonstrated that, for severe, fully involved fires, the 
intensity and duration of burning within compartments and other enclosures were also functions of 
the availability of air for combustion, commonly referred to as ventilation and normally coming 
from openings such as doors and broken windows or from forced ventilation from the HVAC 
system.  
 In Sweden, an extensive family of fire curves has been developed, by test, for fully 
involved (i.e., post flashover) fires as a combined function of fuel load and ventilation (Magnusson 
and Thelandersson 1970). The published curves have peak temperatures of 6001,100 °C (1,100-
2,000 °F).  
 Most recently, Ian Thomas in Australia has demonstrated with reduced scale models that 
the combustion process in facilities where there is a depth from the vent opening (e.g., broken 
windows) to the actual fuel can produce conditions where a large portion of the vaporized fuel 
actually burns at a point removed from the location of the solid fuel (combustible material) source. 
Thomas' experiments used fully involved spaces where the depth from the vent opening was at least 
twice the width of the test space. In these experiments, the air supply drawn into the test space by 
the fire was insufficient to burn all of the available fuel. Fuel once vaporized was transported to the 
openings and burned there, producing an unexpectedly high heat flux on the elements at and near 
the vent opening. The importance of Thomas' work is that it demonstrates the fact that, in many 
fires, the reality is that the fire exposing the structural elements is not necessarily a constant in 
either time or space.  
 Fortunately, there are now advanced numerical models capable of describing the fire 
caused environment in detail.  
ASTM E1529 and UL 1709: The Hydrocarbon Pool Curves  
 In the late 1980s, as a result of failures of fireproofed steel members exposed to petroleum 
spill fires, the petroleum industry felt a need to develop a new test curve. The curve developed was 
designed to apply a sudden and intense shock, typified by a large hydrocarbon pool fire either 
burning in the open or in some other situation where there was no significant restraint to the flow of 
combustion air to the burning pool fire. ASTM  E1529 was developed to answer this need. The  
objective of this ASTM test is to almost instantaneously impose 158 kW/m2 (50,000 Btu/ft2-hr) on 
the element under test. Additionally a similar but somewhat more severe test procedure has been  
developed by Underwriters Laboratories and published as their standard UL 1709. The UL test is 
designed to impose 200 kW/m2 (65,000 Btu/ft2-hr) on the test element. This unusual difference in 
the ASTM and UL standards reflects a technical difference of opinion between the two 
organizations. The tests are often quoted as a time-temperature curve quickly reaching and 
maintaining a test furnace temperature of 1,093 °C (2,000 °F) in the case of the ASTM standard and 
1,143 °C (2,089 °F) at UL. The hydrocarbon time-temperature curve is, however, actually a test-
specific item and can vary some from test apparatus to test apparatus.  
 The ASTM E119 curve was derived from experiments and is empirically based; however, 
ASTM E1529 exposure is based on judgment, experience, and a database of experiments 
concerning the measurement of the temperatures involved in large hydrocarbon fires. The incident 
flux approximates the incident flux on a member completely bathed in the flame from a large free-
burning pool fire. Although both of the ASTM curves are useful in conducting tests of fireproofed 
building elements as pre-installment tests, they are not predictions of the intensity of actual fires 
and are often not appropriate as an input to models or other computations seeking to assess a fire 
hazard for a building.  
 A prime impact of the high flux "shock" exposure is to test the capability of the 
fireproofing to survive such exposure. In addition, such thermal shock could induce spalling in 
concrete systems.  
 Comparison between ASTM E119, ASTM E1529, and UL 1709 is further complicated by 
instrumentation differences in the two "hydrocarbon fire" tests and that used in the ASTM E119 
test. In particular, different thermocouple installations are used to control and record furnace 
temperatures in the respective tests. In the ASTM E119 test, the thermocouples are contained within 
a protective capped steel pipe, resulting in a time delay between the actual and recorded furnace 
temperatures. In the hydrocarbon tests, the thermocouples are bare, thereby providing a more timely 
indication of the actual gas temperature. The lag in ASTM E119 is most pronounced at the start of  
the test. Figure A-3 provides a plot of the two standard curves with an additional curve of the 
approximate actual temperature (if measured with bare thermocouples) in an ASTM E119 furnace 
test. Most of the tests to date have been conducted using the UL 1709 curve. Many tested items 
show a significantly shorter time to failure using the UL 1709 procedure as compared to the ASTM 
E119 procedure.  
A.3.1.3 Response of high-rise, steel-frame buildings in previous fire incidents  
 In recent years, three notable fires have occurred in steel frame buildings, though none 
involved the total floor area as in WTC 1 and WTC 2. However, prior to September 11, 2001, no 
protected steel frame buildings had been known to collapse due to fire. These previous three fire 
incidents include the following:  
• 1st Interstate Bank Building, Los Angeles, May 4-5, 1988  
•  Broadgate Phase 8, UK, 1990  
•  One Meridian Plaza, Philadelphia, February 23-24, 1991  
 The steel in the 1st Interstate Bank Building and One Meridian Plaza was protected with 
spray-applied protection. Because the fire occurred at the Broadgate complex while it was under 
construction, the steel beams had not yet been protected. The fire durations of the three incidents are 
indicated in Table A.2. The durations noted in the table refer to the overall duration of the incident. 
The fire duration in a particular area of the building was likely less than that noted.  
 In the case of the fire at One Meridian Plaza, the fire burned uncontrolled for the first 11 
hours and lasted 19 hours. Contents from nine floors were completely consumed in the fire. In 
addition to these experiences in fire incidents, as a result of the Broadgate fire, British Steel and the 
Building Research Establishment performed a series of six experiments at Cordington in the mid-
1990s to investigate the behavior of steel frame buildings. These experiments were conducted in a 
simulated, eight-story building. Secondary steel beams were not protected. Despite the temperature 
of the steel beam reaching 800900 °C (1,5001,700 °F) in three tests (well above the traditionally 
assumed critical temperature of 600 °C [1,100 °F]), no collapse was observed in any of the six 
experiments.  
 
Table A.2  Fire Duration in Previous Fire Incidents in Steel-frame Buildings 
Building Date Fire Duration (hours) 
1st Interstate Bank Building  May 4-5, 1988 3.5 
Broadgate Phase 8 1990 4.5 
One Meridian Plaza February 23-24, 1991 19(11 uncontrolled) 
 
 One important aspect of these previous incidents is that the columns remained intact and 
sustained their load carrying ability throughout the fire incidents (though there was no structural 
damage caused by impacts). Throughout the fire in One Meridian Plaza, horizontal forces were 
exerted on the columns by the girders and despite the 24- to 36-inch deflections of the girders, floor 
beams, and concrete and steel deck floor slabs, the columns continued to stabilize the building 
throughout the fire and for several years after the fire. Questions have been raised about the 
comparison of the structural performance of the WTC 1 and WTC 2 and the Empire State Building. 
In the case of the Empire State Building:  
1. The impacting aircraft was a U. S. Army Air Force B-25 bomber weighing 12 tons 
with a fuel capacity of 975 gallons, which, at the time of the crash, was traveling at a 
speed estimated to be 250 mph;  
2. Crash damage to structural steel was confined to three steel beams. One exterior wall 
column withstood the direct impact without visible effect;  
3.  Exterior walls are ornamental cast aluminum panels under windows with steel trim 
backed by 8 inches of brick. The walls at columns are 8 inches of limestone backed by 
8 inches of brick supported on steel framing; and  
4.  The floors above the Saturday morning plane crash were largely vacant and 
unoccupied, so the fire load was minimal and perhaps close to zero. Fire was confined 
to a portion of two floors. Because the building had few occupants at the time of the 
crash, the fire department could concentrate on controlling and extinguishing the fire.  
A.3.1.4 Properties of steel  
 The principal thermal properties that influence the temperature rise and distribution in a 
member are its thermal conductivity, specific heat, and density. The temperature-dependence of the 
thermal conductivity and specific heat for steel are depicted in Figure A-4.  
 The mechanical properties that affect the fire performance of structural members are 
strength, modulus of elasticity, coefficient of thermal expansion, and creep of the component 
materials at elevated temperatures. Information on the thermal and mechanical properties at 
elevated temperatures for various types of steel is available in the literature (Lie 1992, Milke 1995, 
Kodur and Harmathy 2002).  
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-4 Thermal properties of steel at elevated temperatures (SFPE 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-5  Stress-strain curves for structural steel (ASTM A36) at a range of temperatures (SFPE 
2000).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A-6 Strength of steel at elevated temperatures (Lie 1992). 
 
 
 References to the tensile or compressive strength of steel relate either to the yield strength 
or ultimate strength. Figure A-5 shows the stress-strain curves for a structural steel (ASTM A36) at 
room temperature and elevated temperatures. As indicated in the figure, the yield and ultimate 
strength decrease with temperature as does the modulus of elasticity. Figure A-6 shows the 
variation of strength with temperature (ratio of strength at elevated temperature to that at room 
temperature) for hot rolled steel such as A36. As indicated in the figure, if the steel attains a 
temperature of 550 °C (1,022 °F), the remaining strength is approximately half of the value at 
ambient temperature.   
 The modulus of elasticity, E0, is about 210 x 103 MPa for a variety of common steels at 
room temperature. The variation of the modulus of elasticity with temperature for structural steels 
and steel reinforcing bars is presented in Figure A-7. As in the case of strength, if the steel attains a 
temperature of 550 °C (1,022 °F), the modulus of elasticity is reduced to approximately half of the 
value at ambient temperature.  
 Figure A-8 shows the variation of yield strength of light gauge steel at elevated 
temperatures, corresponding to 0.5 percent, 1.5 percent, and 2 percent strains based on the 
relationships in Gerlich (1995), Makelainen and Miller (1983), and BSI (2000).   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-7 Modulus of elasticity at elevated temperatures for structural steel and steel 
reinforcement bars (SFPE 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-8 Reduction of the yield strength of cold-formed light-gauge steel at elevated 
temperatures. 
  
 In addition to the changes in the properties with increasing temperature, steel expands 
with increasing temperature. The coefficient of thermal expansion for structural steel is 
approximately 11 x 10-6 mm/mm-°C. Consequently, an unrestrained, 20-meter-long steel member 
that experiences a temperature increase of 500 °C (1,022 °F) will expand approximately 110 mm. 
WTC 5 had many buckled girders and beams on the burned-out fire floors where the expansion was 
restrained.  
 An approximate melting point for steel is 1,400 °C (2,500 °F); however, the melting 
temperature for a particular steel component varies with the steel alloy used.  
A.3.1.5 Fire Protection Techniques for Steel  
 Given the significant reduction in the mechanical properties of steel at temperatures on the 
order of 540 °C (1,000 °F), isolated and unprotected steel members subjected to the standard test 
heating environment are only able to maintain their structural integrity for 10 to 20 minutes, 
depending on the mass and size of the structural member. Unprotected open web steel joists 
supporting concrete floors in the ASTM E119 fire test have been tested and collapse in 7 minutes 
(Wang and Kodur 2000). 
 Isolated and unprotected steel box columns 8 inches x 6 1/2 inches formed using 1/4-inch 
plate and channels in an ASTM E119 fire test collapse in about 14 minutes (Kodur and Lie 1995).  
Consequently, measures are taken to protect loadbearing, steel structural members where the 
members are part of fire resistant assemblies. A variety of methods are available to limit the 
temperature rise of steel structural members, including the insulation method and the capacitive 
method.  
 Insulation Method: The insulation method consists of attaching insulating spray-applied 
materials, board materials, or blankets to the external surface of the steel member. A variety of 
insulating materials have been used following this method of protection, including mineral-fiber or  
cementitious spray-applied materials, gypsum wallboard, asbestos, intumescent coatings, Portland 
cement concrete, Portland cement plaster, ceramic tiles, and masonry materials. The insulation may 
be sprayed directly onto the member being protected, such as is commonly done for steel columns, 
beams, or open web steel joists. The spray-applied mineral fiber, fire resistive coating is a factory 
mixed product consisting of manufactured inorganic fibers, proprietary cement-type binders, and 
other additives in low concentrations to promote wetting, set, and dust control. Air setting,  
hydraulic setting, and ceramic setting binders can be used in varying quantities and combinations or 
singly, depending on the particular application.  
 Alternatively, the insulation may be used to form a "membrane" around the structural 
member, in which case a fire resistive barrier is placed between a potential fire source and the steel 
member. An example of membrane protection is a suspended ceiling positioned below open web 
steel joists. (In order for a suspended ceiling assembly to perform effectively as a membrane form 
of protection, it must remain in place despite the fire exposure. Only some suspended ceiling 
assemblies have this capability.)  
 In most of the WTC complex buildings and tall buildings built over the last 50 years, the 
preferred method has been spray-applied mineral fiber or cementitious materials. Of these 50 years, 
for the first 20 years the product contained asbestos and for the last 30 years it has been asbestos 
free. The WTC 1, 2, and 7 incidents are the first known collapses of fire resisting steel frame 
buildings protected with this type of fireproofing material. Occasionally, a portion of the steel is 
protected with a spray or trowel applied plaster or Portland cement (e.g., Gunite or shotcrete).  
 Capacitive Method: The capacitive heat sink method is based on the principle of using 
the heat capacity of a protective material to absorb heat. In this case, the supplementing material 
absorbs the heat as it enters the steel and acts as a heat sink. Common examples include concrete 
filled hollow steel columns and water filled hollow steel columns (Kodur and Lie 1995). In  
addition, a concrete floor slab may act as a heat sink to reduce the temperature of a supporting beam 
or open web steel joist.  
A.3.1.6  Temperature rise in steel  
 In building materials such as steel, a critical temperature is often referenced at which the 
integrity of fully-loaded structural members becomes questionable. The critical temperature for 
steel members varies with the type of steel structural member (e.g., beams, columns, bar joists, or 
reinforcing steel). North American Test Standards (e.g., ASTM E119) assume a critical temperature 
of 538 °C (1,000 °F) for structural steel columns. The critical temperatures for columns and other 
steel structural elements are given in Table A.3. The critical temperature is defined as  
approximately the temperature where the steel has lost approximately 50 percent of its yield 
strength from that at room temperature. In an actual structure, the actual impact of such heating of 
the steel will also depend on the actual imposed load, member end restraint (axial and rotational), 
and other factors as discussed in Section 6.3.1.7.  
Table A.3  Critical Temperatures for Various Types of Steel 
Steel Temperature 
Columns 538 ċ (1,000 F) 
Beams 593 ċ (1,100 F) 
Open Web Steel Joist 593 ċ (1,100 F) 
Reinforcing Steel 593 ċ (1,100 F) 
Prestressing Steel 426 ċ (800 F) 
 
 To limit the loss of strength and stiffness, external fire protection is provided to the steel 
structural members to satisfy required fire resistance ratings. This is usually achieved by fire 
protecting the steel members to keep the temperature of the steel, in case of a fire, from reaching a 
critical limit. Traditionally, the amount of fire protection needed is based on the results of standard 
fire resistance tests.  
 The temperature attained in a fire-exposed steel member depends on the fire exposure, 
characteristics of the protection provided, and the size and mass of the steel. For steel members 
protected with direct-applied insulating materials, the role of the insulating materials is strongly 
dependent on their thermal conductivity and thickness.  
 The role of the fire exposure and size and mass of the steel can be demonstrated by 
analyzing the temperature rise in two protected steel columns with two different fire exposures. For  
this comparative analysis, the fire exposure associated with two standard fire resistance tests is 
selected, ASTM E119 and UL 1709. The following two column sizes are selected for this 
comparative analysis:  
• W14X193 
•  steel box column, 36 inches x 16 inches, with a wall thickness of 7/8 inch for the 36-
inch-wide side and 15/16 inch for the 16-inch-wide side  
 In the first analysis, the steel columns are considered to be unprotected. The results of the 
analysis are presented in Figure A-9. In the second analysis, 1 inch of a spray-applied, mineral fiber 
insulation material was assumed to be present (the thermal conductivity of the insulation material 
was assumed to be 0.116 W/ m-K). The results of this analysis are presented in Figure A-10.  
 In both analyses, the resulting steel column temperatures follow expected trends. The 
more massive column (the tube) experiences less temperature rise for the same fire exposure than 
the lighter column (the W14x193). The unprotected columns reach critical temperatures exposed to 
ASTM E119 condition in 15 to 18 minutes. For the more severe UL 1709 exposure, the unprotected 
columns reach critical temperatures in 6 to 7 minutes. In contrast, the temperature of the protected 
columns after 2 hours of exposure to the ASTM E119 conditions is 240 °C (464 °F) for the tube,  
while the temperature of the W14x193 is 330 °C (626 °F). For the more severe fire exposure 
associated with UL 1709, the temperature of the steel columns after 2 hours is 6080 °C (140176 °F) 
greater than for each of the steel columns exposed to the ASTM E119 conditions.  
 Fully developed building fires can generally attain average gas temperatures throughout 
the room containing the fire in excess of 1,000 °C (1,800 °F). The temperature measurements 
acquired in experiments involving office furnishings conducted by DeCicco, et al. (1972) in the  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-9 Steel temperature rise due to fire exposure for unprotected steel column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-10 Steel temperature rise due to fire exposure for steel column protected with 1 inch of 
spray-applied fireproofing.  
 
Hudson Terminal Building (30 Church Street, New York), along with the two time-temperature 
curves from the standard tests is presented in Figure A-3. Temperature development in the first 5 
minutes in the room space is notably similar in the experiment with that in ASTM E1529, UL 1709, 
and the bare thermocouple temperatures for ASTM E119.  
 Greater temperatures may be acquired locally in a room and especially within flames. 
Research has indicated that, in the center of flames generated by relatively small fires, temperatures 
may approach 1,300 °C (2,400 °F) (Baum and McCaffrey 1988). For larger fires, where radiation 
losses may be reduced, it is conceivable that fire temperatures could reach 1,400 °C (2,550 °F), 
although this has not been confirmed experimentally. 
A.3.1.7 Factors affecting performance of steel structures in fire  
 Several factors influence the behavior of steel structures exposed to fire. The more 
significant factors are discussed in the following sections.  
 Loading: One of the major factors that influence the behavior of a structural steel member 
exposed to fire is the applied load (Fitzgerald 1998, Lie 1992). A loss of structural integrity is 
expected when the applied loading exceeds or is equal to the ultimate strength of the member. The 
limiting temperature and the fire resistance of the member increases if the applied load decreases. 
Traditional fire resistance tests apply a load that results in the maximum allowable stress on the 
structural member resistance.  
 Connections: Beam-to-column connections in modern steel-framed buildings may be 
either of bolted or welded construction, or a combination of these types. Most are designed to 
transmit shears from the beam to the column, although some connections are designed to provide 
flexural restraint between the beam and column, as well, in which case they are termed "moment 
resisting." When moment-resisting connections are not provided in a building, diagonal bracing or 
shear walls must be provided for lateral stability. When fire-induced sagging deformations occur in  
simple beam elements with shear connections, the end connections provide restraint against the 
induced rotations and develop end moments, reducing the mid-span moments in the beams, as well 
as the tensile catenary action. The moment and tension resisted by connections reduces the effective 
load ratio to which the beams are subjected, thereby enhancing the fire resistance of the beams as 
long as the integrity of the connection is preserved. This beneficial effect is more pronounced in 
large multi-bay steel frames with simple connections. Connections are generally not included as 
part of the assembly tested in traditional fire resistance tests. Further, most modeling efforts assume 
that the pre-fire characteristics of a connection are preserved during the fire exposure.  
 The investigating team observed damaged connections in WTC 5. For example, distorted 
bolts and bolt holes were found. The performance of connections seems to often determine whether 
a collapse is localized or leads to progressive collapse. In the standard fire tests of structural 
members, the member to be tested is wedged into a massive restraining frame. No connections are 
involved. The issue of connection performance under fire exposure is critical to understanding 
building performance and should be a subject of further research.  
 End Restraint: The structural response of a steel member under fire conditions can be 
significantly enhanced by end restraints (Gewain and Troup 2001). For the same loading and fire 
conditions, a beam with a rotational restraint at its ends deflects less and survives longer than its 
simply supported, free-to-expand counterpart. The addition of axial restraint to the end of the beam  
results in an initial increase in the deflections, due to the lack of axial expansion relief. With further 
heating, however, the rate of increase in deflection slows.  
 Effectiveness of Fireproofing: The acceptability of a particular fireproofing material as 
an insulator is examined as part of ASTM E119. The fireproofing material should form a stable 
thickness of insulating cover for the steel. Mechanical or impact damage to the fireproofing material 
prior to the fire exposure that results in a loss of insulating material reduces the ability of the 
material to act as an insulator (Ryder, et al. 2002). During the fire exposure in the ASTM E119 
tests, fireproofing material may fall off as a result of thermal strains caused by differing amounts of 
expansion in the fireproofing and steel, excess curvature of the steel, or decomposition of the 
fireproofing material. If the fall-off occurs early in the test or fire exposure, the performance of the 
assembly is likely to be unsatisfactory. However, if the fireproofing material falls off late in the test 
or at the time when the fire is declining in intensity, the impact of the lost protection may not be 
significant. Several test methods other than ASTM E119 can be followed to assess the performance 
characteristics of fireproofing material. These tests are indicated in Table A.4. 
 
Table A.4 Test Methods for Spray-applied Fireproofing Materials 
Standard Title 
ASTM E605 Thickness and Density of Spray Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to 
Structural Members. 
ASTM E736 Cohesion/Adhesion of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to 
Structural Members 
ASTM E759 Effective of Deflection of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to 
Structural Members 
ASTM E760 Effective of Impact on the Bonding of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials 
Applied to Structural Members 
ASTM E761 Compressive Strength of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to 
Structural Members 
ASTM E859 Air Erosion of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to Structural 
Members 
ASTM E937 Corrosion of Steel by Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to 
Structural Members 
 
 
 Both the sprayed fiber and, to a lesser extent, cementitious materials, can sometimes fail 
to adhere to the steel, be mechanically damaged, or otherwise be degraded when exposed to a fire. 
The current quality control testing of adhesion/cohesion and density, while helpful, does not solve 
the problem of assuring that the fireproofing will be present at the time of a fire and function 
throughout the duration of the fire exposure. Other factors that can affect the durability and 
performance of fireproofing include resistance to abrasion, shock, vibration, and high temperatures.  
 Sprinklers: Sprinkler systems can be very effective in protecting all structures from the 
effects of fire. Automatic sprinkler systems are considered to be an effective and economical way to 
apply water promptly to control or suppress a fire. In the event of fire in a building, the temperature 
rise in the structural members located in the vicinity of sprinklers is limited. Therefore, the fire 
resistance of such members is enhanced. The sprinkler piping is sized considering all sprinklers in a 
design area of operation that are discharging water. For office buildings, typical areas of operation 
are approximately 1,500 to 2,500 square feet. Should a fire involve an area larger than the area of 
operation, the water supply may be overwhelmed, thereby negatively impacting the effectiveness of 
the sprinkler system.  
 Structural Interaction: In contrast to an isolated member exposed to fire, the way in 
which a complete structural building frame performs during a fire is influenced by the interaction of 
the connected structural members in both the exposed and unexposed portions of the building. This 
is beneficial to the overall behavior of the complete frame, because the collapse of some of the 
structural members may not necessarily endanger the structural stability of the overall building. In 
such cases, the remaining interacting members develop an alternative load path to bridge over the 
area of collapse. This is a current area of research and is not addressed by traditional fire resistance 
tests.  
 Tensile Membrane Action: A tensile membrane (catenary) action can be developed by 
metal deck and reinforced concrete floor slabs in a steel-framed building whose members are 
designed and built to act compositely with the concrete slab (Nwosu and Kodur 1999). This action 
occurs when the applied load on the slab is taken by the steel reinforcement, due to cracking of the 
entire depth of concrete cross-section or heating of supporting steel members beyond the critical 
temperature. Tensile membrane action enhances the fire resistance of a complete framed building 
by providing an alternative load path for structural members that have lost their loadbearing 
capacity.  
 Temperature Distribution: Depending on the protective insulation and general 
arrangements of members in a structure, steel members will be subjected to temperature 
distributions that vary along the length or over the cross-section. Members subjected to temperature 
variation across their sections may perform better in fire than those with uniform temperature. This 
is due to the fact that sections with uniform temperatures will attain their load capacity at the same 
time. However, in members subjected to non-uniform temperature distribution, a thermally induced  
curvature will occur to add to the deflections due to applied loads and some parts will attain the 
load limit before the others. Temperature distributions within structural members may be attained if 
the member is part of a wall or floor-ceiling assembly where the fire exposure is applied only to one 
side.  
A.3.2 Effect of fire on concrete  
A.3.2.1 General  
 Concrete is one of the principal materials widely used in construction and, in fire 
protection engineering terminology, is generally classified as Group L (loadbearing) building 
material: materials capable of carrying high stresses. The word concrete covers a large number of 
different materials, with the single common feature that they are formed by the hydration of cement. 
Because the hydrated cement paste amounts to only 24 to 43 volume percent of the materials 
present, the properties of concrete may vary widely with the aggregates used.  
 Traditionally, the compressive strength of concrete used to be around 20-50 MPa, which is 
referred to as normal-strength concrete . Depending on the density, concretes are usually subdivided 
into two major groups: (1) normal-weight concrete, made with normal-weight aggregate, with 
densities in the 2,200 to 2,400 kg/m3 range, and (2) lightweight concrete, made with lightweight 
aggregate, with densities between 1,300 and 1,900 kg/m3.  
 The floor slabs at WTC 1 and WTC 2 (as well as in most of the WTC buildings and 
vicinity) were \made of concrete made of metal deck. The floor construction typically consisted of 4 
inches of lightweight concrete fill on corrugated metal deck. Hence, the discussion here is focused 
on lightweight concrete.  
A.3.2.2 Properties of lightweight concrete  
 As with steel, concrete loses strength with temperature, though some concretes maintain 
their ambient temperature strength up to a greater temperature than structural steel. Some 
lightweight concretes may not exhibit the same level of performance as normal weight concretes 
under severe fire conditions. In these concretes, spalling under fire conditions is one of the major 
concerns. The fire resistance of lightweight concrete structural members is dependent on spalling  
 characteristics in addition to thermal and mechanical properties of lightweight concrete at elevated 
temperatures.  
 A great deal of information is available in the literature on the properties of lightweight 
concrete (Abrams 1979, ACI 1989, Lie 1992, Kodur and Harmathy 2002). The modulus of 
elasticity (E) of various concretes at room temperature may fall within a very wide range, 5.0 x 103 
to 50.0 x 103 MPa, dependent mainly on the water-cement ratio in the mixture, the age of concrete, 
and the amount and nature of the aggregates. The modulus of elasticity decreases rapidly with the 
rise of temperature, and the fractional decline does not depend significantly on the type of aggregate 
(Kodur 2000)(see Figure A-11; E0 in the figure is the modulus of elasticity at room temperature).  
 The compressive strength (σu) of lightweight concrete can vary within a wide range and is 
influenced by the same factors as the modulus of elasticity. For conventionally produced 
lightweight concrete (at the time of the WTC construction in 1970s), the strength at room 
temperature usually was in the 20 to 40 MPa range. The variation of the compressive strength with  
temperature is presented in Figure A-12 for two lightweight aggregate concretes, one of which is 
made with the addition of natural sand (Kodur 2000); (σu)0 in the figures refers to the compressive 
strengths of concrete at room temperature). The strength decrease is minimal up to about 300 °C 
(570 °F); above these temperatures, the strength loss is significant.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-11 The effect of temperature on the modulus of elasticity strength of different types of 
concretes (Kodur and Harmathy 2002).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-12 Reduction of the compressive strength of two lightweight concretes (one with natural 
sand) at elevated temperatures (Kodur and Harmathy 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-13 Usual ranges of variation for the volume-specific heat of normal-weight and 
lightweight concretes (Kodur and Harmathy 2002).  
 
 Generally, lightweight concrete has a lower thermal conductivity, lower specific heat, and 
lower thermal expansion at elevated temperatures than normal-strength concrete. As an illustration, 
the usual ranges of variation of the specific heat for normal-weight and lightweight concretes are 
shown in Figure A-13.  
 Spalling is defined as the breaking of layers (pieces) of concrete from the surface of the 
concrete elements when it is exposed to high and rapidly rising temperatures. The spalling can 
occur soon after exposure to heat and can be accompanied by violent explosions, or it may happen 
when concrete has become so weak after heating that, when cracking develops, pieces fall off the 
surface. The consequences may be limited as long as the extent of the damage is small, but 
extensive spalling may lead to early loss of stability and integrity due to exposed reinforcement and 
penetration of partitions.  
 The extent of spalling is influenced by fire intensity, load intensity, strength and porosity 
of concrete mix, density, aggregate type, and internal moisture content of the concrete. Significant 
spalling can occur if the concrete has high moisture content and is exposed to a rapid growth fire.  
A.3.3 Fire and structural modeling  
 Fire protection provided in accordance with building codes is based on laboratory tests 
that have no correlation with actual fires. Through the use of numerical models, the fire protection 
design of structural members can be determined given the exposure conditions from selected fire 
scenarios.  
 Building code requirements for fire resistance design are currently based on the presumed 
duration of a standard fire as a direct function of fire load, building occupancy, height, and area. 
The severity of actual fires is determined by additional factors, which are not now considered in 
current building codes except as an alternate material method or equivalency when accepted by the 
enforcing official. Recent fire research provides a basis for designing fire protection for structural 
members by analytical methods and is becoming more acceptable to the building code community. 
In recent years, the use of numerical methods to calculate the fire resistance of various structural 
members has begun to gain acceptance. These calculation methods are reliable and cost-effective 
and can be applied to analyze performance in a specific situation (Milke 1999). The Euro codes 
currently describe a calculation method for assessing the performance of steel members exposed to  
actual fires. There are three analyses that need to be conducted in a numerical assessment of fire 
resistance:  
• model fire development 
•  model thermal response of assemblies  
•  model structural response of assemblies  
 Fire development is modeled to describe the heating exposure provided by the fire. Next, 
the thermal response analysis consists of predicting the temperature rise of structural members. 
Finally, an analysis of structural performance can be conducted to determine the structural integrity 
or load carrying capacity of the fire-exposed structural members. Such an analysis needs to account 
for thermally-induced deformations and property changes.  
 The analysis of the WTC buildings and the evaluation of other existing and future tall 
buildings could involve both fire and structural modeling. Both mathematical and scale modeling, 
along with validation tests, may be needed. In terms of the numerical modeling, it is currently 
possible to assemble a model package that reasonably predicts the impact of the fire on strength, 
elongation, spalling, and other properties related to the structural stability of the buildings involved. 
Currently, the available models for air movement (to the fire), fire growth and the resulting 
environmental condition in the space, breaking of windows, heat transfer through materials (e.g., 
fireproofing), and temperature rise in structural elements operate independently of each other and 
generally do not share data. In the future, combined fire-structural models may emerge that can 
interactively feed the output from heat transfer analysis models to structural analysis routines on a 
time basis as the simulated fire progresses, with return feed to the fire models of any changes 
(pertinent to the fire model) that the structural computations predict, such as changes in ventilation 
characteristics. The combined fire-structural model(s) would permit extending the analysis of the  
impact of this incident to other scenarios, such as fire alone or other combinations of multiple 
simultaneous impacts (e.g., fire with wind, earthquake) on buildings.  
 Although the current models are based on sound physics, the state of the art of existing 
models involves uncertainties. Most of the models needed to supply the structural designer with 
case-specific data on temperatures of the exposed structural elements in unit area increments 
matching the finite elements selected for structural analysis exist. However, most of these models 
are as yet only partially validated.  
A.4 Life Safety  
 The matter of high-rise evacuation has become preeminent in fire and building discussions 
since September 11, 2001, as a result of the fatalities of over 3,000 building occupants and 
emergency personnel. Life safety is provided to building occupants by either giving them the 
opportunity to evacuate or be protected in place. Basic life safety principles include notification, 
evacuation (including relocation to other floors), and protection in place (SFPE 2000).  
 Notification: Occupants need to be notified promptly of an emergency. In addition, 
communication systems should be provided that allow automatic messages to be transmitted to 
occupants to given them specific instructions on how to respond. These messages may also be 
delivered over public address systems by building safety managers or fire suppression personnel.  
 Evacuation: This aspect involves providing people with the means to exit the building. 
The egress system involves the following considerations:  
• Capacity - A sufficient number of exits of adequate width to accommodate the 
building population need to be provided to allow occupants to evacuate safely.  
•  Access - Occupants need to be also to access an exit from wherever the fire is, and in 
sufficient time prior to the onset of untenable conditions. Alternative exits should be 
remotely located so that all exits are not simultaneously blocked by a single incident.  
•  Protected Escape Route - Exits need to be protected by fire-rated construction to limit 
the potential for fire and heat to impact these routes until the last occupant can reach a 
place of safety. In addition, such routes may also be smoke protected to limit smoke 
migration into the route.  
 In general, the means of egress system is designed so that occupants travel from the office 
space along access paths such as corridors or aisles until they reach the exit. An exit is commonly 
defined as a protected path of travel to the exit discharge (NFPA 101 2000). The stairways in a 
high-rise building commonly meet the definition of an exit. In general, the exit is intended to 
provide a continuous, unobstructed path to the exterior or to another area that is considered safe. 
Most codes require that exits discharge directly to the outside. Some codes, such as NFPA 101, 
permit up to half of the exits to discharge within the building, given that certain provisions are met.  
 Design considerations for high-rise buildings relative to these two options involve several 
aspects, including design of means of egress, the structure, and active fire protection systems, such 
as detection and alarm, suppression, and smoke management.  
 There is no universally accepted standard on emergency evacuation. Many local 
jurisdictions through their fire department public education programs have developed 
comprehensive and successful evacuation planning models, but unless locally adopted, there is no  
legal mandate to exercise the plans. Among the cities that have developed comprehensive programs 
are Seattle, Phoenix, Houston, and Portland, Oregon.  
 Protect in Place: The protect in place strategy is commonly employed in high-rise 
buildings. Occupants either remain in an area enclosed in fire rated construction or move to such a 
location. This approach is especially important for mobility impaired individuals. Building 
construction and fire protection systems are employed to protect occupants from fire and smoke 
spread for the duration of the incident or until rescued.  
 In some cases, occupants may be moved from one location to a location of relative safety 
while they await rescue. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (42 USC 12181), in 
its design guidelines for new construction since 1993, requires that each floor in a building without  
a supervised sprinkler system must contain an "area of rescue assistance" (i.e., an area with direct 
access to an exit stairway where people unable to use stairs may await assistance during an 
emergency evacuation). In existing buildings, the ADA makes no reference to occupant evacuation 
other than to prohibit unnecessary physical barriers to mobility.  
A.4.1 Evacuation process  
 Two methods are followed for the evacuation of buildings. One method consists of 
evacuating all occupants simultaneously. Alternatively, occupants may be evacuated in phases, 
where the floor levels closest to the fire are evacuated first, then other floor levels are evacuated on 
an as needed basis. Phased evacuation is instituted to permit people on the floor levels closest to the 
fire (i.e., those with the greatest hazard) to enter the stairway unobstructed by queues formed by 
people from all other floors also being in the stairway. Those who are below the emergency usually 
are encouraged to stay in place until the endangered people from above are already below this 
respective floor level. Generally, phased evacuation is followed in tall buildings, such as WTC 1 
and WTC 2.  
A.4.2 Analysis  
 A fairly simplistic model can be applied to develop a first order approximation of the time 
required to evacuate a high-rise building. The model is described by Nelson and MacLennan in the 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. The following calculations are based on several 
major assumptions:  
• All persons start to evacuate at the same time and hence no pre-movement time is 
considered (e.g., talking to coworkers, turning off computers, putting on coats). 
•   Occupant travel is not interrupted to make decisions or communicate with other 
individuals involved.  
•   The persons involved are free of any disabilities that would significantly impede their 
ability to keep up with the movement of the group. This includes any temporary 
disabilities as a result of fatigue.  
•  Firefighters coming into the stairway do not impose a significant impact on the flow 
rate of occupants traveling down the stairs.  
•   The controlling feature of the flow rate of people from the building is the door at the 
bottom of the exit stairway. This assumes that people develop a queue in the stairway 
that ends at the doorway at the base of the stairway. Also, the time for the first people 
to form the queue is assumed to be much less than the total evacuation time.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-14 Specific flow rates as a function of density (SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering). 
 
•   The density of the people traveling through the doorway is in the range of observed 
values (i.e., 6-10 ft2/person). As such, the flow rate per foot of effective width for each 
doorway would be anticipated to be in the range of 18 to 24 persons/min (see      
Figure A-14). Consequently, the flow rate from each doorway in the World Trade 
Center buildings would have been on the order of 30 to 50 persons/min.  
 Given these assumptions, the results presented in Figure A-15 relate to a lower limit of the 
time expected to evacuate the WTC towers. There were three exit stairways serving most floors of 
the WTC towers. Below the impact area, all stairways appeared to be available. The number of 
people in each building on the morning of September 11, 2001, is not known. Therefore, a range of 
occupant loads is included in Figure A-15. 
 By all indications, it was instantly apparent to the building occupants that evacuation was 
necessary, so very little time was likely to have transpired in pre-movement activities. The time for 
the leading edge of the evacuees to reach the stairs and to descend from the lowest occupied floor 
(7) to the discharge doors on floors 1 and 2 is estimated to have taken about 3 minutes until the  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-15  Estimated evacuation times for high-rise buildings.  
 
 
 steady human flow reached its capacity. The sense of urgency in the evacuees is estimated to have 
maintained the egress flow at or near the theoretical maximum for stair exit flow (i.e., 24 
persons/minute per foot). 
  The two end stairs were 44 inches wide and the center stair was 56 inches wide. Each 
stair had a single 36-inch-wide exit door at its discharge level. As such, the effective width for each 
stair door was 24 inches (2 feet). The expected steady flow rate from the stair doorways was 48 
persons/minute. Based on an available egress time of 90 minutes in WTC 1 and 50 minutes in WTC  
2, the number of persons who could have exited through the stairs is estimated to be up to13,000 for 
WTC 1 and up to 7,200 for WTC 2. These estimates do not include any persons who used elevators, 
were on the 2nd (Plaza) level or lower in the buildings at the time, or initiated evacuation in WTC 2 
immediately after the impact of WTC 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
STRUCTURAL STEEL AND STEEL CONNECTIONS 
 
B.1 Structural Steel  
 This appendix focuses mainly on the structural steel and connections in the WTC towers 
(WTC 1 and WTC 2).  
 The structural steel used in the exterior 14-inch by 14-inch columns that were spaced at 3 
feet 4 inches on center around the entire periphery of each of the WTC towers was fabricated from 
various grades of high-strength steel with minimum specified yield stress between 36 kips per 
square inch (ksi) and 100 ksi (PATH-NYNJ 1976). Column plate thickness varied from 1/4 inch to 
5/8 inch in the impact zone of WTC 1 for floors 89-101, and from 1/4 inch to 13/16 inch in the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-1 Exterior column end plates. 
 
impact zone of WTC 2 for floors 77-87. Spandrel beams at each floor level were fabricated of 
matching steel and integrated into the columns as the columns and spandrel sections were 
prefabricated into trees. These trees were three columns wide and one to three stories high. The 
cross-sectional shape of the columns can be seen in Figure B-1. These varied in length from 12 feet 
6 inches to 38 feet, depending on the plate thickness and location.  
 The three columns in a panel were generally fabricated from the same grade of steel. The 
yield stress varied from 50 ksi to 100 ksi in increments of 5 ksi up to 90 ksi. Although most of the 
time the same grade of steel was used in all three columns, sometimes a column was fabricated 
from different grades. The difference was up to 15 ksi (i.e., 75 ksi, 85 ksi, and 90 ksi). The core 
columns were box sections fabricated from A36 steel plate and were 36 inches x 1416 inches with 
plate thickness from 3/4 inch to 4 inches. Above floor 84, rolled or welded built-up I-shaped\ 
sections were used.  
 The floor system was supported by 29-inch-deep open-web joist trusses with A36 steel 
chord angles and steel rod diagonals. Composite 1-1/2-inch, 22-gauge metal floor deck ran parallel 
to double trusses that were spaced at 6 feet 8 inches. The floor deck was also supported by alternate 
intermediate support angles and transverse bridging trusses that were spaced at 3 feet 4 inches. The 
bridging truss also framed into some periphery columns. Figure 3-2a,b (in Chapter 3) shows the 
layout of a typical floor. Because 13-foot-wide and 20-foot-wide modular floor units were 
prefabricated for construction, the outside two trusses shared a common top chord seat connection 
with adjacent panels. All double trusses were attached to every other periphery column by a seat 
angle connection and a gusset plate that was welded to the spandrel and top chord. Therefore, all 
truss supports had two trusses attached to the seat connection. A single bolt was used for each truss 
sharing a seat connection. The bottom chord of each pair of trusses was attached to the spandrel 
with visco-elastic dampers that had a slip capacity of 5 kips. At the core, the trusses were connected 
to girders that were attached to the box or H-shaped core columns by beam seats welded to the 
column faces.  
B.2 Mechanical Properties  
 Nearly all of the steel plate was produced in Japan to ASTM standards or their equivalent. 
None of the mill test reports were available that describe the mechanical properties and chemical 
composition of the steel used in the WTC structures. Approximately 100 potentially helpful steel 
pieces were identified at the four salvage yards that had contracts to obtain and process the WTC 
steel debris. These pieces have been removed and transported to the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland, for storage and further study. No coupons were 
taken or tested to check material conformance with specification of any plate, rolled section, bolt, 
weld, reinforcing steel, or concrete. Visual examination of the debris did not identify any apparent 
deficiencies in the structural materials and connectors.  
 In lieu of actual WTC steel properties, typical stress-strain curves characteristic of 3 of the 
12 steels used in the design and construction of the WTC complex are shown in Figure B-2 for 
three ASTM-designation steels with minimum specified yield strengths of 36 ksi (A36), 50 ksi 
(A441), and 100 ksi (A514). In general, as the yield strength of the steel increases, the yield-to-
tensile-strength ratio (Y/T) also increases. For A36 steel, Y/T is approximately 0.6, whereas for 
A514 steel, Y/T is approximately 0.9. The yield plateau for five steels (yield points 36, 50, 65, 80, 
and 100 ksi) can be highly variable for structural steels, as is apparent from a comparison of the 
expanded initial portions of the five steels shown in Figure B-3. At the higher yield strength 
associated with quenched and tempered alloy steels, there may not be a distinct yield plateau; 
instead, the steels exhibit gradual yielding and nonlinear behavior with strain hardening.  
 High strain rates tend to increase the observed yield strength and tensile strength of steel, 
but may also reduce the ductility. There is a greater influence on the yield point than on the tensile 
strength. Figure B-4 compares the effect of a very high strain rate (100 in/in/sec) for a mild carbon 
steel with a more usual test speed of 850 micro in/in/sec. In this example, the yield point more than 
doubled, whereas the tensile strength was increased about 27 percent, and the Y/T ratio approached 
unity.  
 In fracture toughness tests where rapid load toughness is determined, the dynamic yield 
strength of certain steels can be estimated by the following equation taken from ASTM E1820 
(ASTM 1999):  
              σyd =   σys + -           174,000                     - 27.2 ksi                                    (B-1)  
                                   (T + 460)log10(2x107 t)  
 
Where  σys is room temperature static yield strength in ksi, t = loading time in milliseconds, and T is 
the test temperature in °F.  
 In Making, Shaping, and Treating of Steel (USX 1998), it is noted that a tenfold increase 
in rate of loading increased a 0.12 percent carbon steel yield strength by 7 ksi, but the influence on 
tensile strength was negligible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-1 Exterior column end plates. 
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Figure B-1 Exterior column end plates. 
 
 High impacts that create notches can also lead to brittle fracture at stresses that are less 
than the dynamic yield strength. This is also true if triaxial stress conditions exist from constraint.  
 The high-temperature characteristics of structural steel are discussed in Appendix A.  
B.3  WTC 1 and WTC 2 Connection Capacity  
B.3.1  Background  
 Connections are typically designed to transfer the joint forces to which they are subjected. 
Generally, simple equilibrium models are used to proportion the mechanical or welded connectors 
and the plate or beam elements used in the connection for the required design loads (Fisher, et al. 
1978; Kulak, et al. 1987; Lesik and Kennedy 1990; Salmon and Johnson 1996).  
 According to available information, steel connections in the WTC structures were 
designed in accordance with the AISC specifications that were applicable at the time to resist the 
required design loads. This section focuses on the ultimate limit strengths of the connectors and the 
various connections that were used to construct the WTC towers. Standard practice is that the 
design of connectors and connections provide a factor of safety of at least two against the various 
design strength limit states. Significant deformations can be expected when these limit states are 
reached.  
B.3.2  Observations  
1.  The exterior tree columns were spliced using bolted end plate connections.  
2.  All column end plate bolted connections appeared to fail from the unanticipated out-of-plane 
bending of the column tree sections due to either the aircraft impacts or the deformation and 
buckling of the unbraced columns as the floor system diaphragms were destroyed by the impacts 
and fires. The bolts were observed to exhibit classical tensile fracture in the threaded area. Most 
bolts were also bent in the shank. Figure B-1 shows the column end plates and holes with some 
fractured and bent bolts. No evidence of plastic deformation was observed in the end plates.  
3.  Column splice requirements in the AISC Specifications (1963) indicated in Section 1.15.8 that 
"Where compression members bear on bearing plates and where tier-building columns are finished 
to bear, there shall be sufficient rivets, bolts, or welding to hold all parts securely in place."  
B.3.3 Connectors  
 The connectors generally used for steel structures are either high-strength bolts or welds. 
The project specifications indicated that bolts were to meet the ASTM A325 or A490 standards.  
 Bolts are designed based on their nominal shank area Ab for tension, shear, or some 
combination. For tension, the nominal strength (per unit of area) of a single bolt is provided by  
                               Fn = Ct Fu                                                (B-2)  
Where Fu is the minimum specified tensile strength and Ct = 0.75, which is the ratio of the stress 
area to the nominal shank area. An analysis of A325 bolts produced in the 1960s and 1970s 
indicated that, on average, the bolts exceeded the minimum specified tensile strength by 18 percent 
(Kulak, et al. 1987).  
 For shear, the nominal strength of a single bolt is provided by  
                                            Fv = Cs Fu                                                (B-3)  
The average shear coefficient Cs = 0.62 for a single bolt. This coefficient is reduced to Cs = 0.5 to 
account for connection lengths up to 50 inches parallel to the line of force. When threads are not 
excluded from the shear plane, the coefficient Cs is further reduced to Cs = 0.4.  
 Other failure modes are possible as bolts transfer forces from one component into another 
by bearing and shear of the fastener. This can result in bearing deformations and net section fracture 
of the connected elements. Other failure modes are shear rupture or bearing strength as bolts shear 
connected material between the bolt and a plate edge, or block shear, which combines the tension 
and shear resistance of the connected elements. An example of one of these failure modes can be 
seen in Figure B-5, which shows a spandrel beam bolted shear connection that has failed in end 
zone shear as the connection was subjected to moments and/or tensile loading. This indicates that  
all elements in this example were at their ultimate load capacity when the spandrel connection 
failed.  
 The commonly used weld connectors are either fillet welds or groove welds. Complete 
joint penetration groove welds are designed for the same basic capacity as the connected base metal 
and match its capacity. Fillet welds and partial joint penetration groove welds are designed to resist 
a calculated or specified load by sizing for the weld throat area, which is the effective cross-
sectional area of the weld.  
 The nominal strength of a linear weld group loaded in-plane through the center of gravity 
is (Fisher, et al. 1978; Lesik and Kennedy, 1990).  
  Fw = 0.6 FEXX (1.0 + 0.5 sin1.5 θ )                                   (B-4)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-5 
Column tree showing bolt bearing shear failures  
of spandrel connection.  
 where FEXX is the electrode classification number (minimum specified tensile strength) and     is the 
angle of loading measured from the longitudinal axis in degrees. Hence, when the load is parallel to 
the weld, the capacity is 0.6 FEXX, and when it is perpendicular to the longitudinal weld axis, it 
increases to 0.9 FEXX or more. This increased strength of fillet welds transverse to the axis of 
loading was not recognized in the AISC Specification when the WTC was designed and built.  
Figure B-6 shows the shear failure of the fillet welds that connected a built-up wide-flange column 
to the top end of a box core column. The basic limit states for bolts and welds described by 
Equations B-2, B-3, and B-4 are used in Chapter J of the AISC Load and Resistance Factor Design 
Specification along with resistance factors to design structural steel building connections (Fisher, et 
al. 1978). Additional connection strength design provisions are covered in Chapter K of the same 
specification for flanges and webs subjected to concentrated forces (Fisher, et al. 1978). Those 
relationships can also be used to assess the ultimate capacity, or strength, of structural members and 
connections subjected to concentrated tension and compression forces.  
 Discontinuities such as porosity and slag seldom cause a significant loss of static strength. 
Common imperfections are permitted within limits and accommodated by the provisions of the 
design standards. On the other hand, lack of fusion or cracks can have a major impact on strength 
and can result in joint failure at loads below the design load. This will depend on the size of the 
discontinuity or defect and its orientation to the applied loads.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-6  
Shear fracture failure of fillet welds 
connecting a W-shape column to a  
box core column.  
  
B.4 Examples of WTC 1 and WTC 2 Connection Capacity  
B.4.1 Bolted column end plates  
 Collapse of the WTC towers resulted in failure of many of the bolts in bolted end plate 
connections as the columns were subjected to large and unanticipated out-of-plane bending. In the 
majority of cases, the A325 high-strength bolts reached their tensile capacity and failed in the 
threaded stress area. The example shown in Figure B-7 examines the flexural capacity of the bolted 
end plate in a column in the impact area where the column plate thickness was 1/4 inch.  
 The simple moment capacity of the bolt group is 20 to 30 percent of the plastic moment 
capacity of a column fabricated from steels with a 50 to 100 ksi yield point, assuming no axial load 
in the columns. The end plates at the columns splice have a 11-3/4-inch x 14-inch cross-section. 
The columns are subjected to axial load from the dead load acting on the structure. For the as-built 
structure, the moments acting on the bolted splice are small, because the splices were located at the 
column inflection points and the resultant of the applied axial load and moment is within the middle 
third of the 12-inch-deep bearing connection. Assuming an axial stress of 20 ksi in the column, the 
corresponding axial force acting on the base plate is 280 kips. As the columns lose lateral support 
and deform out-of-plane from overloading eccentricities and from the thermal effects, the bending 
moment acting on the column splice does not introduce significant forces into the bolted end plate 
connection until the eccentricity exceeds 2 inches. As the eccentricity increases, the applied bending 
moment will exceed the bolt preload stress when the eccentricity reaches approximately 4 inches. 
Continued deformation will exceed the ultimate moment capacity of the connection and result in 
instability as the eccentricity approaches 4.5 inches.  
 It also should be noted that the column splices were staggered midheight at each floor, as 
was illustrated in Chapter 2. As a result, two-thirds of the perimeter columns were continuous at 
each floor's midheight elevation. This resulted in staggered failure patterns, as the bolted end plate 
connections and spandrel beam connections failed during the resulting instability and collapse. The 
exception to this staggered pattern was the splices at mechanical floors, which were not staggered, 
and the bolts were supplemented with welds. 
B.4.2 Bolted spandrel connections  
 Collapse of the WTC towers resulted in failure of the bolted shear splices that connected 
the spandrel beams together at each of the prefabricated column trees. Several modes of failure 
were observed in these connections. Figure B-5 showed an example of bearing strength failure of 
the spandrel plate. The loading appeared to be a combination of unanticipated moment and tensile 
loading. The following example examines the shear rupture capacity of one of the bolts. The  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-7  Bent and fractured bolts at an exterior column four-bolt connection.  
 
spandrel plate thickness was assumed to be 3/8 inch, which was observed at the columns with 1/4-
inch plate used in Figure B-7. 
 The ultimate bearing strength capacity is given by (AISC 2001; Fisher, et al. 1978)  
  Ru = Lc t Fu  ≤  3.0  d t Fu ≤ Fv As                        (B-5)  
Where d is the nominal bolt diameter (7/8 inch), Lc is the clear distance, in the direction of force, 
between the edge of the hole and the edge of the spandrel plate (1-5/16 inches), Fuis the tensile 
strength of the spandrel plate, and t is the thickness of the spandrel plate (0.375 inch).  
 This results in the following bearing capacity of a single bolt  
  Ru = Lc t Fu = 1.3125 x 0.375 x 90 = 44.3 kips                                               (B-6)  
 This is well below the single shear capacity of the bolt, which is  
  Fv As = 0.62 x 120 x 1.18 x 0.6013 = 52.8 kips                                              (B-7)  
 Hence, the failure mode observed in Figure B-5 is consistent with the predicted capacity.  
 
 
 
B.4.3 Floor truss seated end connection at spandrel beam and core  
 The floor system supported by 29-inch-deep prefabricated steel trusses consisted of 4 
inches of lightweight concrete fill on a 1-1/2-inch corrugated deck that ran parallel with the truss 
(PATH-NYNJ 1976). As noted in the introduction, alternate truss supports had two joists attached 
to the seat connection.  
 Figure B-8 shows the end of the top chords that were connected to every other exterior 
column/ spandrel beam and the core support channel beams. The top chords were supported on 
bearing seats at each end of the two trusses. At the exterior column/spandrel beam, a gusset plate 
was groove-welded to the spandrel face and fillet-welded to the top chord angles. At the bearing 
seat, two 5/8-inch A325 bolts in 3/4-inch x 1-1/4-inch slotted holes connected the trusses' top 
chords to the bearing seat with a single bolt in the exterior angle of each truss. The lower chord was 
attached to the exterior column/spandrel beam with a visco-elastic damping unit connected to a 
small seat with two 1-inch A490 bolts that provided a slip-resistant connection. The damping unit 
had a capacity of about 5 kips.  
 At the core, the top chords were supported by bearing seats with two vertical stiffeners. 
Two 5/8-inch A325 bolts were installed in 3/4-inch x 1-3/4-inch slotted holes in the seat plate and 
standard holes in the top chord outside angles.  
 Figure B-9 shows several of the failure modes of the truss connections to the chord 
bearing seat and spandrel beam. The gusset plate welded to the spandrel beam and the top chord 
failed by tensile fracture of the plate. The gusset plate connection was primarily resisting the floor 
diaphragm support to the column. After fracture, the slotted holes in the seat would allow rigid 
body motion of the trusses until the 5/8-inch bolts came into bearing. That resulted in partial 
fracture in the seat of the fillet welds attaching the fill plate to the spandrel beam. The seat angle 
welded connection to the fill plate remained intact as this separation occurred and final block shear 
failure developed in the outstanding angle leg at the two slotted bolt holes.  
 The capacity of the 3/8-inch x 4-inch A36 steel gusset plate can be estimated as:  
  Ru = Ag Fu = (1.5 inches2) (60 ksi) = 90 kips                                                  (B-8)  
  Ru = 2Lc t Fu = 2(1 inch)(0.375 inch)(60 ksi) = 45 kips                                 (B-9)  
 The shear capacity of the two 5/8-inch A325 bolts is  
  2 Fv Ax = 2 x 0.62 x120 x 1.18 x 0.307 = 53.9 kips                                      (B-10)  
 The block shear rupture strength provided in Chapter J of the AISC LRFD specification 
(Fisher, et al. 1978) can be used to assess the tensile force that separated the floor joist from the 
bearing seat  
The bearing capacity of the two 5/8-inch bolts connecting the top chord angles to the seat  
angle is  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-8  Typical truss top chord connections to column/spandrel beam and to the core beam.  
  
  Ru = 0.6 Fu Anv + Fu Ant                                                                                 (B-11)  
 Where Anv is the net shear area = 0.375 inch x 1.5 inches = 0.5632 inch2.  
 The net tension area Ant = Anv. Hence, assuming an average tensile strength for A36 steel 
of Fu = 60 ksi results in a maximum resisting force  
  Ru = 2[0.6 (60)(0.563) + 60 (0.563)] = 108 kips                                           (B-12)  
 It is probable that, once the 3/8-inch gusset plate fractures, the next lower bound resistance 
is provided by the bearing capacity of the two 5/8-inch bolts on the beam seat angle. This failure  
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also tore off the ends of the angle even though the tensile capacity of those segments was predicted 
to be higher.  
 It should also be noted that each truss top chord provided a horizontal diagonal plate brace 
(1-1/2 inches x 1/2 inch) to the two adjacent columns. These members were welded to welded 
bracket plates on each adjacent column/spandrel member, as illustrated in Figure B-10. In this case,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A)Visco-elastic damper angles bolted 
to spandrel plate 
Figure B-9   (B) Failed bearing seat connection. 
Figure B-10   (A)Bracket plate welded to the 
column/spandrel plate welded 
to the failed bracket. 
(B) Horizontal plate brace with shear 
connectors 
it would appear that the diagonal plate braces fractured on their gross section or tore the bracket 
plate. The component of ultimate strength of the two diagonal plate braces normal to the 
column/spandrel member is about 85 percent of the tensile capacity of braces, which would be 76 
kips.  
 Many of the bearing seat brackets and the damper angle connections on the 
column/spandrel beam plate were completely sheared off. Only the weld segments remained on face 
of the column/spandrel beam plate (Figure B-11). This mode of failure appears to be due to 
excessive vertical overloads on the floor system. This is in contrast with the failure mode exhibited 
in Figure B-9 where the bearing seat bracket has pulled away from the column/spandrel plate, after 
fracture of the top chord gusset plate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-11 shear failure of floor truss connections from column/spandrel plate.  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
